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ABSTRACT
This research interrogates potential futures for long-distance intercity rail transportation in
the United States in the context of possible energy resource constraints. Three epistemically-
distinctive analytical frameworks are used in order to provide a more rigorous and synthetic
perspective than would be possible with the assumption of passenger rail as an ontological
unity. The first chapter uses Actor-Network Theory to analyze the evolution of long-distance
passenger rail in the United States as a sociotechnical network. The second chapter is a crit-
ical examination of the concept of energy intensty and the use of rail’s purported energy
intensity advantage over other transport modes as a basis for projecting increased long-
distance passenger rail travel. The final chapter presents a systems dynamics simulation of
potential futures for intercity passenger rail in the United States. The volume and spatial
dispersion of future long-distance locomobility will likely be contingent on the nature of the
sociotechnical transition to renewability. Politically and materially, a persistence of auto-
mobility and aeromobility would likely leave little demand for locomobility outside of recre-
ational uses and local/regional systems that facilitate capitalist exploitation of concentrated
urban spaces. Conversely, any severe material and energetic constraints that significantly re-
duce the viability of automobility and aeromobility would also likely leave the US incapable
of operating and maintaining (much less expanding) a robust long-distance passenger rail
system as a decline in mass capitalist industrialization takes with it the iconic transportation
mode associated with modernity’s advent.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
An oft-repeated assertion is that as fossil fuels become less plentiful and more expensive, the
existing dominant fossil-fuel-dependent transport modes of automobiles and airplanes may
become less viable, leading passenger rail to assume a more important role reminiscent of
the role it had in the early 20th century. This assertion is common in popular literature on
both railroads and sustainability, but is generally presented based on nostalgia, intuition,
and / or aspiration rather than as the conclusion of a detailed, rigorous argument.
The question then becomes to what extent and under what circumstances that assertion can
be said to be true. Because this is an assertion about the future, no positive statements of
truth can be made until the future has become the past and is available as an object for
study. However, it is possible to unpack and problematize the core assertion so that the
underlying assumptions can be evaluated and the future implications of those assumptions
can be posited.
While the core assertion seems superficially simple, deeper consideration soon reveals that
the tentacles of mobility extend into almost all facets of daily life: economic, political,
technological, aesthetic, geospatial, etc., leading to an infinite regression of interconnections.
Therefore, there are limits to how far an unpacking can go and still result in some meaningful
understanding of the phenomena under investigation.
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Toward that end, this project is bounded to an investigation of long-distance passenger
rail transportation in the United States, with a core question of what the potential effects of
future energy constraints might be on that system. While rail transportation at smaller scales
(streetcar, light-rail, subway, regional/commuter), at higher speeds, or in other countries has
been studied quite extensively, conventional long-distance rail in the United States has been
much-less-closely investigated within scholarly literature. This presents an opportunity for a
study of long-distance passenger transportation to make a novel contribution to the literature
and meaningfully contribute to the discourse surrounding future energy transitions.
A further challenge then becomes how to decompose the problem in a way that involves a
meaningful level of rigor while still providing broad, comprehensible insight into the potential
future of the system. While a conventional approach might be to focus on a specific geography
(such as the Midwest) or a specific aspect of passenger rail (such as economics), such a focus
would provide only limited insight into the functioning of the national system as a whole.
To rectify that situation, this project decomposes the problem into three separate episte-
mologies and temporal periods. The hope is that the epistemic division will provide a richer
understanding than would be possible with a more unified approach, while the temporal
division provides a unifying narrative arc. This division also has a practical purpose in
cleanly dividing the project into independent papers that can stand on their own as articles
in separate academic journals.
The first paper (chapter three) focuses on the past and uses actor-network theory as a qualita-
tive, postmodern analytical technique. This methodology was chosen because actor-network
theory provides a means to consider the historical and semiotic issues often ignored by the
positivist methodologies that dominate contemporary transportation analysis. While not
providing definitive analysis or positive prediction about the future, this analysis aggres-
sively addresses both the social and technical aspects of passenger rail in a way that offers
a perspective distinct from scholarly research that separates the social and technical worlds
into isolated statistical reductions, and from the vast body of popular rail literature that
fetishizes the material and social aspects of historical rail transportation and does not aspire
to provide theoretical understanding.
In this analysis, long-distance passenger rail transportation can be said to have persisted
in the US because of the material, discursive and strategic strength of the actor-networks
associated with that mode. This stability has been both positive and negative, resulting
in an equilibrium that has both prevented dissolution and inhibited expansion. While this
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stability has the significant potential to persist in the future, such persistence could be
disrupted by transitions in other actor-networks that cause a juxtaposition in the passenger
rail actor-network. Such a destabilization could be the result of significant reductions in
the quantity of energy available after the transition to renewability, or a consequence of the
inability of the existing mobility actor-networks to adapt to renewable energy sources that
differ qualitatively from the dense liquid hydrocarbons essential to current operation.
The second paper (chapter four) focuses on the present with a critical meta-review of the
literature on comparative modal energy intensity across different transportation modes. Fun-
damental to the assertion that long-distance passenger rail might assume a more important
role in an energy constrained future is the assumption that passenger rail is less energy-
intensive than automobiles or airplanes.
While positive assertions of an energy intensity advantage for passenger rail can be defended
with quantitative evidence, a critical look at those numbers reveals layers of value-laden
assumptions hidden under the rigorous quantitative veneer. These hidden assumptions give
ample opportunity for subjective value judgments to hide conscious or unconscious biases
toward or against particular transportation modes. The critique in this report reflects an
epistemology of critical realism that focuses the energetic and material reality of trans-
portation (realism), but also exposes the problems (critical) with making positive universal
reduction of those phenomena into a single variable.
Even using existing statistical reductions, the energy advantage of passenger rail is minimal.
Ground transportation modes seem to converge on a fundamental minimal amount of energy
needed to move a particular amount of mass a specified distance. Different modes add to their
energy intensity by providing differing increments of speed, availability, flexibility, circuity,
comfort and safety. The appropriateness and cost of a particular mode for a particular
journey is therefore based on the subjective value of these distinctive qualities within the
context of individual needs, and the societal norms codified in customs, regulations and
spatial structures. When qualitative issues are considered, it can be questioned whether any
assertion of current universal energy advantage has anything more than discursive marketing
value. However, opening the discourse to include the qualitative also exposes the energetic
strength of rail in the ability to use renewable electricity for motive power, and the potential
for rail to facilitate denser, more-energy-efficient spatial arrangements and practices.
The third paper (chapter five) focuses on the future with a systems dynamics simulation
where relationships between economy, energy and mobility are quantified in a positivist
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methodology that permits mathematical computation of logical conclusions based on the
input assumptions. The simulation also reflects a structuralist ontology with coefficients
based on correlations from historical data that are presumed to reflect the deep structures
that will influence the future of long-distance passenger rail in the United States. Coefficients
are also provided that can be varied to reflect different energy transition scenarios and the
socio-technical adaptability of different transportation modes to those transitions.
The outputs of the simulation indicate that in the absence of any significant, prolonged
energy shock, passenger rail can be presumed to continue to exist in a policy stalemate
as a multi-scaled mode that is a hybrid of subsidized mobility and kinetic recreation. If
significant energy constraints arise but are not overwhelming, spatial contention for private
rail infrastructure with increasingly-important rail freight will likely be an impediment to
expansion of passenger rail availability and accessibility, and may pose an existential threat to
national service in the worst-case conditions. Even if energy constraints become significant,
the dominance of automobility in the built spatial structure of the United States should give
automobility persistence as long as the technology is even modestly affordable. And since
rail systems are as dependent on modern industrial processes as automobiles and airplanes,
in the most energy-constrained scenarios, capital, public subsidy, and essential materials may
not be available to maintain rail infrastructure outside of spatially-constrained corridors.
The broad agenda of this project is to unpack the layers of influences and meanings em-
bodied in US passenger rail rather than to make positive predictions or firm reductionist
conclusions. Accordingly, the contribution of this project to the academic literature will be
a structured problematization of assertions about the potential for increased use of long-
distance passenger rail in a future world of constrained energy resources.
The first paper problematizes the reductionist and nominally apolitical literature on long-
distance passenger rail (both popular and academic) by offering a postmodern view of long-
distance passenger rail as a sociotechnical actor-network that is codified using the novel
term locomobility - which is compatible with the related terms automobility and aeromo-
bility in the mobilities literature. The second paper problematizes the academic project of
energy intensity analysis by critically uncovering the value-laden assumptions that have been
largely hidden in empirical (and nominally objective) academic, governmental and corporate
literature over the past half century. The third paper then uses the positivist methodol-
ogy of systems dynamics to synthesize the logical implications of the first two papers into
a parametric model that, like its ancestor World 3, problematizes both cornucopian and
catastrophist assertions about the future as a foundation for vigorous scholarly debate.
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The future is, of course, unknown and unknowable with any level of certainty. But the
fact that the analysis from these three different epistemologies converge on similar material
outcomes hints that further assertions based on these understandings may be more convincing
those based on a more constrained perspective. By offering these three explorations into the
future, this research aims to both inform current policy discussions and provide a context for
further research that can aid in the process of making the difficult individual and collective
choices that will be associated with the transition to the post-fossil-fuel era.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Railroads are complex, long-lived assets that require the amassing of large amounts of physi-
cal resources, economic capital, and political power for construction and operation. Accord-
ingly, strategic thinking about the future of trains has been a rich subject for authors since
the advent of the technology in the early 19th century. But as with most writing about the
future, these works often say more about the time in in which they were written than the
future that might actually occur.
In a domain dominated by engineers with a focus on solving problems, the future is often seen
as the outcome of agency in a problematized present rather than a structural inevitability.
The epistemology is usually a normative one about what should happen rather than a positive
one about what actually will happen. This conception of the future also makes the body of
literature on the future of railroads reflective of the modal life cycle (Garrison and Levinson
2006, 46-123) and, to some extent, the broader societal issues of the day.
The following bodies of literature are summarized as background for the analysis that follows:
the history of passenger railroads in the US as it relates to the state of the current system, the
formation of Amtrak, analysis and critiques of Amtrak, the energy intensity of passenger rail,
high-speed rail, transportation energy transitions, and the sub-discipline of futures studies.
2.1 Pre-Amtrak Railroad Futures
Following the lead of the British, small tramway operations for moving heavy items over
short distances began to emerge in the United States in the 1820s. The country’s first
rail passenger common carrier, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was chartered in 1827
and began regular horse-drawn service in May of 1830. The South Carolina Canal and
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Transportation Company began the country’s first locomotive-hauled passenger service in
December of 1830 (Schafer 2001, 10-15; Stover 1970, 7-11).
Construction and technical advances boomed during the 1840s and by the end of the decade
there were around 3,000 miles of track in the United States being operated with vehicles
that began to resemble mature passenger trains. However, much of the country’s mileage was
made of disconnected segments operated by independent carriers and often using differing rail
gauges that prevented interoperability. Accordingly, rail travel over long distances during
this early period of rail development often involved intermediate transfers with road or
water modes. This began to be ameliorated in the 1840s with the construction of trunk
lines, although, depending on origin and destination, long-distance rail travel often involved
transfer between multiple carriers well into the 20th century (Stover 1999, 12-19).
In this mid-19th century period of system deployment, works like Thomas Keefer’s 1849
[1972] Philosophy of Railroads and Henry Carey’s 1855 The Present Situation And Future
Prospects of American Railroads breathlessly promoted the enormous potential from rail
system expansion. The railroad was an integral component of the Euro-American expansion
across the North American continent in the 19th century and rail transportation remains
a fundamental component of the modernist project. Wolfgang Schivelbush’s 1977 oft-cited
The Railway Journey elucidates in extensive detail the role of railroads in 19th century
transformation of Western conceptions of time and space, a sentiment echoed by Harvey
(1990). At the global scale, Halford Mackinder’s 1904 oft-noted The Geographical Pivot
of History, saw railroads as the unifying technology that would centralize global power
geographically in the Eastern Europe heartland, making the future determined by control of
that heartland.
As the American rail network reached maturity in the late 19th and early 20th century, an
array of interlocking economic, regulatory and service issues in the national rail system were
lumped under the moniker The Railroad Problem, which culminated in a breakdown of the
system and nationalization in World War I. Hence, the future-oriented writing of the time
focuses on policy and technical proposals for ameliorating that problem (e.g. Babson 1914;
Hungerford 1917; Lovett 1919; Armstrong 1920; Martin 1971).
The ultimate solution to the Railroad Problem proved to be the deployment of alternative
networks in the form of highway and air transportation. These new decentralized networks
enabled the vast postwar spatial decentralization that finally resolved the capitalist crisis of
the Great Depression (Harvey 2001).
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The peak of rail’s dominance of passenger travel in the US occurred around the end of the
First World War (United States Bureau of the Census 1975, Series Q 284-312). Mode shift
to highway and then air is commonly cited as the cause of this decline (for examples, see
Hilton 1980, 2; Wilner 1994, 16; Phillips 2011, 23), with the aspirational implication that
reversal of this proximate cause would also reverse the fortunes of passenger rail.
However, closer consideration of modal traffic volumes shows that the automobile was do-
ing more than taking short-distance traffic from the railroads in a zero-sum game. The
automobile, truck and bus were permitting exploitation of space in a way that railroads
did not, and therefore inducing new levels of traffic. While statistics for decentralized (and
largely untracked) automobility are less reliable and consistent than those for centralized
(and highly-regulated) locomobility and aeromobility, the Model T was first introduced in
1908 (Casey 2008) and the process of American automobilization was well underway, and
may have been equivalent in passenger-miles to locomobility, by the time rail passenger
volumes peaked around 1920.
Although US commercial air passenger service began in 1914 (Glines 1997) and accelerated
in the 1920s, passenger rail still dominated long-distance common-carrier transportation into
the middle of the 20th century (Hilton 1980, 2). The mode shift of long-distance domestic
travel to air did not clearly begin to take effect until after the technological developments of
the Second World War and the socioeconomic developments of the postwar period. Although
the mode shift from locomobility to aeromobility is graphically more precipitous than the
shift to automobility, as with the shift to automobility the volume statistics imply a broader
transformation in long-distance mobility rather than simply a zero-sum shift.
The implications of these statistics is that a future “return” to rail would be accompanied
by a significant detransformation of mobility practices and the spaces that were produced by
those practices. When rail was the only way to get around, Americans didn’t move around
very much. In a rail-based future, Americans might not move around as much as they have
for the past century.
Following a spike in rail passenger volumes during deprivations of the Second World War
fueled by restrictions on automobility and vast troop movements, the emerging new transport
networks, combined with vestigial and discriminatory public policy transformed the chronic
Railroad Problem increasingly into an acute existential crisis for passenger rail. The 1958
Transportation Act was a response to strains in the rail industry resulting from competition
with other modes and the decreasing economic viability of mandated passenger rail service.
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Notably, the act took control over discontinuance of passenger rail services away from the
states and gave it to the federal Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which precipitated
an increasing rate of dissolution of the American passenger rail network (Hilton 1969).
A 1958 report by ICC examiner Henry Hosmer (United States Interstate Commerce Com-
mission 1958), predicted that most American passenger rail service would be gone by 1970.
Despite these predictions and clear secular trends, passenger rail retained a strong allegiance
in some sectors of the government and society. In 1962, Rhode Island Democratic Senator
Claiborne Pell gave a Senate speech advocating Federal investment in high-speed service in
the Northeast Corridor, and his speech was codified into the bookMegalopolis Unbound (Pell
1966). The advent of the Japanese Shinkansen high-speed line in 1964 (Hood 2006) was a
“Sputnik moment” that resulted in the passage of Pell’s High Speed Ground Transportation
Act of 1965 and the debut of the successful Metroliner service (Klein 1993; Perl 2002, 134-
146). Numerous speakers at a 1967 Chicago conference on high-speed rail extolled the virtues
of rail for congestion relief while situating the future of intercity service as optimal for
medium-distance trips of 100 - 600 miles - firmly between the optimal parameters of short-
distance auto and long-distance air transport (Hay 1967; Minn 2012). Historian John Stover
(1970) in his popular work The Life and Decline of the American Railroad also saw the
future of American passenger rail primarily as government-run commuter lines, although he
spoke approvingly of Pell’s Megalopolis Unbound vision in the abstract.
2.2 Amtrak
Proposals within Congress for nationalizing intercity passenger operations had been discussed
at least as far back as the 1961 Doyle Committee Report (The United States Congress 1961,
326). Thoms (1972) attributes the development of the “Railpax” idea to Harvard Business
School professor Paul W. Cherington. There are numerous accounts of the political machina-
tions leading from that idea to the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (Public Law 91-518),
with some notable ones being Hilton (1980); Tobey (1986); Nice (1998); Phillips (2011). The
culmination of that process was the effective nationalization of American intercity passenger
rail transportation on 1 May 1971 as the government-owned, nominally for-profit National
Passenger Railroad Corporation - known more commonly by its marketing name, Amtrak.
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Many of Amtrak’s lines were initially operated by their legacy carriers under contract to
Amtrak and a handful of private lines continued to operate independently through the 1970s
(Wilner 1994, 57). The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific continued a pair of state-subsidized
trains in Illinois and Iowa through 1978 before finally succumbing to bankruptcy and cesing
operations in 1980 (Sanders 2011; Glischinski 2007, 77). The Southern Railway continued
their Southern Crescent service from New York to New Orleans before ceding the operations
to Amtrak in 1979 (Cox 2011, 376). Following failed negotiations during Amtrak’s formation,
the Denver and Rio Grande Western continued their scenic and popular (but money-losing)
Zephyr service through the Rockies until ceding the operations to Amtrak in 1983 (Griffin
2003, 73). The Georgia Railroad continued to operate an anachronistic and lightly-used mixed
passenger/freight service for tax purposes until abandonment in 1983 (O’Toole 2011a).
Amtrak has been the subject of a significant amount of writing since its advent. Despite
occasional attempts to project a dispassionate voice, these works tend to be advocatory in
nature and reflect the contradictory perspectives about the corporation’s purpose and value
that have been present since its founding. Even the supportive texts are tempered by the
admissions of the deficiencies in service relative to the romanticized imaginings of both rail
fans and casual users.
A steady stream of descriptive, historically-oriented, and generally supportive books have
been published since Amtrak’s advent, often with glossy photos designed to appeal to the
railfan community:
• Harold A. Edmonson (1972) Journey To Amtrak: The Year History Rode The Passen-
ger Train
• William E. Thoms (1973) Reprieve For the Iron Horse: The Amtrak Experiment - Its
Predecessors and Prospects (summarized in Thoms 1972)
• Fred W. Frailey (1977) Zephyrs, Chiefs and Other Orphans: The First Five Years of
Amtrak
• Patrick Dorin (1979) Amtrak Trains and Travel
• Karl R. Zimmermann (1981) Amtrak at Milepost 10
• Bruce Goldberg (1981) Amtrak: The First Decade
• Rodger Bradley (1985) Amtrak: The US National Railroad Passenger Corporation
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• Mike Schafer (1991) All Aboard Amtrak: 1971–1991
• Frank N. Wilner (1994) The Amtrak Story
• Samuel P. Goodwin (2002) Amtrak: Background and Bibliography
• Brian Solomon (2004) Amtrak
• Craig Sanders (2006) Amtrak in the Heartland
• Amtrak Amtrak (2011) Amtrak: An American Story
• John A. Fostik (2012) Amtrak Across America: An Illustrated History
Books written from a critical perspective tend to be a bit more substantive, deemphasizing
photography and fetishization, and relying on quantitative analysis and / or detailed policy
discussion:
• Economist George Hilton’s (1980) Amtrak : the National Railroad Passenger Corpora-
tion is an oft-cited and richly-detailed monograph articulating still-relevant neoclassical
economic explanations for the “failure” of Amtrak and critiquing the arguments used
by Amtrak supporters.
• Political scientist R. Kent Weaver (1985) in The Politics of Industrial Change: Railway
Policy in North America. analyzed Amtrak and Conrail in relation to political theory
about industrial change.
• Political scientist David Nice’s (1998) Amtrak: The History and Politics of a National
Railroad is an obscure but substantive and somewhat sympathetic analysis that is
largely synthesized from a 15-year series of journal articles.
• Business consultant, passenger rail advocate and vociferous Amtrak critic Joseph Vranich
has written a trio of books that are variations on a theme that privatization is a better
alternative to the highly-politicized and ossified Amtrak structure: Supertrains: So-
lutions To America’s Transportation Gridlock (1991), Derailed : What Went Wrong
And What To Do About America’s Passenger Trains (1997), and End Of The Line :
The Failure of Amtrak Reform and the Future of America’s Passenger Trains (2004).
• Political scientist Anthony Perl (2002) presented a detailed analysis of existing and
proposed public policy affecting both the American and Canadian intercity rail systems
in New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First Century
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• Journalist James McCommons (2009) spent a year riding Amtrak and talking to a
variety of policymakers, railroad managers, and passenger rail advocates, a venture he
summarized in Waiting on a Train: The Embattled Future of Passenger Rail Service -
A Year Spent Riding Across America
Amtrak releases regular annual reports, monthly performance reports, and business plans,
as well as sporadic assessments and feasibility studies, the most recent of which are freely
available on their website, www.amtrak.com. The reliability of numbers reported by Amtrak
has been questioned over the years (USDOT Office of the Inspector General 2013; Phillips
2013), and the fuzziness of Amtrak’s accounting might be traceable back to the deception
that has been essential to countering existential threat since the company’s conception.
Amtrak has been the subject of a significant number of reports and studies by different
entities within both the administrative and legislative branches. Most of these studies are
rooted in neoclassical economics and are therefore highly critical of Amtrak based upon the
original sin of Amtrak’s (mis-)conception as a for-profit corporation. Some notable examples
include:
• The Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-421) mandated a total (and con-
troversial) reassessment of Amtrak’s routes, which resulted in a pair of reports from
the United States Department of Transportation (1978, 1979). While acknowledging an
increase in ridership due to the OPEC-induced oil price shocks, the future was seen as
high-speed rail. The response to these reports included discontinuance of a number of
long-distance trains, but, ironically, a return to approximately the same route mileage
that Amtrak had at its inception. The Act also acknowledged the obvious, redesignat-
ing the company from a “for profit corporation” to one “operated and managed as a
for profit corporation” (Tobey 1986, 265; United States Department of Transportation
1979).
• At the direction of the Congressionally-formed National Transportation Policy Study
Commission, economist Francis P. Mulvey (1978, 1979) produced a report that con-
cluded that the original legislation creating Amtrak presented conflicting and unrealis-
tic goals, that Amtrak contributed little to the country’s transportation goals outside
of the Northeast Corridor, and that long-distance routes should be eliminated.
• A Congressional Budget Office report (Ferris 1982) responded to proposed Amtrak
subsidy reductions in the Reagan administration’s proposed budgets with a conclusion
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that the service offered little advantage in terms of energy or transportation security.
With the acknowledgement that transportation subsidies in general benefit the aﬄu-
ent more than the poor, and that the recreational and historic value of Amtrak was
unquantifiable, selective service reductions were seen at the best way to reduce the Am-
trak subsidy where “the largest savings could be achieved by eliminating or reducing
long-distance service, since these routes account for the largest proportion of Amtrak’s
estimated avoidable loss.”
• Money (1984) analyzed the failure of initiatives to implement magnetic-levitation tech-
nology in the Northeast Corridor. Among other findings, Money concluded that
economists are generally not sympathetic to arguments favoring technology where suc-
cess depends on induced demand, and that innovative solutions will generally not be
adopted where problems can be solved with existing technology.
• In the wake of increasing debt caused by underfunding during the Reagan and Bush
I administrations, a United States Government Accountability Office (1995) report
concluded that increasing debt load, deferred maintenance and reduced staffing were
unsustainable and that the one or more of the following options would be necessary:
increased federal funding (which would be politcally difficult), privatization (which
would likely be impractical), state support of some routes, and/or significant route
reduction.
• The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997 (ARAA, Public Law 105-134),
among numerous other actions, mandated the creation of an Amtrak Reform Council
(2002) to “evaluate Amtrak’s performance; and... make recommendations for achiev-
ing further cost containment and productivity improvements, and financial reforms.”
Their final report recommended dividing the company in two (with one company op-
erating the heavily-trafficked Northeast Corridor and the other operating the rest of
the much more financially dependent system) and then privatizing the operations with
performance-based contracts. These recommendations were ignored. Council member
James Coston (2001) defended his vote against the findings by decrying the absurdity
of the exercise and stating that, “Profitability in passenger transportation is a myth.
Everybody is subsidized. Congress needs to get over it.”
• Also in response to the ARAA, the Federal Railroad Administration (1998) evaluated
the scenarios for privatization of Amtrak and concluded that none had the “potential
for significant reductions in Federal financial committments,” and that the elimination
of federal subsidy would immediately end intercity rail passenger service.
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• A report by the USDOT Office of the Inspector General (2002) indicated that Amtrak
would be unable to meet the 2002 self-sufficiency deadline stipulated in the ARRA,
and that the short-term financial fixes being used by Amtrak management to survive
Congressional underfunding were cannibalizing the railroad’s assets and compromising
the future of intercity passenger rail.
• A report for the Congressional Budget Office (Pinkston 2003) considered long-distance
service to be rail’s comparative weakness. Four possible options were presented for
Amtrak: (1) Eliminate Federal subsidy and provide for an orderly shutdown of service
and/or devolution to states; (2) Discontinue long-distance trains and focus investment
on corridors; (3) Maintain long-distance and upgrade investment in corridors; and (4)
Massive reinvestment in both long-distance and corridors.
• A report for the Congressional Research Service (Frittelli and Kirk 2004) that nom-
inally focused on the “political and social aspects of Federal intercity passenger rail
policy” asserted that “Amtrak is the result of nostalgia: a romantic attachment to pas-
senger trains,” and that, “A political stalemate over Amtrak has continued for over 30
years, partly because of a discrepancy that exists between the economic geography that
supports a competitive passenger rail service and the political geography necessary to
support its high cost structure.”
• Amtrak (2007) published Critical Link, a 26-page summary touting its strengths and
benefits: highway and airport congestion mitigation, national and regional economic
development, additional modal choice, energy and environmental benefits, safe trans-
port, international competitiveness, return on federal investment comparable to other
modes, and improved business operating environment.
• The Passenger Rail Working Group (2007), mandated by SAFETEA-LU (Public Law
109-59) to study high-speed rail (HSR), produced a Vision for the Future final report
that recommended a wish-list corridor-based national network built around the Re-
gional Plan Association (2006) conception of megaregions. Progress was suggested in
three phases through 2050, with combination of shared and dedicated ROW and a final
price tag of $357 billion (2007 dollars). While recommending preservation of existing
long-distance lines, investment would be targeted at corridor lines within megaregions
that would overlap in some cases to provide connectivity between megaregions.
• The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) (Public Law
110-432, Division B) that reauthorized Amtrak and the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (ARRA - Public Law 111-5) appropriated $8 billion primarily for projects
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that could in some way be considered high-speed rail. The result was a flurry of
studies and reports (Peterman, Frittelli, and Mallett 2009; United States Government
Accountability Office 2009b; Amtrak 2010; United States Government Accountability
Office 2009c; Federal Railroad Administration 2012, among others).
Industry associations and advocacy groups have been the source for a number of descriptive
reports about Amtrak that are supportive, or at least sympathetic.
• Ewing and Gallagher (2002) prepared an extensive summative report on Intercity
Passenger Rail Transportation for the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials. Although the focus was on the potential for corridor ser-
vice, long-distance (greater than 500 miles) service is viewed as serving four unique
roles: national connectivity, essential service to communities with limited air/bus ac-
cess, emergency redundancy, and express mail. Most long-distance trains also function
as corridor trains for some part of their journey. The absence of ridership growth in
the long-distance sector is attributed to capacity reductions (discontinued routes) and
capacity limitations during periods of peak demand (holidays and summer vacation
seasons).
• Hansen (2002) wrote a summative review for Congressional Quarterly of the history
of Amtrak and the political and economic issues surrounding its continued existence.
• The advocacy group National Association of Railroad Passengers (2013) authored Long
Distance Trains: A Foundation for National Mobility that summarizes much of the
current discourse used by advocates in support of long-distance rail travel. The report
attributes a rediscovery of trains to the increasing difficulty and expense of driving and
flying. Advantages of long-distance rail include personal use of travel time, ability to
efficiently serve intermediate stops in small-/medium-sized towns, fuel efficiency, and
overall cost effectiveness.
Private businesses and conservative think tanks over the life of Amtrak have also been quite
active in producing reports highly critical of Amtrak:
• In an early such report prepared by anonymous authors and sponsored by Continen-
tal Trailways (1975), Amtrak was condemned as not having “approached, much less
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achieved, the purposes that prompted its establishment.” Proposals centered around
curtailing subsidies that placed bus travel at a competitive disadvantage to subsidized
Amtrak service.
• In celebration of Amtrak’s 25-year anniversary, Love, Cox, and Moore (1996) from the
libertarian Cato Institute released a report that concluded: Amtrak makes a negligible
contribution to the nation’s transportation system; Amtrak’s typical riders are not low-
income; Amtrak has virtually no impact on reducing traffic congestion, pollution, or
energy use; and Amtrak is the most highly subsidized form of intercity transportation.
• The Cato Institute’s Randal O’Toole (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011b) is a prolific writer
whose books and reports consistently promote increased public highway spending but
abandonment of many other publicly-funded infrastructure projects, like rail transit.
Of Amtrak, O’Toole (2012, 1) concluded, “The only real solution for Amtrak is privati-
zation. Private operators would enjoy substantial cost savings over Amtrak and would
be free to serve those routes that attract the most passengers rather than the ones that
are backed by the most political muscle. Private railroads would also be more likely to
develop innovations that will attract new riders.”
• The nominally-centrist Brookings Institution (Puentes, Tomer, and Kane 2013) in A
New Alignment: Strengthening America’s Commitment to Passenger Rail echoes an
increasingly dominant discourse about the strongest growth (and, therefore, the future)
of American passenger rail in corridors (less than 400 miles). The vision is framed
as “operational efficiency versus geographic equity,” but clearly favors the former in
recommending the devolution of authority and funding for long-distance lines from the
Federal to the State level.
Peer-reviewed research has looked at Amtrak from a variety of disciplinary perspectives:
• Civil engineers James Sloss and James T. Kneafsey (1977) performed statistical analysis
comparing demand for intercity rail travel between Britain and the US Northeast Cor-
ridor based on state-collected origin-destination ridership data. The study attempted
to explain the greater travel share for rail in Britain despite similar geographic, demo-
graphic and economic conditions. In both countries, speed elasticity was found to be
greater than fare elasticity, with the conclusion that increased speed in the Northeast
Corridor might reduce some of the disparity between the two countries.
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• Attorney Lawrence E. Tobey (1986) created an extensive review of the evolution of
Amtrak, a meta-review of studies of Amtrak’s performance, and the likely effects of its
dissolusion. Tobey concludes that “prior studies have underestimated both Amtrak’s
contribution to the social and economic goals set by Congress and its ability to reduce
the need for federal subsidies.”
• Political economist David P. Baron (1990) analyzed the persistence of Amtrak from
the framework of distributive politics and concluded that, “The continued existence
of a nationwide, intercity passenger rail network thus rests on the political support
derived from the distributive consequences it generates.”
• Economist Steven A. Morrison (1990) used a multinomial logit demand model to quan-
tify traveler benefit with and without Amtrak. While coming to the standard conclu-
sion that benefit to travelers on long-distance routes fell short of the subsidy required for
such service, aggregation of the highly beneficial Northeast Corridor with the broader
network makes systemwide benefits positive in light of the legal mandate to provide a
basic national rail passenger system.
• Economist William P. O’Dea (1991) analyzed and rejected the argument that indirect
subsidies to bus and air distorted economic comparisons with directly subsidized rail,
and concluded that “the high cost of providing its right-of-way and the relatively
modest level of common carrier traffic in most travel corridors in the United States
combine to severely limit the train’s range of possible applications.”
• Logistics specialists Joe B. Hanna and John T. Drea (1998) used travel surveys and a
logit model to conclude that station accessibility, access to schedules, ability to work
in-transit, and network scope were significant determinants of decision to take Am-
trak. Additional qualitative analysis reinforced the importance of Amtrak maintaining
strength in cost, comfort, and frequency to be competitive.
• Economist Frank Wilner (2005) responded to Bush administration proposals for dis-
mantling Amtrak by offering a brief proposal to return Amtrak lines to private railroad
control (with federal subsidy) as a strategy to leverage conservative disdain of gov-
ernment ownership (but love of government subsidy to private enterprise). Attorney
James E. Coston (2005) responded in the same issue with a counterproposal that oper-
ations devolve to railroads but be controlled by a centralized (and largely anonymous)
contracting authority to “integrate the creative, operational, personnel and financial
resources needed to deliver a single product.”
17
• In looking at the overall transportation picture in the Northeast Corridor, Political
scientist Allison L. C. de Cerren˜o (2007) felt that the financial tenuousness of Amtrak
was a hindrance to high-speed rail and suggested that, “Perhaps the best hope is for
the operations in the Corridor to be split out from other national operations, as it
probably has a higher potential for profitability in the dense corridor market.”
These different strands of analysis have a tendency to focus on specific operational, political
or technical aspects of Amtrak that are within the disciplinary boundaries of the researchers.
While valuable for exposing important details, these reductionist approaches often miss the
significant effects of systemic interconnections between the elements of the larger structure of
long-distance passenger rail in the US. Chapter Three uses Actor-Network Theory to analyze
the system as a heterogeneous network, with the objective of increasing understanding of
the importance of network interconnectivity.
2.3 Energy and Rail
Amtrak’s formative first decade coincided with a pair of oil price shocks triggered by geopo-
litical events in the Middle East. The “energy crisis” increased public awareness of the
dependence of modern lifestyles on inexpensive energy sources and was the impetus behind
a significant amount of energy research in the 1970s. This research frequently framed rail-
roads as a key element of a future, energy-efficient America. During the 1970s, the Energy
Research Group at the University of Illinois under the direction of Bruce Hannon developed
a input-output matrix flow model for calculating the direct and indirect energy costs of
goods and services (Hannon 1973; Bullard and Herendeen 1975). The general result of the
research was that “most United States industries are becoming more energy-intensive and
less labor-intensive” (Hannon 1973, 146). Applying this model to analysis of the negative
energy effects of the Highway Trust Fund, Bezdek and Hannon (1974) found that (based on
the 1963 data in the model) passenger rail transport was less dollar and energy intensive,
and more labor intensive than auto transportation. Hannon et al. (1975) modeled dollar
cost, total energy and employment impacts for the three major passenger modes at different
trip lengths and found similar benefits to rail. Hannon (1974) found freight rail to be much
less energy intensive than truck transportation. Hirst (1974) used this I/O technique and
found rail transport almost three times as energy efficient as air travel, slightly more efficient
than auto travel and half as efficient as bus travel, on a BTU per passenger-mile basis.
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In 1978, the US Department of Transportation’s Reexamination of the Amtrak Route Struc-
ture noted the increase (albeit temporary) of ridership during the 1973-1974 energy crisis
and praised the response of Amtrak to that increase. However, that report also saw the
future of passenger rail in high-speed service.
Additionally, there is the need to consider Amtrak in the context of the nation’s
energy shortage. The passenger train, if it is operated well and if it carries
a reasonable number of passengers, is energy efficient. The 1973-74 fuel crisis
demonstrated that the American people will ride trains when automobile fuel is
in short supply. We probably will reach a time when supplies will be permanently
limited. In the meantime, we must work at improving the Amtrak system and its
operations, so that the American people will, when the time comes, have available
an energy-efficient alternative (United States Department of Transportation 1978,
1).
Rail transportation at different scales is commonly mentioned in popular works on sustain-
ability and energy. Numerous authors (including Kunstler 2005; Heinberg 2005, 2006; Re-
gional Plan Association 2006; Runte 2006; Winter 2006; Newton 2008; Brown 2009; MacKay
2009; Frank 2009; Newman, Beatley, and Boyer 2009; Orr 2009) have suggested that inter-
city passenger rail should play a greater role in intercity transportation as increasing fuel
prices and energy scarcity reduce the viability of the predominant auto/air transportation
paradigm.
However, there seems to be a surprisingly small body of contemporary peer-reviewed liter-
ature focusing specifically on sustainability and long-distance passenger rail transportation.
Most sustainable transportation literature (both popular and peer-reviewed) focuses on rail
in the context of more-dominant passenger modes (DeLucchi 1996; Lenzen 1999), or ad-
dresses primarily economic or political issues (Perl 2002). The energy crises of the 1970s did
spur a wide range of domestic energy-related research - including some focused on passenger
rail (e.g. Fels and Munson 1975; Fels 1976) - but energy was only one of a wide range of
issues considered in HSR research of the time (United States Department of Transportation
1973).
In 2012, Amtrak’s share of total US transportation energy usage was around 0.04% and 82%
of Amtrak’s operational energy is from diesel fuel (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2012,
Table 4-6). While Amtrak arguably has an energy intensity advantage over air and private
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auto transportation and Amtrak has had steady growth in ridership, its current contribution
to the environment as a problem or a solution is trivial.
Of greater significance may be the seemingly “inherent” charisma of the railroad (Marx
1964). While passenger rail remains an important component of mobility within certain
geographies, it has achieved a mythology and cultic devotion that, arguably, far outweighs its
present utility (Stilgoe 2007). Sustainability is an empty signifier which “derives its political
and ideological value as an important master signifier of identification” (Gunder and Hillier
2009, 135–155; Davidson 2010). Accordingly, the connection of intercity passenger rail with
sustainability might be more explicable as a translation of sustainability discourses by rail
advocates rather than a rational conclusion of analysis of the comparative energy efficiency
or environmental footprints of competing modes.
The energy intensity of long-distance passenger rail and the extensive body of research on
comparative modal energy intensity is analyzed and critically reviewed in Chapter Four.
2.4 The Need for Speed
The quest for increasing speed has been a component of technical and economic develop-
ment of the railroads since their advent, but the view of speed as key to the existential
future of intercity American passenger service can probably traced to the streamliners of the
1930s. These trains were a radical technical and stylistic leap, incorporating diesel engines,
lightweight materials and sleek modernist design that permitted some level of competitive-
ness with then-emerging air transport (Klein 1993).
Aside from the Northeast Corridor’s Metroliner and Acela services, passenger rail service
above 79 miles per hour has remained elusive in the rest of the country since the 1940s due to
technical and operational limitations as well as legal speed restrictions enacted by Congress
under pressure from the highway, trucking and automobile industries (Stilgoe 2007, 68–74).
Radical futuristic technologies touched on by noted rail researcher William W. Hay in the
mid 1960s remain as far in the future as they were a half century ago (Hay 1967).
But the elusiveness of high-speed rail in the US is not due to a lack of proposals and studies.
The United States Department of Transportation (1973) released an exhaustive High Speed
Ground Transportation Alternatives Study that examined both traditional high-speed steel
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wheel/rail technology as well as air-cushioned and magnetically-levitated proposals. The
market analysis focused on a set of HSR corridors that formed a fairly comprehensive network
in the Eastern US, with isolated corridors in California and Washington state. The future-
oriented chapter of the report focused primarily on energy concerns, proposing baseline,
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios through the year 2000. Following the imaginings of the
day, the report assumed a national transition to nuclear power with hydrogen serving as
the storage medium used directly in terrestrial vehicles. Air corridor congestion was also
anticipated, with HSR substituting for short-haul flights in dense corridors.
A decade later, following a corridor plan by the Federal Railroad Administration (1981),
the United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment (1983) released US Passenger
Rail Technologies, which reduced the ideal HSR range to 100-300 miles and considered that
for shorter distances “the use of a high-speed rail is essentially equivalent to creating a
transit system” (29). Energy considerations remained but with a more sober analysis that
“rail is an energy-efficient mode only in high-volume corridors...it will make only a small
contribution on high density routes” (9), while acknowledging that it might have value as
an electrically-powered backup “in the event of future energy crises” (57). In contrast to
more recent advocacy-based studies, the analysis in this report remains surprisingly fitted
to circumstances that persist three decades later.
In 1997 the United States Department of Transportation released High Speed Ground Trans-
portation for America, which largely kept the same corridors as the 1983 report. Energy
concerns largely subsided during the 1980s and, as would fit the prosperous economic and
conservative political tenor of the time, the studied projections of the future assumed com-
paratively stable growth in transportation demand and an “unchanged energy environment
through 2040” (United States Department of Transportation 1997, 4–3).
During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of HSR projects around the US reached differing
levels of development, although none actually resulted in any new passenger service other
than Acela in the Northeast Corridor. Cerren˜o, Evans, and Permut (2005) and Cerren˜o
and Mathur (2006) provide exhaustive detail of the numerous HSR projects explored and
proposed along with narratives of the political machinations surrounding their conception
and demise. The studies associated with these projects were generally aspirational in na-
ture, and, accordingly, suggest futures firmly in accordance with a modernist teleology of
increasing levels of ridership and robust economic impacts.
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2.5 Transportation Energy Transitions
Transportation accounts for around 27% of US energy use. In 2010 the US consumed around
7 billion barrels of oil per year, or around 22% of the world’s total consumption of around 31
billion barrels per year. Transportation accounts for around 70% of US petroleum consump-
tion and petroleum-based fuels account for around 93% of US transportation energy use
(Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012; United States Energy Information Administration 2012).
Current world oil consumption is around 31 billion barrels a year and the International
Energy Agency (2011) expects that to rise to 35 billion barrels a year by 2035. Most of that
growth is driven by a doubling of the size of the world’s automobile fleet (led by emerging
economies). Most of the additional supply is expected to come from natural gas liquids and
unconventional sources, although questions have been raised about the reliability of that
prediction (Macalister 2009).
Smil (2010b, 62) notes that concerns about the limitations of petroleum resources extend
back to the 1870s, well before broad expansion of petroleum-based fuels into almost all
transportation modes. Estimates of the ultimately recoverable resource have increased con-
sistently since then, demonstrating the difficulty of predicting discoveries and changes in
extraction technology. Nevertheless, the almost total dependence of American transporta-
tion on finite supplies of petroleum makes consideration of the limitations and alternatives
imperative.
Although the transition from fossil fuels to whatever comes after will be novel, Smil notes
that past energy transitions have been protracted affairs, reflecting the deep embedding of
energy sources in the social and spatial forms they make possible. For example, although
coal is commonly associated with the advent of industrialization and is thought of as a fuel
of the past, coal remains a dominant and growing energy source, providing around 30% of
global primary energy, including 41% of world electricity production (World Coal Association
2014).
The key characteristic of hydrocarbon vehicle fuels is the liquid state. No other technically-
extant energy storage medium comes close to liquid hydrocarbons in terms of economy,
flexibility, density or safety. Additionally, humanity has made a multi-trillion dollar invest-
ment in liquid-fuels-based machinery that is now tightly integrated into almost all aspects
of modern life. Mobility is key to material flows and spatial exploitation, which are funda-
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mental to the health of contemporary economic systems (Locklin 1972; Kumhof and Muir
2012), which are fundamental to modern life and the survival of the modernist project. Hu-
mans can and have existed without modernity, but modernity cannot exist without mobility.
If mankind wishes to preserve and expand modernity, inexpensive mobility must also be
preserved.
Aside from a small number of geologists that assert that petroleum is of purely geologic
origin (Glasby, 2006; Ragheb, 2011), it is generally accepted that petroleum has its origins
in ancient buried organic matter, is effectively captured solar energy, and is a finite resource.
It is the level of that finitude and the potential for technological adaptation that is in question
(Bridge and Wood 2010).
The potential solutions to near- and long-term energy constraints can be grouped into supply-
side and demand-side options. All solutions involve problems and trade-offs and there are
no seamless answers.
Aside from significant remaining conventional petroleum resources, vast unconventional re-
sources exist in hydrocarbons embedded tightly in shales, densely in tar sands, or deeply in
undersea methane hydrates (United States Energy Information Administration 2011; Inter-
national Energy Agency 2012). All of these resources require extensive energy and capital
investment to extract. The existing terrestrial processes require large amounts of water (often
in regions that are already water-stressed) and result in significant environmental degrada-
tion. This makes the extractors of these resources undesirable neighbors and results in polit-
ical constraints. Wells deplete more quickly, requiring continuous drilling, which makes these
resources capital-intensive and dependent upon high fuel prices. High fuel prices constrain
the fuel-dependent economy and restrict the availability of capital in a negative feedback
loop (Stevens 2010).
Commercial plants for Fischer-Tropsch transformation of plentiful non-liquid fossil sources
like natural gas and coal into liquid fuels have been in operation for decades, but these plants
operate using processes that are energetically inefficient, which impedes the economy of such
operations (Vosloo 2001). The feedstocks are still finite resources, which means this can only
be a temporary solution that represents a scraping of the “bottom of the barrel” (Monbiot
2003).
Renewable energy sources are obviously an objective, but all renewable liquid fuel sources
have significant problems. Biofuels are highly inefficient converters of sparse solar energy
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that require large amounts of land to grow, large amounts of energy to harvest, and large
amounts of energy to process. Corn ethanol may have negative energy return and is only
minimally positive at best (Patzek 2006). Biodiesel is somewhat better, but may still be
energy negative and is much more limited in potential availability (Pimentel and Patzek
2005).
All biomass resources are very limited in potential. Converting the entire annual US corn
crop to ethanol would only replace 6% of US liquid fuel demand (Pimentel, Patzek, and
Cecil 2007). Biofuels compete with food crops, the supplies of which are already stressed by
growing global demand and climate change (Boddiger 2007; Ajanovic 2011). Ethanol from
cellulosic sources has promise but still suffers from negative energy return (Patzek 2010).
Algae has vast theoretical potential, but current technology has limited economic potential
and has not been demonstrated to scale outside of the laboratory (Lundquist et al. 2010).
The practical existing deployed renewable technologies (hydro, wind, solar, geothermal) all
generate electricity, which cannot be more broadly used for transportation use without a
radical transformation of American transport infrastructure. Electricity can be used to
extract hydrogen gas from water and while liquefied hydrogen would be much too difficult
to handle for private vehicles, a German-Russian projected demonstrated the potential for
the use of liquefied hydrogen in aviation (Pohl and Malychev 1997). The US Navy has a
project to synthesize jet fuel from seawater CO2 and hydrogen using nuclear energy, but the
technology is still at the laboratory phase (Willauer et al. 2012). Nuclear power is sometimes
spoken of as renewable (or at least less finite), but social fears, prohibitive economics, lack
of a solution for the waste, and the requirement for fossil fuel to extract and process nuclear
fuel makes the nuclear future cloudy. All renewables require public subsidy because fossil
fuels even at current prices are dramatically more economic than renewables.
Given the problems with supply-side solutions, attentions must also be paid to demand-
side solutions. These solutions can be viewed from two related but distinct perspectives:
efficiency and conservation (NRC 2014). For the purposes of this document, efficiency is
defined as doing more with less, and conservation is defined as just doing less.
US auto technical efficiency has improved dramatically over the past 40 years, but most of
those efficiency gains have been plowed back into larger vehicles and increased horsepower
(Knittel 2012). Airplanes have also had dramatic improvements in efficiency (European Com-
mission 2005), with well-loaded long-haul airplanes now being more energy efficient than
single-passenger cars (Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012, 2-14). However, as with automobiles,
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these efficiency gains have also followed Jevon’s Paradox and induced demand, with efficiency
trumping conservation and being offset by growing worldwide demand for air travel (Jevons
1865; Kasarda and Lindsay 2012).
Commercial aviation has had only marginal economic viability since its advent in the 1920s
(Wong 2003) and fuel price increases over the past decade have played havoc with airline
finances (United States Government Accountability Office 2009a; Notaras 2010). Various
analysts have asserted that ubiquitous and universal aeromobility cannot persist beyond an
maximum oil price somewhere in the range of $80 to $150 per barrel in late-2000’s dollars
(Rubin 2009, 232; Kornell 2010). Above that civilian passenger aviation would presumably
be reduced to limited service available at great cost to a small group of wealthy people
(McKay 2012, among others). There are physical reasons to question how much more efficient
aviation can be made without some unknown radical technological innovation (MacKay 2009,
276), and the structures of the current aviation paradigm leave it ill-prepared for a massive
technological transition to a post-fossil-fuel world (Kivits, Charles, and Ryan 2010).
Electrified rail is in common use in rail transit and as HSR is commonly promoted for its
energy efficiency. However, the reduction of a complex phenomenon like modal energy inten-
sity to a single variable that can be universally applied in all situations is highly problematic
(chapter 4). The high capital requirement, high cost of operation and the spatial concen-
tration inherent to rail represents a dramatic break from the existing decentralized spatial
organization that has been facilitated by automobility, aeromobility and, ultimately, inex-
pensive petroleum. Thus, a move to ubiquitous and economically-viable electrified rail is
dependent on a radical transformation in spatial organization and on substantial, forward-
thinking, and risky capital investment.
Efficiency is dependent upon technical innovation, which is unpredictable. Innovation is
dependent upon capital and energy inputs to support researchers and their projects. There is
a danger that the dominant modes of thought reflect a complacency engendered by the steady
technical progress since the enlightenment that has been powered by increasing exploitation
of ancient solar energy embedded in fossil fuels.
In the absence of efficiency, the alternative is conservation, or a reduction in energy use back
to a level that can be sustained from solar and solar-derived energy. That leads back to the
potential scenario of a neo-medieval, pre-modern Kunstlerian world that emerges from the
Long Emergency (Kunstler 2005). Technical innovation created modernity and may save it,
but that is a statement of faith rather than sight.
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Stilgoe (2007, 13) notes that, “Railroads concentrate population. Automobiles and airliners
distribute it.” Railroads have a historic connection to centralization, both as a driving force
and as a beneficiary. Rail is most economically and operationally viable in situations where
large numbers of people can be transported between a small set of stations. Accordingly,
transformations of land use and urban planning that might result from more expensive and
less available energy resources may be as significant as the broader economic effects of future
energy constraints. And those concentrations would be more amenable to locomobility than
spatially-consumptive automobility.
A number of studies have investigated the potential land use implications of different types
of renewable energy production, notably biofuels (e.g. Yamamoto, Fujino, and Yamaji 2001;
Pro, Hammerschlag, and Mazza 2005; Gurgel, Reilly, and Paltsev 2008). Historic changes
in land use and their relationship to enrgy use have also been explored (Krausmann et al.
2003; Kuskova, Gingrich, and Krausmann 2008).
In the wake of the twin 1970s energy crises, (Burchell and Listokin 1982) edited Energy
& Land Use, a volume of papers exploring possible energy-related changes to land use in
the United States and proposing responses. The contribution of Kain (1982), who may be
best known as the originator of the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Kain 1968), was dismissive
of any major transformations in urban form resulting from higher energy prices. Citing
significantly higher fuel prices in Europe, Kain notes that those prices did promote more-
fuel-efficient vehicles, but had little effect on per-capita auto ownership and vehicle miles
traveled. Kain noted studies indicating that auto ownership and low-density housing were
direct consequences of high incomes and that incomes were still projected to increase, even
with increasing petroleum prices. 30 years out, Kain’s prediction seems to have largely
remained true.
Hannon’s (1982) contribution acknowledged the trends articulated by Kain, but cited the
finiteness of physical resources in positing that conservation would be inevitable at some
unknown future time. Based on the linear historical relationship between total income
and energy demand, physically or politically mandated reductions in per capita energy use
could be expected to constrain incomes and, therefore, the spatially-consumptive practices
of automobility and suburbanization. The recommended spatial reorganization would be to
smaller, denser communities which would avoid the real estate cost premium of large cities.
Travel in this denser, decentralized, less automobilized world would increasingly be by public
transportation - perhaps rail.
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The processes and determinants of land use are complex and difficult to model with any
certainty. Similar to the controversy over the World3 / Limits to Growth world systems
model (Bardi 2011), large-scale models of urban growth were also subject to criticism and
fell out of favor in the 1970s before making a modest resurgence in the 1990s (Lee 1973;
Klosterman 1994). Somewhat more successful have been more modestly scaled models (Deal
and Schunk 2004).
Energy availability is clearly a significant factor in urban form, although Smil (1994, 251-256)
gives a lengthy defense of the limits to which energy can be ascribed deterministic power.
One potential land-use response to future energy resource constraints is increased urban
density that is commonly considered more energy efficient than suburban development. See-
ing that as a positive, the contemporary New Urbanism movement advocates a return to
HSR-connected cities and robust transit, although energy conservation is lumped in with a
general environmentalist desire to be more resource-efficient (Congress for the New Urban-
ism 1996). Smith (1999) is especially critical of New Urbanism as a class-based enterprise
and the actual transportation energy benefits of marginally-increased density are open to
question (Polzin, Reich, and Davis 2011).
The dark side of the increased-density response may already be visible in the Global South
with the explosive growth of massive urban slums (Davis 2006). While arguably related more
to issues of economics and development than directly to energy, this existing trend could have
even more disturbing Darwinian implications in the economic and material chaos resulting
from escalating energy prices.
A contrasting proposed land-use response is a move in the opposite direction with a return to
the farm. This is the vision promoted by Kunstler (2005, 2008) where the energy-shortage-
induced collapse of food supply socio-technical systems necessitates a return to the land and
agrarian lifestyles. Lovins (1976) proposed a similar decentralized energy vision, although
Smil (2010a, 44-54) notes the ideological roots of soft energy in the countercultural revolution
along with the failure of most utopian visions from that revolution to come to pass.
Some hint of the potential for this kind of transition in the developed world can be viewed
anecdotally in the eco-localization movement (North 2010). Some Greeks and Spaniards
have turned to farming in response to the collapse of economic opportunity in urban areas
(Donadio 2012; Minder 2012). However, these are not a return to subsistence farming, and
whether these decentralizations presage a trend or are simply isolated transient adaptations
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to an economic phenomenon is still to be determined. Scenarios resulting from the dynamic
interaction between energy and the economy are explored in Chapter Five.
2.6 Futures Studies
This research will draw epistemically from the sub-discipline of Futures Studies. While
attempts to understand and/or predict the future are timeless, Futures Studies emerged as a
distinct, coherent sub-discipline of sociology in the 1960s with the formation of organizations
like the World Futures Studies Federation and the World Futures Society (Masini 2002, 54;
Dator 2002b, 2).
One key element borrowed from Futures Studies is the assertion articulated by Dator (2002b,
7-8) that, “Futures studies does not try to study ‘the future,’ since ‘the future’ does not exist
to be studied. What does exist, and what futurists can and do often study, are images of the
future in people’s minds.” This ontological premise is the foundation of this research as the
study of potential influences rather than statements of specific positive outcomes resulting
from those influences. This deals with “Hume’s fork” (Shand 1993, 135) by making a priori
assertions entirely within the domain of logic rather than trying to make positive assertions
about reality that can only be known a posteriori.
A second key element borrowed from Futures Studies is the use of scenarios rather than a
single unified image of the future. Bell (2002, 39) notes that futurists “work to expand the
alternative possibilities that people consider before they decide to act one way or another.”
They also “attempt to forecast the most probable futures given specific situations, sets of
circumstances, and particular alternative courses of action.”
A third key element borrowed from Futures Studies is what Bell (1997, 191–238) refers to
as an ontology and epistemology of critical realism, contrasting it as a middle way between
the absolute assertions of positivism and the reactionary fracturing of postpositivism / post-
modernism. Critical realism proposes that truths can be known within the limits of human
senses and intellect and that the logical structure and coherence of statements of truth are
a meaningful area for concern. While critical realism owes a debt to positivism in a free-
dom from handicapping metaphysical beliefs, it also owes a debt to postpositivism for a
humanistic critique of asserted positive truths.
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This ontology can be said to assert that there will be one specific actual future (realism)
although exactly what that future will be is unknowable at any significant level of certainty
(critical). This research will be an epistemic tool for trying to gain some heuristic under-
standing of the possibilities for what that future might actually be. This is in contrast to
the profession of urban planning where research of this type would be used to analyze and
communicate the potential implications of proposed policy choices. This also contrasts to
the position of advocates that use research to find and defend options for achieving one or
more specific, desired futures.
A fourth key element is the use of simulation and modeling as a methodology. This approach
is used in the systems dynamics simulation component of this research. The general issues
with simulation in futures studies as well as the details of the simulation used in this research
are discussed more fully in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 3
AMERICAN LONG-DISTANCE LOCOMOBILITY AND THE SPACES OF
ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY
Much of the discourse surrounding intercity passenger rail service in the United
States revolves around why it has lagged so far behind European and Asian coun-
terparts. However, a more interesting question might be why it has survived
despite competition from faster, more nimble transport modes, discriminatory
public policy, and the ascension of neoliberal discourse hostile to public endeavor.
This paper uses the concept of durability in actor-network theory to offer some
insights into how the system has achieved a remarkable but problematic stability,
and what the potential futures of that system may be in a world of increasingly
constrained material resources.
The United States is unique in the developed world in its limited role for intercity passenger
rail. American travelers in Europe or Asia ride robust (and, often, high-speed) rail systems
and wonder why they do not have systems like that at home. However, this difference
may be better conceptualized by turning the negative question of “why not” to a positive
inquiry about why long-distance passenger rail still exists at all in the United States despite
competition from faster, more nimble transport modes, discriminatory public policy, and the
ascension of neoliberal discourse hostile to public endeavor.
This paper uses actor-network theory (ANT) to analyze the history and semiotics of Amtrak
and argues that in the context of America’s unique socio-technical meanings, Amtrak can
actually be considered a success. A specific focus is given to the concept of network durability,
which makes it possible for a socio-technical network to resist change - both positive and
negative. Amtrak is one of these actor-networks, persisting with only incremental change
despite the concerted efforts of a variety of actors to defund, rationalize, privatize, corridorize,
reform, and transform America’s last remaining national passenger railroad.
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ANT is chosen as a methodology because it provides a means to consider the historical
and semiotic issues often ignored by the positivist methodologies that dominate contem-
porary transportation analysis. Railroads in the US are large socio-technical systems that
have evolved through a rich, colorful and well-documented history. Much of the extant
scholarship on railroads focuses on specific (and often fetishized) aspects of railroads like
equipment, infrastructure, economics, or organization, often making it difficult to see the
semiotic relationships between those different entities in the socio-technical networks and
locking the internal social networks as static structures. ANT offers a way to aggressively
address both the social and technical aspects of passenger rail with a perspective distinct
from conventional social research that separates the social and technical worlds into fixed
statistical reductions. ANT also offers a deeper theoretical framework than historical large
technical systems studies (Hughes 1983) while being somewhat more accessible and useful
than highly abstracted transitions studies (Geels 2002, 2010; Jørgensen 2012) or assemblage
theory (Deleuze and Guattari 1980 [1987]; De Landa 2006; Jensen 2013).
ANT’s perspective on socio-technical systems as dynamic networks of heterogeneous ele-
ments offers the potential for a rich understanding of passenger rail systems and the ways
those systems might be affected by equally complex exogenous forces like energy-resource
constraint. Accordingly, this paper uses a conception of passenger rail travel as locomobility,
analogous to similar systemic conceptions of auto and air travel as automobility and aero-
mobility, respectively (Urry 2004; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2007; Cwerner, Kesselring,
and Urry 2009).
Law (2009, 141) emphasizes that although ANT is defined and described in abstract terms,
ANT is grounded in empirical case studies. Classical and contemporary objects of ANT
analysis include: scallops (Callon 1986), electric cars (Callon, Law, and Rip 1986), microbes
(Latour 1988a), transit systems (Latour 1996), lighting systems (Akrich 1992), military air-
craft projects (Law and Callon 1992), cervical cancer screening programs (Singleton and
Michael 1993), health care information systems (Atkinson 2000), and housing developments
(Ruming 2009).
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Much of the analysis in this paper is patterned after the Law and Callon (1992) analysis of
the ill-fated TSR.2 military aircraft project, which had its initial conception in the late 1950s
and was canceled in 1965. While the narrative portions of Law and Callon’s analysis are
structured much like conventional journalistic accounts of the political and technical chaos
surrounding the fated project, the clear, integrated tracing of the narrative plot points to
associations between dynamic, multi-scalar networks of humans and non-human actors using
a specific vocabulary of relational terms distinguishes ANT analysis from simple storytelling.
3.1 Amtrak: The Formation of a Local Network
Railroad companies in the US have existed in an almost perpetual state of economic chaos
and crisis, even during their heyday (Martin 1971). This state of crisis was in varying parts
material and discursive, which is in keeping with the integral role of railroads in crisis-prone
capitalism (Harvey 1999 [2006], 75-97). The mid-20th-century crisis in passenger service
would be resolved with the formation of Amtrak in 1971, and the crisis in freight service
would be resolved with a subsequent series of deregulatory policy changes culminating in
the Staggers Act of 1980 (Stover 1997). However, the result of that resolution has been a
stalemate – the Amtrak Equilibrium – where federal subsidy of Amtrak is just large enough
to keep the service politically viable, but not so large as to attract significant opposition
outside of a handful of fervent (albeit vocal and well-funded) ideologues (Hilton 1980, 78).
3.1.1 The Railroad Sociology of the Social
There was a strong inverse correlation over the 20th century between rail travel versus air
and auto travel that clearly implicates mode shift as the proximate cause of the decline of
US passenger railroading to its current skeletal state (United States Interstate Commerce
Commission 1958, 12). However, when analysts have sought ultimate causes, the results over
the years have often involved deterministic generalization:
• Technological obsolescence (69)
• Psychological obsolescence (Morgan 1959, 16)
• Consumer preference (Hilton 1980, 8)
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• Intransigent labor unions (United States Interstate Commerce Commission 1958, 14–
17; Stover 1970, 218; 1970, 226; Wilner 1994, 29)
• Ossified railroad management (Lyon 1968, 233–255)
• Federal subsidy of competing air and auto infrastructure (Stover 1970, 228; Wilner
1994, 16–20)
• Amtrak’s fundamental structural flaws (Vranich 2004, 9–10)
• America’s economic geography (Samuelson 2010)
• Innate American frontier mentality and distrust of government (Phillips 2011a, 42)
• Political opposition by competing industries (43)
Latour (2005, 4–5) devotes a significant amount of effort in distinguishing the conventional
“sociology of the social” in contrast with the more fine-grained “tracing of associations”
characteristic of ANT. One example dramatizing this distinction is the contrast between
grand generalizations about centralization that become less meaningful when specific points
of crisis and responses to those crises are examined.
For example, in a conventional sociological comparison of US and France, Dobbin (1993,
126–128) asserts that historical patterns of centralized power in France dating from the early
19th century partially account for the centralized control of rail systems in France, including
construction of the high-speed TGV. By contrast, the legacy of decentralized power encoded
in the 18th century foundational documents accounts for the dominance of US rail systems
by decentralized private enterprise and the absence of privately-run passenger rail.
However, the US still had centralization of power, just in different network configurations.
The “Railroad Problem” associated with the mobility monopoly enjoyed by the private rail
industry in the late 19th century was met with increasing levels of centralized regulation as
other industrial networks translated the Laissez-faire governance of the Gilded Age regulatory
regime into the comparatively activist governance of the Progressive Era. This centralization
of control culminated in the nationalization of US railroads in 1917 when the private rail
network effectively broke down during the first World War (Garrison and Levinson 2006,
105). Even after control was returned to the railroads in the early 1920s, the durability of
the regulatory network would dramatically affect the ability of the private railroad network to
adapt to the rapidly changing socio-technical conditions in the 20th century (Martin 1971).
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Railroading in the US can be seen as a centralized and centralizing actor-network built by a
distributed network of private economic institutions and translated public policies (such as
land grants) working within topographically-defined constraints. Likewise, the post-WW-II
project of decentralizing suburbanization was the acceleration of a process that had been on-
going for almost a century (Jackson 1985), facilitated by construction of a centrally-planned
and publicly-funded interstate highway system (Harvey 1990, 69). The contention of the
competing automobility, aeromobility and locomobility local actor-networks for resources
from the global network favored highway transportation, resulting in the destabilization of
both passenger and freight rail networks and, finally the creation of Amtrak (for passenger
service) in 1971 and Conrail (from a collection of bankrupt northeastern freight railroads)
in 1976.
Although Capitol Hill seems to be as much a centralized focus of power as Paris, from an ANT
perspective these centers are themselves networks of associations with tentacles that extended
far beyond their physical geographies or tight networks of governmental insiders. In seeking
to find the centres of calculation (Latour 1988b, 160; 2005, 178) striving to mobilize resources
from the network, the central government may be viewed as just a contested negotiation space
where competing networks of industrial actors seek to mobilize the benefits of capitalism for
themselves.
3.1.2 Global and Local Networks
Law and Callon (1992, 21) introduce the concept of global and local networks:
...an actor attempts to mobilize and stabilize what we call a global network in
order to obtain resources with which to build a project. In our language, then,
a global network is a set of relations between an actor and its neighbors on the
one hand, and between those neighbors on the other. It is a network that is built
up, deliberately or otherwise, and that generates a space, a period of time, and
a set of resources in which innovation may take place. Within this space - we
call it a negotiation space - the process of building a project may be treated as
the elaboration of a local network - that is, the development of an array of the
heterogeneous set of bits and pieces that is necessary to the successful production
of any working device.
52
The creation of Amtrak can be analyzed as a local network which operates within a global
network of punctualized actors, which included a host of federal and state governing and
administrative bodies, rail labor unions, rail advocacy groups (like the National Association
of Rail Passengers), individual riders, etc. Over the course of the negotiation space, the local
network was transformed from a large but loose confederation of privately-owned and -run
operations to a smaller, unified network controlled by the government-owned corporation,
Amtrak.
In keeping with the ascription of agency to non-human actors characteristic of ANT, aeromo-
bility and automobility might also be considered actors in the global network. Those socio-
technical systems are themselves complex actor-networks of relationships that are punctual-
ized for analytical convenience. A number of individual human actors like Senator Claiborne
Pell and President Richard Nixon also emerge as pivotal figures in the negotiations between
actor-networks.
In analysis by Law and Callon (1992), the British TSR.2 military aircraft project involved the
elaboration of a local network with the ultimate goal of production of a military jet airplane.
However, the specifics of what that airplane would look like, what problems it would solve,
and whether it should exist at all were the result of negotiations between neighboring actors
in the global network that had different answers to those questions.
A similar situation existed for locomobility in the 1950s. Secular cost and ridership trends
clearly presaged a juxtaposition of some kind, but different actors responded in contradictory
ways. This reflects the variable geometry / interpretive flexibility where the passenger rail
system meant different things to different actors .
Some company managers attempted to maintain high levels of service and others made
intentional efforts to alienate customers and suppress ridership (such as stopping trains in the
middle of runs or suppressing operating schedule information) as a pretext for discontinuance
of money-losing services (Phillips 2011b, 23; Hilton 1980, 10–11; 1980, 65; Lyon 1968, 223–
255).
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Unions fought to keep jobs and advocates of service in different communities used political
influence to prevent the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) from permitting private
passenger train discontinuances. But the non-advocate populace in those communities was
abandoning those trains for autos and airplanes while other departments and branches of
the government were engaged in heavy public subsidy for that same auto and aviation in-
frastructure (Wilner 1994, 14–35).
As part of the negotiation process, the flows of intermediaries between these actor-networks
included money, political power, legal & regulatory action, infrastructure, and rail service
itself. But in these negotiations the local actor-network of locomobility was unable to obtain
sustaining resources from the global network and the crisis worsened.
Some significant intermediaries stand out at this point in the passenger rail narrative.
• The Transportation Act of 1958 transferred the passenger service abandonment process
from the states to the ICC in a translation process that circumvented a multitude of
constricted local political processes and focused abandonment through the ICC as a
somewhat more amenable obligatory point of passage.
• In 1958, ICC Examiner Howard Hosmer issued a report that attributed air and road
competition as the root cause of the decline of passenger rail and said current attempts
to rationalize service were hopeless. Hosmer predicted that passenger trains would be
gone by 1970.
• In 1962, Rhode Island Democratic Senator Claiborne Pell gave a Senate speech (which
he codified into the book Megalopolis Unbound in 1966) advocating Federal investment
in high-speed service in the Northeast Corridor, which, through his advocacy, ulti-
mately resulted in the successful Metroliner service. Pell also proposed a solution for
the problems of the system as a whole: “The answer is to divide the railroad system into
a public authority that would carry passengers while the existing private companies
would continue their more profitable function of hauling freight.” This intermediary
in the negotiation process largely codified the structure chosen for Amtrak nine years
later.
The account by Phillips (2011b) of the formation of Amtrak gives Pell credit for saving
passenger rail in the United States, and Pell (1966) himself provides support for this position.
However, Whittle and Spicer (2008, 616) note that ANT has:
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...sought to move beyond deterministic models that trace organizational phe-
nomena back to powerful individuals, social structures, hegemonic discourses
or technological effects. Rather, ANT prefers to seek out complex patterns of
causality rooted in connections between actors.
From this perspective, the Claiborne Pell of this narrative becomes less of a heroic individual
than a spokesperson for a punctualized local network of relationships with other government
leaders, businesses and businessmen, staffers, constituents, family, friends, and others that
even Pell may not have been conscious of. Pell’s effort can be praised or reviled, but,
regardless, he would not have accomplished the same things outside of his particular actor-
network of relationships. Questions about the political future of intercity locomobility in the
US dictate an similar unpacking of the complex local networks of governance.
Pell’s conversations with President Kennedy led to a White House task force that recom-
mended a coordinated transport program in the Northeast Corridor. After Kennedy’s as-
sassination, Pell continued his advocacy with President Johnson, who saw the proposal as
intermediary that could be used in an election-year strategy to bolster weak support in the
Northeast - translating a transportation actor-network into the political actor-network of
which Johnson was the spokesperson. With Pell standing behind him, newly-reelected Pres-
ident Johnson signed the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act into law on 30 September
1965, which resulted in highly-successful Metroliner service between Washington and New
York and the audacious but somewhat less-successful TurboTrain service between New York
and Boston. The first revenue runs of the Metroliner took place on January 16, 1969. In
this case, translation brought additional support for the local network from a global network
that included a local network of selected voters in the Northeast.
However, the Metroliner as an intermediary did little to address the growing instability in
the local rail system network. The managers (spokespersons) of the Pennsylvania Railroad
(PRR) and the New York Central Railroad (NYCRR) were desperate for a merger. The
Northeast Corridor demonstration project was partially funded by the PRR and the project
was quickly approved by the PRR in hopes of gaining political capital for getting the merger
approved.
The zeal for merger led to approval of additional intermediaries with the New Haven Railroad
(to be included in the merger) and labor union demands (layoff restrictions and rehires) that
would ultimately make the agglomeration too unstable to persist. This strategy by a local
network to gain resources from the global network resulted in destabilization of the local
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network. Hobbled by the contractual arrangements, continued business decline, the ending
of postal service mail carriage by rail, questionable management & accounting practices, and
an apocalyptically harsh winter, the merged Penn Central went bankrupt on June 21, 1970.
The impending Penn Central bankruptcy, along with the election of Richard Nixon in 1968
and the continuing and growing level of instability in the local networks of the individual
railroads was increasingly being translated through the global network, making it difficult
for the federal government to continue to ignore. This translation increased the Federal
government’s dominance of the negotiation space, although since the Federal government is
also a heterogeneous local network, this translation did not reduce the complexity of the
ongoing translation process.
The most serious concern in 1970 was freight rail service, which was still quite vital to
industrial concerns. But while passenger rail could likely have been terminated completely
or absorbed by states with little effect on the global network, bubbling under the surface
of the powerful commercial and governmental actor-networks was a somewhat less obvious
local network of rail fans.
Lyon (1968, 233) notes that, in contrast to the established local networks of industry,
shipping and labor advocates, the passenger actor-network was uncoordinated and largely
spokesperson-less. This began to change in 1966 when attorney Anthony Haswell formed
the advocacy group The National Association of Rail Passengers. However, Phillips (2011b,
28) asserts that an influx of letters to Capital Hill in the crucial years of 1969 and 1970
appeared to be a spontaneous expression of concern by significant numbers of voters that
Congress could not ignore. Regardless of the amount of centralized organization, the local
actor-network of rail passengers was translating the global network for their benefit.
The members of this local advocacy actor-network were not exclusively civilian. Aside from
the aforementioned Senator Pell, Phillips (2011b) names a number of rail fans who also were
part of other local networks and in a position to shape policy. This demonstrates how the
networks of ANT are dynamic, interlocking mesh structures, in contrast to the more static
a priori structures of conventional sociology:
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• Steve Ditmeyer was an engineer who oversaw contractors on the Metroliner project in
the Office of High Speed Ground Transportation
• JimMcClellan was a former New York Central manager working in the Federal Railroad
Administration
• Paul Cherrington ran the Transportation Department policy office
• Bob Gallamore was Cherrington’s “right-hand man” on passenger issues
• Wilner (1994, 42–43) even asserts that President Nixon was a closeted rail fan, not-
ing that Nixon’s father was a streetcar conductor and that Nixon’s memoir (Nixon
1978) includes recollections that as a child his aspiration was to be a railroad engineer
(something common in that era, see Freud 1910, 53–54).
A variety of proposals for Federal subsidies to private railroads or ownership of passenger
equipment began circulating in Congress in 1969 (Wilner 1994, 36–51). The compromise that
emerged from the process of negotiation between liberal and conservative local networks was
Railpax, which involved a conception of a nationalized passenger rail system as a for-profit
corporation. This imagined new local network had little basis in any possible material
network. While the for-profit intermediary was a vital part of negotiation, it has left a
persistent legacy in discursive instability and rhetorical vulnerability to conservative attacks.
The legislation was proposed by Transportation Secretary John Volpe, introduced into the
Senate by Senators Vance Hartke and Winston Prouty and introduced into the House by
Representative Harley Staggers (Tobey 1986, 153; Phillips 2011b, 30). The Senate passed the
Railpax bill with little debate on 1 May 1970. The bankruptcy of the Penn Central on 21
June 1970 was an intermediary that spurred similar action in the House, and the reconciled
Railpax bill (HR 17849) passed both houses by voice vote on 14 October 1970. Despite
last-minute rumors of a pocket-veto, President Nixon signed the bill into law on 30 October
1970 with no official ceremony.
Furious negotiation and translation then ensued as the new actor-network became fully
elaborated. Of the 259 intercity trains still running at the time, 110 were cut. 20 of the 26
eligible railroads chose to join Amtrak. After a number of storied trains took their final, well-
publicized runs, Amtrak - a new local network of intercity passenger rail - began operation
at 12:01am on 1 May, 1971.
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3.2 Network Durability
Law (2009, 148–149) ascribes the durability of actor-networks to three aspects: material,
strategic, and discursive. While these three aspects are views of actor-networks and,
therefore, interdependent, use of these perspectives provides a framework for building some
measure of understanding of complex network dynamics.
Law notes that the focus of ANT is on hows in opposition to the focus of traditional sociology
on whys (the Aristotelean efficient causes rather than end causes). This leaves questions
about whether this ideographic methodology can reveal any useful nomothetic knowledge
about regularities. Law asserts that ANT responded by, “exploring the logics of network
architecture and looking for configurations that might lead to relative stability.”
In asking why intercity passenger rail has survived in the US, the ANT perspective transforms
this into a question of how Amtrak has survived. And by using the durability framework of
ANT, some larger insights into the logic of that survival and into the future may result.
3.2.1 Material Durability
Law (2009) notes the obvious in stating that, “some materials last longer than others.”
However, this statement highlights an absence in explanations for the state of passenger rail
that rely solely on technological, economic or social influences. Since ANT acknowledges the
interdependence of the human and non-human, ANT suggests that the vast material and
formal durability of the physical railroad may offer an explanation for its persistence.
Level rights-of-way, steel track, stone ballast and monumental structures are all materially-
durable non-human actors that facilitate the exertion of massive energies in the transporta-
tion of goods and people. They require massive infusions of capital and energy to construct,
and are stable, defining fixtures of both urban and rural landscapes. Rail lines are active
participants in the life of the community in ways that can be viewed as positive (commodity
supply, mobility) or negative (noise, pollution, traffic congestion).
Even when abandoned, portions of this infrastructure will often physically persist for gener-
ations unless equally massive energies are exerted to obliterate their form. Adaptive reuse
of stations as malls (e.g. St. Louis) or rail-banking of right-of-way as recreational trails
preserves the mythology of the railroad in fetishized sacred spaces. The material persistence
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of the sacred space promotes the social reproduction of this mythology in the same way that
the physical majesty of the religious cathedral promotes social reproduction of submission to
the nominal mortal representatives of the eternal. The translation of the material mythology
of the railroad through the performative “kinetic art” of Amtrak (Hilton 1980, 75–78) is a
driver of ridership and revenue.
All transportation modes shape spaces. Schivelbusch (1977) notes the pivotal role of rail-
roads in transforming conceptions of space and time in the 19th century. Schivelbusch cites
railroad engineer Weber (1882) for the observation that in Europe railroads facilitated traffic
in building on an established preindustrial transportation system, but in the US railroads
created traffic through wilderness that was yet to be tamed by Euro-Americans.
While the spaces of residential and commercial life in the US have certainly evolved since
the era when locomobility monopolized passenger transportation, the formal patterns of the
railroad persist in the geographies of mobility. Commuter rail, light rail, and bus rapid transit
lines are commonly operated on legacy corridors, promoting a persistence of commutation
patterns that can date from the dawn of America’s industrial revolution. Railroad tracks
still separate aﬄuence from poverty in many communities. Many Western communities
without convenient access to air or bus transportation still retain some reliance on Amtrak
for long-distance public transportation in the same way that their great-grandparents relied
on Amtrak’s ancestor private railroads (Perl 2002, 98).
But Law (2009, 148) is careful to point out that material durability begets tendencies rather
than deterministic pathways. ANT focuses on relationships rather than actors. Although
the physical durability of a massive non-human actor like a cathedral railroad station will
promote the durability of relationships with the surrounding community, physical durability
does not guarantee immortality. The abandonment and extensive destruction of physically
durable housing stock within a single generation in the South Bronx, Highland Park, MI or
central St. Louis, MO is testimony to the way in which relationships between humans and
non-humans are performative, quickly mutable, and not inherent in the materials themselves.
Understanding the durability of a performative institution like Amtrak requires understand-
ing strategies and discourses.
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3.2.2 Strategic Durability
Networks are elaborated through actions that are often deliberate strategies to create durable
sets of relationships (the Aristotelean end causes). These strategies often involve the trans-
lation of strategies developed in other actor-networks. And these strategies can also be said
to include non-human actors from the biophysical environment that follow, “teleologically
ordered patterns of relations indifferent to human intentions” (Law 2009, 148).
The Railpax bill that formed Amtrak was the product of direct, deliberate action by actors
like Secretary Volpe and Representative Staggers. These actors were operating in the context
of relational network forces, such as constituent advocacy, failing railroad economics, the
highway lobby, etc. Different actors and groups of actors had differing intentions for their
actions (variable geometry). While many in the private railroad actor-network had supported
Railpax as a strategy for preserving their own durability through the dissolution of the
material passenger rail network (Perl 2002, 93), and many elected officials saw Railpax as an
actor-network that could be translated for political benefit, interpretive flexibility allowed
proponents inside and outside of government to advocate for the Railpax compromise as the
beginning of a long-term strategy for creating a durable new actor-network of intercity rail
(97). Bowen (2012a) notes the significance of the oft-ignored actor-network of private rail
industry suppliers, who have made strategic investments in the future of Amtrak and remain
advocates for its continuance.
Weaver (1985, 20) notes the presence in Federal governance of multiple veto points. This
meta-strategic legacy of the founding fathers was intended to make governing cumbersome
and inhibit tyranny. The result has been a system of governance where radical change is
difficult and where programmatic actor-networks can endure long after the original rationale
for their creation has ceased.
Strategies are not always successful. Chen (2011) notes that high-speed rail (HSR) proposals
have appeared in Congress in perennial waves that coincide with economic downturns and
Keynesian calls for economic stimulus and job creation. Accordingly, these long-term projects
have attempted to translate short-term needs, and once the crises have abated the initiatives
have subsequently receded to fight another day.
The conservative political actor-network elaborated in the 1970s has had remarkable success
in translating the discourses of politics in the US toward neoliberalism. But despite the
fervently-articulated and highly-detailed ideological arguments promulgated by conservative
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think-tanks–notably the Cato Institute (founded 1977) and the Reason Foundation (founded
1978)–the actor-network embodied by Amtrak thus far been too durable to translate out of
existence (Perl 2002, 101). The budgetary arguments against Amtrak are discourses that
attempt to translate multiscalar economic angst to the benefit of the broader neoliberal
agenda. But the benefits of the proposed systemic juxtaposition (devolution and dissolu-
tion) do not translate into legitimate material benefits outside of the ideologically-motivated
minority network. Hence, there is no translation of the strategies of the supporters and local
beneficiaries who would suffer in such a juxtaposition.
Strategic durability extracts an opportunity cost in constraining the ability to adapt to
changing conditions. A competitive equilibrium developed between ossified Gilded-Age-era
regulatory actor-network and the longstanding administrative and financial actor-network of
the private railroads, constraining vision and the capacity for strategic thought and action.
As government and industry focused strategies for durability on highways and air travel, the
network durability of the rail/regulation interlock precipitated the post-WW-II railroad crisis
(12). The new strategies for creating durability that were represented by Amtrak and Conrail
could only be pursued once the crisis had compromised the durability of the actor-network
to the point where the actors could be juxtaposed and the needs of the actor-networks could
be translated into new sets of relationships.
By contrast, in Europe and Asia, the destabilizing crisis was WW-II itself, which resulted
in the catastrophic disruption of material, economic, political, and geopolitical networks.
In the multi-generational process of building both new infrastructure and new identities,
inadequacies in the rail components of their passenger transport actor-networks necessitated
the development of new strategies to restore durability. In addition to expansion of automo-
bility and aeromobility echoing that in the US (albeit at somewhat lower volumes), many
European countries began construction of high-speed rail systems, which adapted established
locomobility to the circulatory demands of late capitalism and reinforced the strategic and
material durability of their legacy rail networks.
3.2.3 Discursive Durability
Law (2009, 149) borrows the idea of mini-discourses from Foucault (Wickham and Kendall
1999, 53) and defines them as modes of ordering (e.g. entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, charis-
matic, etc). Discourses, “define conditions of possibility, making some ways of ordering webs
of relations easier and others difficult or impossible.” Since realities beyond a single mode of
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ordering must be dealt with, stable actor-networks usually must operate multi-discursively,
or in multiple modes of ordering.
Leatherby and Reynolds (2005, 53) analyze passenger rail as, “a set of practices based on
mutually shared understandings,” and note the role of discourses in that, “these shared
understandings are based in language.”
ANT focuses on understandings as meanings, and consistent with the aforementioned variable
geometry, the multiple meanings of Amtrak are shaped by differing discourses:
• For the environmentalist, Amtrak is sustainable mobility
• For the neoclassical economist, Amtrak is a failed corporation and a waste of public
funds
• For the new rider, Amtrak is a novelty
• For the politician, Amtrak is a means to mobilize political capital (both for proponents
and opponents)
• For the rail worker, Amtrak is a job
• For the nostalgic rail fan, Amtrak is a kinetic connection to the past and orderly frame
for a disorderly world
• For the founding advocates of Amtrak, it was a way to reverse passenger rail decline
through public investment (Perl 2002, 97)
• For the progressive rail advocate, Amtrak is an intermediate evolutionary stage on the
way to the truly robust rail network that America deserves
• For the elderly patron, Amtrak is a source of convenient mobility (in contrast to in-
convenient aeromobility and inaccessible automobility)
• For the poor, Amtrak is a more comfortable alternative to the bus
• For some rural communities, Amtrak is a vital form of connection to the outside world
All of these associations of discourses with groups are generalizations and individual perspec-
tives are shaped by multiple (and often contradictory) discourses. Yet from the viewpoint
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of ANT, it is this richness of meanings that might offer some clues to the durability of
locomobility in the US via Amtrak.
If Amtrak were only highly localized political pork, it would be as systemically vulnerable as
the handful of purely “political trains” in Wyoming and West Virginia that were discontinued
when their congressional patrons (Mike Mansfield and Robert Byrd, respectively) retired or
no longer had a direct role in Amtrak affairs (Perl 2002, 106; Wilner 1994, 47–48; Tobey 1986,
262–263). As a diverse set of variable networked meanings, Amtrak retains a diverse set of
networked constituencies that are strong enough to survive, but not visible enough outside
the actor-networks of advocates or opponents to either thrive or attract fatal predators.
The discursive and the strategic are interdependent. For many advocates, Amtrak was a
way of freeing locomobility from the destructive strategies of the private railroads, and for
many it still represents the last hope for preserving the institution of passenger rail in the
United States - which, once gone, would likely be difficult to revive (Weaver 1985, 95; Perl
2002, 104; Federal Railroad Administration 1998, 43). The capital investment in the physical
network of track, structures and rolling stock promotes an (arguably fallacious) sunk-cost
discourse for continuity (Hilton 1980, 78).
While preserving the traditional featherbedding of the 150-mile workday limit, during the
negotiations that created Amtrak, labor also retained a traditional railroad severance package
requiring six-years of continued salary (Northrup 1995; Perl 2002, 98). The stated intention
was to ease the impact on workers of a dissolution of passenger rail service, but this also served
as a strategic poison-pill to prevent dissolution of Amtrak that, while of only minor economic
significance in the context of the massive Federal budget, is a discursive counterpoint to
economic attacks based on the myth of profitability (Tobey 1986, 269; Coston 2001).
Employment is often as much a source of identity as it is a source of income. The labor
intensity and intensity of labor seem to be characteristics that make railroad work as much a
lifestyle as an occupation - one that has been highly romanticized in the discourses of rail fans
(Solomon 2006). Leatherby and Reynolds (2005) note from the British experience that this
role of the railroad as both a material and discursive foundation for identity extends beyond
the labor base. And although the embedding of rail labor in society is much diminished
from 1920 when 7.25% of US workers were employed by the railroad (Solomon 2006, 13), the
mythological discourse persists along with Amtrak.
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3.3 Demonstrations of Durability
3.3.1 Amtrak’s Early Years
The assertion is that Amtrak was “designed to fail” as a graceful (or, at least, blame-free) ter-
mination of long-distance passenger rail transport (Zimmerman 2004, 29; Perl 2002, 93–100)
has circumstantial support. The Railpax bill that originally created Amtrak only required
the corporation to run its designated system until July 1973 (Weaver 1985, 95). Economist
(and Amtrak critic) George Hilton (1980, 75–78) articulated a teleological expectation typical
of his era that Amtrak would die along with its legacy passengers as succeeding generations
became habituated to air travel. Hilton predicted a long devolution that would leave only
the Northeast Corridor.
Nonetheless, Congress continued to fund Amtrak’s operations and limited capital improve-
ments throughout the 1970s as a de facto nationalized passenger train service. This survival
is an example of the ANT concept of network durability.
Baron (1990, 885) notes that the national aspect of Amtrak is significant to its survival. The
interconnected national physical network permits distribution of benefits across political
districts, broadening the political base of support. Even though the interests of different
passengers and employees in different parts of the system are heterogeneous, the actor-
network binds them in relationships of common cause to continue a service that focuses
revenue from the larger global tax revenue actor-network into the smaller local actor-network
that benefits from the national rail system.
Hilton (1980, 78) makes a similar argument that the benefit to the local network is large
enough to motivate political action but at such a small national per-capita cost that there
is little incentive for anyone to fight against it except for a small number of fervent (albeit
vocal and well-funded) ideologues and competitors. With a 2011 subsidy of $1.6 billion out
of a $3.6 trillion federal budget, the per-capita subsidy for Amtrak was around $6 compared
to a total per-capita share of federal expenditures of $11,500 per capita (Amtrak 2012, 41;
Congressional Budget Office 2011).
The passenger rail system’s translation of the Federal Government was part of a larger
translation by the railroads as a whole over the 1970s. Hiner (2006) argues that the effective
nationalization of passenger rail (Amtrak in 1971) and a large portion of the country’s
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freight railroading (Conrail in 1976) contributed directly to passage of two major milestones
in railroad deregulation: the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
(signed by Republican President Gerald Ford) and the Staggers Act of 1980 (signed by
Democratic President Jimmy Carter).
In ANT terms, the enrollment of the Federal Government by the railroads caused a juxtaposi-
tion of roles within the local network of the Federal Government, synchronizing the interests
of both the railroads and the law-making actor-network (both legislative and executive) in
opposition to the regulatory actor-network through the economic obligatory point of passage
of the railroad actor-network. With the regulatory regime of the government (primarily
through the ICC) now effectively working against the railroad ownership interests of the
government, the negotiation space of Congress was activated to innovate a new regulatory
regime.
However, awareness of the complexity of actor-network relations should temper a view of
this synchronization as directly and uniquely causative of the deregulatory process. In con-
trast to the subsequent conservative demonization of President Carter with the rhetorical
epithet liberal (e.g. Evans 2009, among many others), a closer historical examination of that
period reveals Carter as a spokesperson for an unstable collection of local and global po-
litical networks that were undergoing juxtaposition under ascendant neoliberalism (Ribuffo
1988; Drum 2010, among many others). For example, Wilner (1994, 50) presents Carter as
a supporter of Amtrak in a way that has been consistent with conservative representation
of Carter as an epitome of American liberalism. But far from being a passive and reluc-
tant signer of legislation, Carter embraced deregulation and neoliberal discourses that would
come to be personified by his more telegenic successor (Carter 1978; Stone and Landry 2004;
Scallon 2009).
3.3.2 Surviving Rationalization
Carter was an active participant in the 1978 rationalization of the Amtrak route network
(United States Department of Transportation 1978; Baron 1990). Carter mentioned Amtrak
in only one of his State of the Union messages – the speech that followed his defeat by Ronald
Reagan – but the brief mention clearly reflects a distaste for a subsidized national rail service
that might seem more appropriate coming from the mouth of Carter’s conservative successor:
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Our goal through federal assistance should be to maintain and enhance adequate
rail service, where it is not otherwise available to needy communities. But Federal
subsidies must be closely scrutinized to be sure they are a stimulus to, and not
a replacement for, private investment and initiative. Federal assistance cannot
mean permanent subsidies for unprofitable operations (Carter 1981).
Wilner (1994, 50) notes that the local network of rail passengers and advocates remained
politically active (and durable) despite the financial and operational deficiencies of Amtrak
in the 1970s. This reinforced the durability of the larger locomobility actor-network of which
they were a part. After the negotiation process, the 1978 rationalization resulted in a system
that included only a 14% reduction in route miles – which placed Amtrak at approximately
the same size as on its first day of service. And the new legislation finally accepted the
obvious, eliminating language defining eventual profitability as an objective.
With the advent of the Reagan administration and the translation of the Federal Govern-
ment by an actor-network unified by neoliberal ideology and discourse, rationalization of
locomobility was marketed as the elimination of wasteful subsidy - which would effectively
eliminate long-distance locomobility in the United States (Federal Railroad Administration
1998, 43). Reagan’s budget director David Stockman repeatedly urged zeroing out funding
for both Amtrak and Conrail, and he was especially dramatic in his media appearances in
support of that proposal throughout his four-year tenure (Wilner 1994, 3–4; Thoms and
Clapp 1988, 390). The only State of the Union reference by Reagan (1985) to Amtrak was a
blunt post-landslide expression of a concerted effort that year to defund Amtrak:
...we must reduce or eliminate costly government subsidies. For example, deregu-
lation of the airline industry has led to cheaper airfares, but on Amtrak taxpayers
pay about $35 per passenger every time an Amtrak train leaves the station, It’s
time we ended this huge Federal subsidy.
ANT emerged from Science and Technology Studies in opposition to heroic models of innova-
tion (Crawford 2004). Similarly, ANT analysis of political processes can be used to dramatize
the way in which these processes are as much a function of the networks as the individual
actors.
In a traditional heroic account, Wilner (1994, ii) breathlessly attributes the survival of Am-
trak through the Reagan years to the work of a single Amtrak president (who was, ironically,
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appointed by Reagan.) “Let the record show for eternity–for it cannot be contradicted by
evidence–that Amtrak survived, that Amtrak is, and that Amtrak will be because of William
Graham Claytor, Jr.” However, just a few pages later, Wilner goes on to cite statements by
numerous administrators and legislators that undoubtedly reflect the relational durability of
the passenger rail local network and offer some clues as to how that actor-network (of which
Claytor was a significant part) managed to survive the Reagan years (Dempsey 2003, 268).
Labor unions were a special target of the Reagan administration, which effectively translated
public resentment and envy into policy that weakened the power of labor in the US. The
acquiescence of railroad labor unions had been pivotal to the formation of Amtrak and
the negotiated work rules and severance policies reflected that influence (Wilner 1994, 79–
80). Railroad labor arguably remains one of the primary beneficiaries of the existing system,
translating the needs of its local employee actor-network to acquire resources from the global
Federal actor-network (Baron 1990, 887). The comparatively generous work rules negotiated
at the advent of Amtrak arguably gave the unions room for negotiation in a more hostile
1981-1986 environment as the work rules were rationalized down to a 40-hour work week
from the previous traditional 150-mile/day limits that dated from the era of slow steam
locomotives (Tobey 1986, 269).
The focus of ANT on tracing relationships can help unpack oversimplified discourses of ide-
ological purity. In 1981, Reagan appointed an opponent of deregulation, Reese H. Taylor, as
head of the ICC, a body to which the conservative administration would presumably be hos-
tile. Stone and Landry (2004) assert that this seeming contradiction can be explained by the
electoral support of Reagan by the Teamsters Union, which believed further rail deregulation
would weaken the union’s position. Introduction of this contradictory intermediary weakened
the translating capabilities of the actor-network promoting deregulation. Although legisla-
tion had been proposed as early as 1983 to sunset the ICC and a pro-deregulation chairman
succeeded Taylor in 1986, the beneficiaries of ICC regulation (notably shippers) successfully
translated the legislative process for its preservation until it was finally transformed into the
Surface Transportation Board at the start of 1996.
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The Clinton administration might be regarded as the first administration since Nixon that
was even nominally supportive of Amtrak, although that support may have been more dis-
cursive than material. In the signing statement on the Amtrak Reform and Accountability
Act (which his Department of Transportation originally proposed in 1995), Clinton (1997)
referred to Amtrak as, “a significant component of our national transportation services in
densely populated corridors, such as the northeast; on medium- and short-haul routes; and
on transcontinental routes linking cities across the Nation.”
However, the Amtrak Reform law was the product of a hostile Congress and built on the
mythology of passenger rail profitability. The reform council mandated by that Act ulti-
mately recommended a decomposition of Amtrak into a collection of independent companies
- the economically weakest of which would, presumably, be easier to rationalize out of exis-
tence (Amtrak Reform Council 2002; Coston 2001). The HSR initiatives Clinton promoted
in his successful 1992 presidential campaign died in Congress (Freemark 2008; The United
States Congress 1993). The Federal Railroad Administration (2012) designated a number of
HSR corridors during the 1990s (most of which preceded Clinton’s inauguration), but the
partially-high-speed Acela service on the Northeast Corridor was the extent of the Clinton
Administration’s actual progress on HSR in the United States.
ANT focuses on semiotics and sees meanings as contingent on the subjectivities of network
actors in specific times and places. From the purely economic perspective of an economist
like Hilton (1980), the rationalization of Amtrak would be its devolution and privatization
into a handful of disconnected corridors. Garrison and Levinson (2006, 106) asserts that in
transportation the goal of rationalization is efficiency. However, one person’s inefficiency is
another person’s salary. The definition of what is a rational network configuration depends
on who is doing the defining.
The rationalization of labor rules can be argued to have made Amtrak stronger by improving
its fare box recovery. The intermediaries produced by think tanks have provided an intel-
lectual framework for opponents and talking points for elected leaders, but seem to have
done little to destabilize intercity locomobility and translate it to a minority conservative
position. The intense but sporadic efforts of Amtrak’s legislative and executive opponents
to zero-out Federal support seem to primarily have had the effect of mobilizing an otherwise
quiescent actor-network of supporters into advocacy. So in Amtrak’s case, the adage that,
“what doesn’t kill you makes you stronger” may hold true.
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3.3.3 Resistance to Improvement
On February 17, 2009, newly-inaugurated President Obama signed into law the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA or PL 111-5), which included $8 billion for a na-
tional network of high speed rail corridors. 58 days later, Obama unveiled a more detailed
strategic plan with ten proposed 100- to 600-mile corridors in various parts of the country
(Federal Railroad Administration 2009b, 2009a). Little in this vision was actually new - most
of the corridors had been in various states of proposal, research, or planning for as long as
half a century (Cerren˜o, Evans, and Permut 2005; Cerren˜o and Mathur 2006; Federal Rail-
road Administration 1981). What was comparatively novel was the exertion of Presidential
leadership and the actual appropriation of a non-trivial amount of money to make this vision
a reality.
However, outside of upgrades to a handful of corridors to higher conventional speeds, this
effort ultimately proved to be no more successful than initiatives in the Johnson or Clinton
administrations. Arguably, the same network forces that have made Amtrak durable enough
to survive multiple attempts at destabilization have also made it highly resistant to change
of any kind.
The back-door funding of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA
or PL 110-432) via the ARRA reflected the weak political position of intercity rail. The
initial compromise formation of Amtrak was a translation incorporating variable geometry
that permitted both supporters and opponents of intercity rail to see Railpax as furthering
their oppositional goals. By contrast, the Vision for High Speed Rail was a marketing ploy
that offered little value to rail opponents and was arguably deceptive in what it offered its
beneficiaries.
Sold with imagery of sleek bullet trains (and, perhaps, legitimate hopes that would be
the ultimate end), most of the corridor proposals were conventional upgrades of existing
service (e.g. STL/CHI) or development of new conventional corridors (e.g. Ohio 3C). The
one legitimate true HSR possibility was Florida, which had a seriously flawed initial level
of utility (expressed as fare-box recovery) that could easily be attacked discursively and
defunded materially by a hostile governor newly elected in the reactionary wave election of
2010.
Automobility, aeromobility and locomobility were in competition for resources from the
global network, but automobility and aeromobility were larger and more stable. As an
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aggressive, expensive, geographically-expansive initiative by the rail network, the PRIIA
called attention to itself in a way that the comparatively inexpensive annual Amtrak subsidy
does not. Hence, the existing actor-networks were able to mobilize network resources in
opposition to the PRIIA that had not previously been available in efforts to defund the
stable Amtrak actor-network.
This conception of the rail/auto debate as competition between asymmetrical networks may
offer insights into why the failure of rail initiatives can give the appearance of a high-level
conspiracy to rail advocates. While there are overt expressions of negotiational opposition
like Southwest Airlines’ successful effort to quash the Texas TGV initiative in the early
1990s (Perl 2002, 166–169), the opposition or lack of political support for high-speed-rail
and higher-speed-rail (HrSR) initiatives is less easy to trace as direct, centrally-coordinate
quid pro quo between politicians and the “road gang” (Seiler 2008) via the circumstantial
evidence of campaign support. A similar network of support for HSR can be traced via
contributions of the construction industry to promote HSR ballot initiatives (Minn 2013).
Following ANT’s eschewing of the heroic for the tracing of human and non-human actor
relationships, the failure of HSR efforts can be seen as a failure of the HSR local network
to translate the global network in the face of a more fine-grained collection of negotiations
with the local networks of automobility and aeromobility. These networks pushed back in
opposition in a way that could be interpreted as a conspiracy, but which might simply be
seen as a manifestation of their durability.
Unlike the 1960s rail crisis that was, in fact, a crisis of the local rail actor-network that
demanded defensive translation of the comparatively strong global network, the 2008 reces-
sion was a broader crisis of the global network that an opportunistic actor-network of HSR
advocates attempted to translate for elaboration of their local network. The distributional
discursive strategy of 2009 was seed money for an aspirational mode of organization rather
than the desperate strategy of Amtrak’s 1970 formation where a network of riders and advo-
cates was seeking to avoid oblivion. The Amtrak of 2009 was a stable, stalemated network
that faced no immediate existential crisis.
As with discourses surrounding Amtrak, judgment of the PRIIA as a failure is made against
a standard of success that envisions an imagined network similar to the French TGV or
Japanese Shinkansen. This is a continuation of the discourse of failure that has surrounded
Amtrak like a halo since its foundation. If success is more simply defined as progress,
final evaluation of the PRIIA may be more positive. Distribution of resources was the
70
result of a discursive strategy that, consciously or not, became the opening position in
a negotiation between the global and local network. Funds were distributed around the
country as a political strategy to build a broad-based actor-network. But as the negotiation
process ensued, new Republican governors rejected distributed funds, and the funds ended
up back in the corridors where they could have a more immediate effect: St. Louis /
Chicago, Northeast Corridor, California. In Michigan, the ongoing transformations in the
auto industry closed plants, significantly reducing the freight utility of the Norfolk Southern’s
Michigan Line in their Dearborn Division, precipitating its sale to the State, and facilitating
a HrSR conversion with minimal interference from freight (Patch 2011; Bowen 2012b). The
process was indirect, but it did result in modest system improvement. Whether a different
strategy could have resulted in a more immodest outcome is an meaningful but ultimately
unknowable counterfactual inquiry.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated how ANT can be used to aggressively address both the social
and technical aspects of passenger rail in a way that offers a perspective distinct from research
that separates the social and technical worlds into distinct statistical reductions.
In this analysis, intercity passenger rail transportation can be said to have persisted in the US
because of the material, discursive and strategic strength of the actor-network associated with
that mode. This stability has been both positive and negative, with the Amtrak Equilibrium
both preventing dissolution and inhibiting expansion. While this stability has the significant
potential to persist in the future, such persistence could be disrupted by transitions in other
actor-networks that cause a juxtaposition in the locomobility actor-network.
Amtrak’s advent in the 1970s coincided with a pair of geopolitically-induced oil price shocks,
which Amtrak translated to its benefit in early marketing materials. In the present time,
Amtrak specifically and rail advocates in general frequently attempt to translate growing
environmental concerns with the nominal energy efficiency of rail transportation as a ratio-
nale for further expansion and public investment in passenger rail systems. However, since
the energy intensity advantage of long-distance passenger rail over other modes is contested
and contestable (chapter 5) and since long-distance rail represents a minuscule percentage
of long-distance passenger travel in the United States (Bureau of Transportation Statistics
2012, Table 1-40), persistent assertions of the energy efficiency of passenger rail may more a
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function of discursive durability and the existentially-motivated translation of sustainability
discourses than the result or cause of any significant material environmental effects.
The transition from fossil fuels to whatever comes after will be novel, although Smil (2010)
notes that past energy transitions have been protracted affairs, reflecting the deep embedding
of energy sources in the social and spatial forms that co-evolved with those energy sources.
This view is consistent with the ANT perspective on socio-technical systems as the often
durable products of complex relational networks. However, the finitude of fossil fuel sources
along with the uncertainty of that level of finitude and the historic adaptability of energy
actor-networks mean that durability should not be confused with permanence or inevitability.
In this context it is certainly possible to imagine the durable actor-network of intercity
passenger rail in the US having a greater role in a more-energy-constrained future. Yet
this perspective should also temper any expectations based on rail having inherent mystical
qualities that will someday restore it to the mythologized dominance of mobility that it had
in late-19th and early-20th centuries. For those seeking paths to the post-fossil-fuel future,
this should also suggest a need for further critical unpacking of common assertions about the
inherent energetic and environmental benefits of passenger rail, and examination of other
potential transition pathways.
A critique of ANT, and postmodernism in general, is that it is, “The true relativist’s world...a
world without foundations...” (Collins and Yearley 1992). If everything is relative, does
anything really matter, and does an ANT analysis make any contribution other than retelling
stories?
In many ways, ANT analysis can be seen as narrative art based in empirical reality. Art
allows us to step back from the rational and reductive and examine the multitude of variable
meanings often hidden in actions and choices. This places us in a new perspective for
examining our own motivations and our place in these dynamic actor-networks. It asks us
to question what kind of future we labor for - and for whom.
Is Amtrak a wasteful example of distributive politics or a medium that preserves the past for
a sustainable future? Meanings construct networks and networks construct values. Under-
standing those networks can give a clearer focus on what can and should be accomplished.
The choices we make will elaborate actor-networks that will endure long after we are gone.
In the same way that W. Graham Claytor and Claiborn Pell and Harley Staggers and their
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actor-networks shaped the railroads of our day, our choices will resonate in the lives of people
we will never know. We build infrastructure for our grandchildren, and their grandchildren,
and our obligation to them is to be good ancestors. But part of that responsibility involves
asking about meanings and exploring the question of what we mean by “good.”
73
Bibliography
Akrich, Madeline. 1992. The de-scription of technical objects. In Bijker and Law 1992, 205–
224.
Amtrak. 2012. Annual Report Fiscal Year 2011. Washington, DC: National Railroad Pas-
senger Corporation. http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/677/158/2011-Amtrak-Annual-
Report-Final.pdf (accessed 30 December 2012).
Amtrak Reform Council. 2002. An Action Plan For The Restructuring And Rationalization
Of The National Intercity Rail Passenger System. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
arc/report/finalplan.pdf (accessed 12 July 2012).
Atkinson, C.J. 2000. The ‘Soft Information Systems and Technologies Methodology’ (SIS-
TeM): An actor network contingency approach to integrated development. European
Journal of Information Systems 9 (2): 104–123.
Baron, David P. 1990. Distributive politics and the persistence of Amtrak. The Journal of
Politics 52 (3): 883–913.
Bijker, Wiebe E., and John Law, eds. 1992. Shaping Technology / Building Society. Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bowen, Douglas John. 2012a. Amtrak at 40: Here to stay - and grow. Railway Age 12 January.
http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/passenger/intercity/amtrak-at-40-
here-to-stay-%E2%80%94-and-grow.html (accessed 12 October 2012).
———. 2012b. STB OKs Michigan DOT rail line buy. Railway Age 8 May. http://www.
railwayage.com/index.php/passenger/high-performance/stb-oks-michigan-
dot-rail-line-buy.html (accessed 6 June 2013).
Bureau of Transportation Statistics. 2012. National Transportation Atlas Database. http:
//www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_atlas_database/2012/
(accessed 11 May 2014).
74
Callon, Michel. 1986. Some elements of a sociology of translation: Domestication of the
scallops and the fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay. In Power, Action and Belief: A New
Sociology of Knowledge? Ed. John Law, 196–223. London: Routledge / Kegan Paul.
Callon, Michel, John Law, and Arie Rip, eds. 1986. Mapping the Dynamics of Science and
Technology: Sociology of Science in the Real World. Hampshire, UK: Macmillan Press
Ltd.
Carter, James Earl. 1978. State of the Union Address. Washington, DC, 19 January. http:
//www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su78jec.phtml (accessed 12
October 2012).
———. 1981. State of the Union Address. Washington, DC, 16 January. http://www.
jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su81jec.phtml (accessed 12 Octo-
ber 2012).
Cerren˜o, Allison L. C. de, Daniel M. Evans, and Howard Permut. 2005. High-Speed Rail
Projects In The United States: Identifying The Elements For Success (MTI Report 05-
01). San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute.
Cerren˜o, Allison L. C. de, and Shishir Mathur. 2006. High-Speed Rail Projects In The United
States: Identifying The Elements For Success, Part 2 (MTI Report 03-03). San Jose,
CA: Mineta Transportation Institute.
Chen, Zhenhua. 2011. Is the policy window open for high-speed rail in the United States:
A perspective from the multiple streams model of policymaking. Transportation Law
Journal 38 (2).
Clinton, William J. 1997. Statement on Signing the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act
of 1997, 2 December. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=53648
(accessed 24 September 2012).
Collins, H.M., and Steven Yearley. 1992. Epistomological chicken. In Science as Practice and
Culture, ed. Andrew Pickering, 301–326. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Congressional Budget Office. 2011. The US Federal Budget: Infographic. http://www.cbo.
gov/publication/42636.
75
Coston, James E. 2001. The myth of passenger train profitability. In National Association of
Railroad Passengers, Philadelphia, 1 December. http://www.trainweb.org/moksrail/
advocacy/resources/essays/coston.htm (accessed 12 October 2012).
Crawford, Cassandra S. 2004. Actor network theory. In Encyclopedia of Social Theory, Vol-
ume 1, ed. George Ritzer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. http://www.
sagepub.com/upm- data/5222_Ritzer__Entries_beginning_with_A__[1].pdf
(accessed 12 October 2012).
Cwerner, Saulo, Sven Kesselring, and John Urry, eds. 2009. Aeromobilities. Oxon, UK: Rout-
ledge.
De Landa, Manuel. 2006. A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Com-
plexity. London and New York: Continuum.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. 1980 [1987]. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Dempsey, Paul Stephen. 2003. Transportation: A legal history. Transportation Law Journal
2:235–366.
Dobbin, Frank R. 1993. Vive la diffe´rence! In High Speed Trains: Fast Tracks to the Future,
ed. Staffan Hulte´n John Whitelegg and Torbjo¨rn Flink., 124–144. North Yorkshire, UK:
Leading Edge Press / Publishing.
Drum, Kevin. 2010. Carter’s legacy. Mother Jones 8 January. http://www.motherjones.
com/kevin-drum/2010/01/carters-legacy (accessed 12 October 2012).
Evans, Mike. 2009. Jimmy Carter: The Liberal Left and World Chaos: A Carter/Obama Plan
That Will Not Work. Phoenix, AZ: Time Worthy Books.
Federal Railroad Administration. 1981. Rail Passenger Corridors, Final Evaluation. Wash-
ington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration and National Railroad Passenger Corp.
———. 1998. Privatization of Intercity Rail Passenger Service in the United States. Wash-
ington, DC: United States Department of Transportation. http://www.fra.dot.gov/
downloads/Research/pirp.pdf (accessed 12 October 2012).
76
Federal Railroad Administration. 2009a. A Vision for High Speed Rail in America: Highlights
of Strategic Plan (April 16).Washington, DC: United States Department of Transporta-
tion. http://www.fra.dot.gov/Downloads/RRdev/hsrspfacts.pdf (accessed 24
August 2011).
———. 2009b. Overview, Highlights and Summary of the Passenger Rail Investment and Im-
provement Act of 2008 (PRIIA) (Public Law No. 110-432, Division B, enacted Oct. 16,
2008, Amtrak/High-Speed Rail). Washington, DC: United States Department of Trans-
portation. http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/PRIIA%2520Overview%2520031009.
pdf (accessed 12 October 2012).
———. 2012. Chronology Of High-Speed Rail Corridors: Designations And Extensions.
Washington, DC: United States Department of Transportation. http://www.fra.
dot.gov/rpd/passenger/618.shtml (accessed 12 October 2012).
Freemark, Yonah. 2008. Reality Check: Clinton ‘92. http://www.thetransportpolitic.
com/2008/12/10/reality-check-clinton-92/ (accessed 3 January 2013).
Freud, Sigmund. 1910. Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory, tran. A.A. Brill. New
York: The Journal of Nervous / Mental Disease Publishing Company. http://books.
google.com/books?id=wwqVFLKXDpIC (accessed 14 January 2010).
Garrison, William L., and David M. Levinson. 2006. The Transportation Experience: Policy,
Planning and Deployment. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Geels, Frank W. 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31 (8-9): 1257–1274.
———. 2010. Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the multi-level
perspective. Research Policy 39 (4): 495–510.
Harvey, David. 1990. The Condition of Postmodernity. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers
Inc.
———. 1999 [2006]. The Limits to Capital. London.
Hilton, George Woodman. 1980. Amtrak: The National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
77
Hiner, Matthew. 2006. Nationalization and Deregulation: The Creation of Conrail and the
Demise of the ICC, 1973–1980. PhD diss., University of Akron (Ohio). http://etd.
ohiolink.edu/view.cgi?acc_num=akron1150310691 (accessed 20 September 2012).
Hughes, Thomas P. 1983. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society. Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Jackson, Kenneth. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jensen, Ole B. 2013. The mobile city: reviewing and positioning. In Staging Mobilities, 19–
42. Oxon, UK: Routledge.
Jørgensen, Ulrik. 2012. Mapping and navigating transitions–The multi-level perspective com-
pared with arenas of development. Research Policy 41:996–1010.
Latour, Bruno. 1988a. The Pasteurization of France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
———. 1988b. The politics of explanation: An alternative. In Knowledge and Reflexivity,
New Frontiers in the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Steve Woolgar, 155–177. London: Sage.
———. 1996. Aramis, or The Love of Technology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
———. 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press.
Law, John. 2009. Actor network theory and material semiotics. In The New Blackwell Com-
panion to Social Theory, ed. Bryan S. Turner, 141–158. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ISBN:
978-1-405-16900-04.
Law, John, and Michel Callon. 1992. The life and death of an aircraft: A network analysis
of technical change. In Bijker and Law 1992, 21–52.
Leatherby, Gayle, and Gillian Reynolds. 2005. Train Tracks: Work, Play and Politics on the
Railways. Oxford and New York: Berg.
Lyon, Peter. 1968. To Hell in a Day Coach. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
78
Martin, Albro. 1971. Enterprise Denied: Origins of the Decline of American, Railroads,
1897–1917. New York: Columbia University Press.
Minn, Michael. 2013. The political economy of high speed rail in the United States.Mobilities
8 (2): 185–200.
Morgan, David P. 1959. Who shot the passenger train? Trains April.
Nixon, Richard M. 1978. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grossett / Dunlap.
Northrup, Herbert R. 1995. Railroad labor protective programs in mergers: Generous public
policy for a favored few. Transportation Law Journal 23:175–205.
Patch, David. 2011. Michigan to buy rail line for high-speed Amtrak: U.S. to pay for upgrade
on 135-mile segment. Toledo Blade 21 June. http://www.toledoblade.com/local/
2011/07/21/Michigan-to-buy-rail-line-for-high-speed-Amtrak.html (accessed
27 September 2012).
Pell, Claiborne. 1966. Megalopolis Unbound: The Supercity and the Transportation of To-
morrow. New York: Praeger.
Perl, Anthony. 2002. New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First
Century. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
Phillips, Don. 2011a. Fast train phobia: Why America just can’t fall in love with high speed
rail. Trains 71 (4): 42–43.
———. 2011b. The road to rescue. Classic Trains Summer:22–31.
Reagan, Ronald Wilson. 1985. State of the Union Address, 6 February. Washington, DC.
http://www.enebooks.com/data/JK82mxJBHsrAsdHqQvsK/2009-07-20/1248076923.
pdf (accessed 11 May 2014).
Ribuffo, Leo P. 1988. Jimmy Carter and the ironies of American liberalism. Vol. Autumn.
http://www.gettysburgreview.com/selections/past_selections/index.dot?
inode = 2783180 & pageTitle = Jimmy % 20Carter % 20and % 20the % 20Ironies % 20of %
20American%20Liberalism&crumbTitle=Jimmy%20Carter%20and%20the%20Ironies%
79
20of%20American%20Liberalism&author=Leo%20P.%20Ribuffo&story=true (ac-
cessed 12 October 2012).
Ruming, Kristian. 2009. Following the actors: Mobilising an actor-network theory method-
ology in geography. Australian Geographer 40 (4): 451–469.
Samuelson, Robert J. 2010. Calif. rail project is high-speed pork. Washington Post 1.
http : / / www . washingtonpost . com / wp - dyn / content / article / 2010 / 10 / 31 /
AR2010103104260.html (accessed 11 May 2014).
Scallon, Sean. 2009. Carter conservatism. American Conservative 9 April. http://www.
theamericanconservative . com / articles / carter - conservatism/ (accessed 22
September 2012).
Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. 1977. The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and
Space in the 19th Century. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.
Seiler, Cotton. 2008. Republic of Drivers: A Cultural History of Automobility in America.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sheller, Mimi, and John Urry. 2006. The new mobilities paradigm. Environment and Plan-
ning A 38 (2): 207–226.
Singleton, Vicky, and Mike Michael. 1993. Actor-networks and ambivalence: General practi-
tioners in the UK cervical screening programme. Social Studies of Science 23 (3): 227–
264.
Smil, Vaclav. 2010. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger.
Solomon, Brian. 2006. Working On the Railroad. St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishing Company.
Stone, Richard D., and Michael Landry. 2004. Sunsetting the ICC: Is it really dead? Essays
in Economic and Business History 22:213–228.
Stover, John F. 1970. The Life and Decline of the American Railroad. New York: Oxford
University Press.
80
Stover, John F. 1997. American Railroads. Second edition. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
The United States Congress. 1993. H.R.1919, 103rd Congress (High-Speed Rail Development
Act of 1993). http://www.congress.gov/cgi- bin/bdquery/z?d103:HR01919:
@@@L&summ2=m& (accessed 9 June 2013).
Thoms, William E., and Sonja Clapp. 1988. Labor protection in the transportation industry.
North Dakota Law Review 64:379–422.
Tobey, Laurence E. 1986. Costs, benefits, and the future of Amtrak. Transportation Law
Journal 15:245–304.
United States Department of Transportation. 1978. A Reexamination of the Amtrak Route
Structure. Washington, DC. http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/rrdev/reex-
may78.pdf (accessed 19 August 2012).
United States Interstate Commerce Commission. 1958. Railroad Passenger Train Deficit,
[Docket] no. 31954. Washington, DC. http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=
mdp.39015018275076;size=125;view=image;page=root;seq=1 (accessed 15 August
2012).
Urry, John. 2004. The ‘system’ of automobility. Theory, Culture & Society 21 (4–5): 25–39.
———. 2007. Mobilities. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Vranich, Joseph. 2004. End Of The Line: The Failure Of Amtrak Reform And The Future
Of America’s Passenger Trains. Washington, DC: AEI Press.
Weaver, R. Kent. 1985. The Politics of Industrial Change: Railway Policy in North America.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
Weber, Max Maria von. 1882. Vom Rollenden Flu¨gelrade. Berlin: A. Hoffmann & Comp.
http://books.google.com/books?id=xgozAQAAMAAJ (accessed 11 May 2014).
Whittle, Andrea, and Andre´ Spicer. 2008. Is actor network theory critique? Organization
Studies 29 (4): 611–629.
81
Wickham, Gary, and Gavin Kendall. 1999. Using Foucault’s Methods. London: Sage Publi-
cations Ltd.
Wilner, Frank N. 1994. The Amtrak Story. Omaha, NE: Simmons-Boardman.
Zimmerman, Karl R. 2004. All Aboard! Passenger Trains Around the World. Honesdale, PA:
Boyds Mills Press.
82
CHAPTER 4
CONTESTED POWER: AMERICAN LONG-DISTANCE PASSENGER RAIL
AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF ENERGY INTENSITY ANALYSIS
This paper is a meta-review of research on passenger rail energy consumption
that examines the factors that affect the energy intensity of rail, the comparative
energy intensity of alternative modes (auto, air and bus), and the sources of dis-
crepancies between different published energy intensity figures. The ambiguities
underlying those discrepancies point to fundamental questions about what phe-
nomena is being quantified in energy intensity analysis, and whether any trans-
port mode can be said to universally have an energy intensity advantage over
other modes.
Keywords: energy intensity, energy efficiency, Amtrak, railroad, load factor, cir-
cuity
Concerns about the amount of energy used for transportation have been translated by rail
advocates as a rationale for support of passenger rail systems for at least the past four
decades. Amtrak (2013) cites data from Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012, 2–14) to market
itself as “almost 20 percent more efficient than domestic airline travel and 30 percent more
efficient than auto travel on a per-passenger-mile basis.” This energy-efficiency rationale is
a common part of the broader contemporary sustainability discourse in regards to different
scales of rail transport, including streetcars, light rail, regional/commuter rail, and high-
speed rail.
Numerous authors (including Kunstler 2005; Heinberg 2005, 2006; Regional Plan Associa-
tion 2006; Runte 2006; Winter 2006; Newton 2008; Brown 2009; MacKay 2009; Frank 2009;
Newman, Beatley, and Boyer 2009; Orr 2009) and many others, have suggested that pas-
senger rail should play a greater role as fossil fuel resources become more expensive and
difficult to extract, and as those constraints reduce the viability of the dominant auto/air
transportation paradigm.
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Underlying those suggestions is a vast body of energy intensity research that has accrued
over the past half century. But despite the appearance of objectivity created with the use of
large data sets and rigorous mathematical techniques, significant discrepancies exist among
published figures. These discrepancies hint at not only the complexity of the phenomena
being observed, but the subjectivities inherent in the reduction of complex phenomena to
a limited set of numbers, and fundamental questions of exactly what phenomena is being
analyzed.
Long-distance passenger rail in the United States operates in a liminal space between public
and private, between fossil and renewable, between nostalgia and progress, between commu-
tation and recreation, between success and failure. As such it serves as an rich medium for
examining the ambiguities and contradictions of energy intensity analysis. This paper will
critically review the existing literature on comparative energy intensity of long-distance pas-
senger rail with a focus on unpacking and analyzing the questions embedded in the published
aggregate figures used in comparison with other modes and other nations.
4.1 Overview of Historic and Current Energy Intensity Estimates
The energy intensity of a service is commonly expressed in terms of a ratio of some particular
measurement of useful work versus some measurement of energy required to do that work.
The comparative efficiency of different services can then be evaluated based on the differing
levels of energy intensity needed to perform the same task.
Amtrak’s formative first decade as the only national long-distance passenger rail service in
the US coincided with the rise of the environmental movement and a concomitant focus
on material rapaciousness. Although minimizing vehicle fuel consumption has long been
a research topic motivated by business considerations (e.g. Baker 1909; Haines 1919) and
concerns about the limitations of petroleum resources date back to at least the 1870s (Smil
2010, 62), the contemporary body of research on generalized modal energy intensity seems
have had its advent with “System energy as a factor in considering future transportation,”
a paper by Richard Rice (1970) presented to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.
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The subsequent “energy crises” associated with a pair of oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979
that were triggered by geopolitical events in the Middle East increased public awareness of
the dependence of modern lifestyles on inexpensive energy sources and unleashed a flood of
both private and government-sponsored energy research in the 1970s. Many of those reports
include time-series of estimates going back to the 1950s.
The summative scatter plot in figure 4.1 includes US passenger mode energy intensity es-
timates from Rice (1970); Hirst (1973); Federal Energy Administration (1974); Hannon et
al. (1975); Mittal (1977); American Bus Association (1977); The United States Congress
(1979), as well as the baseline figures from Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012) and John Dun-
ham and Associates (2012), and contemporary US time-series estimates from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (2013a, table 4-20) and Federal Highway Administration (2013).
Figure 4.1: Comparison of Historical Energy Intensity Research Results
Despite the significant variances, historical narratives of energy transition are visible in the
different estimates:
• The transition of aviation to low-efficiency turbojets in the 1950s and 1960s is reflected
in steep increases in intensity, with subsequent decreases attributable to improvements
in engine efficiency as well as operational changes wrought by industry deregulation in
1978 and by increased fuel prices.
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• The completion of the transition of passenger rail from steam to Diesel traction in the
early 1950s resulted in a significant drop in intensity, while comparative stasis since the
creation of Amtrak in the 1970s reflects the limited amount of technical or operational
innovation since that time.
• Although the technical efficiency of automobiles improved significantly in the 1970s
and 1980s, the intensity figures have remained stable since the 1990s as those efficiency
gains have been plowed back into larger vehicles and increased horsepower (Knittel
2012). This continues a longer trend of stability that extends back into the 1920s
(Sivak and Tsimhoni 2009).
• Bus energy intensity has also remained quite stable, which may reflect the limited op-
portunities and/or incentives for dramatic technical improvement of an already highly-
efficient (and, arguably, highly-uncomfortable) mode of transport.
Amtrak has marketed itself since its advent as an energy-efficient choice, and has seen mean-
ingful ridership increases during fuel price shocks (United States Department of Transporta-
tion 1978, ES-1; Amtrak 2009, 34). However research since the 1970s has consistently shown
Amtrak as having little or no energy intensity advantage over other modes - especially buses
(in addition to the citations for the graph above, see Boeing 1975; Mulvey 1978; Congres-
sional Budget Office 1979). And a number of industry-sponsored and advocacy-group studies
have been actively hostile to Amtrak’s ecological assertions (e.g. Continental Trailways 1975;
Hilton 1980; O’Toole 2012).
Amtrak’s currently published energy intensity numbers come from the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory’s (ORNL) Transportation Energy Data Book (Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012,
2-14), prepared for the US Department of Energy (USDOE). Those numbers are derived
primarily from official government statistics and are shown in in figure 4.2. Neither the
USDOE, BTS or FirstGroup plc (the operator of Greyhound, the only national motorcoach
carrier in the US) include any specific efficiency information for long-distance buses, so the
energy intensity of 713 BTU/passenger-mile (6.0 vehicle-MPG Diesel) is based on 2010 fuel
and passenger-mile data published by the American Bus Association (ABA) Foundation
(John Dunham and Associates 2012).
86
Figure 4.2: 2010 Baseline Modal Energy Intensity (BTU per Passenger-Miles)
A major hindrance to comparison of statistics from different sources is this expression of
energy intensity in a variety of units. Energy is measured in different multiples of Watts,
Joules, kilocalories, and (occasionally) in gallons or tonnes of often unspecified fuels. Dis-
tance is a bit more standardized, with miles used in the United States and kilometers used
almost everywhere else. The question of exactly what is being moved for that distance -
passenger-miles vs. seat-miles vs. train-miles - increases the number of incompatible permu-
tations (e.g. PKM/MJ, BTU/PMT, MPG, etc). While these numbers can be converted to
common units with a minimal amount of effort, such techniques are beyond the knowledge
of many policymakers and consumers, resulting in a level of mystification that is unfortunate
at best and deceptive at worst.
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4.2 What Energy is Being Measured?
Another ambiguity in assessing energy intensity is defining exactly what energy is being
measured.
Almost all contemporary passenger rail systems are powered either by onboard Diesel engines
or with electricity supplies by external sources and delivered through overhead catenary wire
or an electrified third rail. With Diesel-powered trains or other transport modes powered by
liquid hydrocarbons (which represent most forms of transportation), the energy used can be
calculated by multiplying the volumes or masses of fuel consumed by standardized values of
heat content embodied in the specific types of fuel consumed.
However, with electrified rail, the electricity can be sourced through the electrical grid from
both fossil-fuel plants and non-fossil sources like hydroelectric, nuclear, wind or solar. While
energy calculations with fossil-fuel plants can be made in the same manner as with fossil-
fueled vehicles, there is no uncontested method for assessing the energy inputs to non-fossil
generators (Bonnafous and Raux 2003, 296).
In 2010, Amtrak used around 63 million gallons of Diesel fuel and 559 gWh of electricity
for traction, with the electricity use exclusively in the Northeast Corridor (Davis, Diegel,
and Boundy 2012, A-23). For the baseline Amtrak figure used in this report, Davis, Diegel,
and Boundy (2012) follow the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2013a, table 4-27) in
converting electricity to BTU using a heat rate of 10,339 BTU per kWh that assumes a
33% conversion efficiency for fossil-generated electricity and results in an system-average
energy intensity of 2,271 BTU per passenger-mile. However, the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (2013a, table 4-20; 2013a, table 4-26) presents alternative data consistent with
European practice (UIC 2012) that uses the theoretical heat content of 3,412 BTU per kWh,
resulting in an intensity figure of 1,668 BTU per passenger-mile that is 27% lower than
the Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012) figure and makes Amtrak’s energy efficiency appear
significantly better than competing modes (other than buses).
While most authors and agencies evaluating electrified rail in comparison to Diesel-powered
rail seem to ignore this incompatibility, rail critic Roger Kemp (1994, 2004) incorporated
fossil power-plant losses, transmission system losses, and catenary system losses in asserting
that in the UK, cars, airplanes and rail are largely equivalent in terms of primary fuel use.
Kemp did acknowledge that the “conditions could be very different” in countries where elec-
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tricity comes largely from nuclear or hydro, but he did not propose any analytical method for
comparing situations with those different conditions (Kemp 1994, 79). Garc´ıa A´lvarez (2010)
notes that Kemp’s HSR energy figures are significantly higher than measured performance
on a comparable Spanish AVE system.
Figure 4.3: World Statistics Adjusted to US Heat Rate Values (BTS 2013; UIC 2012)
Even within the nominally objective realm of the theoretical heat content, there are areas of
meaningful ambiguity that affect the reliability and comparability of published numbers.
Hydrocarbon fuel sources contain empirically-measurable amounts of heat content. However,
the actual heat content for specific supplies of a fossil or organic fuel can vary by weight
or mass, with different types of coal presenting an especially wide range of values (30MM
BTU/ton for high-quality bituminous to 9 MM BTU/ton for low-quality lignite). Heat
contents are tracked and averaged by government agencies (United States Energy Information
Administration 2012; Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012). Ethanol has a significantly lower
energy density than conventional gasoline (84,600 BTU/gallon vs 125,000 BTU/gallon) and
the increased blending of ethanol in standard automobile fuel calls into question any statistics
based on the conversions of gasoline gallons into energy content using the conventional
content value.
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In addition, the heat content of a fuel can be expressed as gross (high) value which includes
all heat released when the fuel is burned, or a net (low) value which excludes the latent heat
of water vapor formed during combustion, resulting in a difference of 5-10% depending on
fuel. The US EIA uses the high heating values, while the low heating values are typically
used in European calculations (EIA 2012, 321), making energy intensity figures from Europe
understated relative to US statistics.
While the use of the theoretical rather than heat-rate conversion factors may reflect a desire
by rail operators to improve the marketability of passenger rail as sustainable, the choice of
conversion factors reflects a substantive core assumption about what is being sustained.
The fundamental incomparability of energy from fossil and renewable sources raises a core
question of exactly what phenomenon is being measured under the concept of energy in-
tensity. Conservationist discourse presumes that lower energy intensity is better, and the
advent of contemporary energy intensity research in the 1970s has a direct philosophical
connection to a discourse of scarcity (Hemmingsen 2010). When comparing modes powered
by fossil fuels, the phenomena is efficient use of finite stocks. In relation to modes using
renewably-generated electricity, the phenomena is maximizing utility of constricted flows.
Efficiency ratings based on theoretical potential do exist for wind turbines and solar cells
(e.g. Manwell, McGowan, and Rogers 2009, 34; Green et al. 2012), but since the lost energy
with renewables is from flows that can be presumed to continue indefinitely, such efficiency
is conceptually different from efficiency losses of finite, irreplaceable fossil energy stocks.
4.3 What Life-Cycle Energy is Considered?
Most published energy-intensity statistics only consider the operational energy directly used
by the vehicles, although in some cases losses in the electrical generation or fuel produc-
tion process are considered (e.g. Kemp 1994; Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012, A-23). All
transportation systems require vast amounts of resources to facilitate their operation. Since
those resources require energy to manufacture, maintain and operate, that energy has been
considered in assessing the energy intensity of a transport mode.
One common analytical methodology involves the use of Leontief (1966) I/O matrices of the
US economy in conjunction with industrial energy pricing information to create energy-dollar
flow models for calculating the direct and indirect energy costs of goods and services.
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Hirst (1972) performed this type of analysis for total automobile energy costs (in a mono-
graph of otherwise conventional statistical analysis) using coefficients from Reardon (1971)
and concluded that in 1968, the total life-cycle energy used by an automobile was twice the
amount of direct energy use from fuel. This analysis does not appear to include the energy
costs of road construction. In a similar analysis of aviation, Hirst (1974b) used 1963 coeffi-
cients from Herendeen (1973) to conclude that indirect energy use represented an additional
33% above the direct energy use by airplanes of fuel, although 60% of that was devoted to
fuel refining. The Energy Research Group at the University of Illinois under the direction of
Bruce Hannon used the I/O technique extensively for a number of years across a wide range
of sectors, including transportation (Hannon 1973; Bullard and Herendeen 1975).
Results from Hirst (1974a, 1974b) and Hannon et al. (1975) are shown along with the 2010
baseline intensity figures in figure 4.4. More recently, Lenzen (1999) also applied this tech-
nique in Australia and his results are included at the bottom of figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Direct and Indirect (Life Cycle) BTU Per Passenger-Mile
A complimentary bottom-up approach emerged in the 1970s with Fels (1975; 1976; 1978;
Levi 2011) that involves decomposing product life-cycles into processes and materials that are
then analyzed for their energy intensity, with the results summed to find the indirect energy
91
embedded in a product or service. This methodology has become especially popular in recent
years for analyzing the greenhouse-gas impacts of individual consumer purchasing choices.
While this methodology is fraught with issues about where to set analytical boundaries, the
process can be seen as somewhat more intuitive than the I/O accounting method.
Unfortunately there does not yet appear to be a comprehensive life cycle analysis of Amtrak,
and separating the costs of passenger from freight service has been a highly contested issue
for decades (United States Interstate Commerce Commission 1958; Morgan 1959; Berge
1964; Hilton 1980; Phillips 2013). Assuming that track damage and wear is proportional to
ton-miles (Talcott 1904), Amtrak’s share of rail maintenance energy outside of the passenger-
intensive Northeast Corridor is likely minimal. Amtrak (2011) traveled around 37 million
train-miles in 2011. Assuming a typical long-distance train weight of 850 tons similar to
the California Zephyr, Amtrak only accounted for 31 billion or under 2% of the 1.7 trillion
ton-miles carried by US Class I railroads (Association of American Railroads 2012). Since
most non-NEC Amtrak rail service operates on tracks shared with freight, US long-distance
rail does not incur the energy costs of dedicated infrastructure typical to HSR systems in
other countries.
The situation is similar for automobiles and buses. Automobiles and buses are totally depen-
dent upon a vast street and highway network, and robust maintenance is critical to passenger
travel. But Chester (2008, 40) notes that the damage to roadways follows a fourth power
function of weight per axle, and the vast majority of roadway damage (including 98.4% of
the damage to rural interstates) is attributable to freight trucks.
Fels (1976) and Congressional Budget Office (1979) asserted that the energy cost of rail
equipment manufacture was comparatively insignificant when distributed over the opera-
tional life of a vehicle, something that likely remains applicable to the long-lived Superliner
passenger cars from the late 1970s and mid 1980s that dominate Amtrak’s long-distance
routes.
Chester (2008) performed a comprehensive transport life-cycle energy analysis on a variety
of transport modes, including three types of light-duty vehicle, three types of airplanes, three
types of urban rail systems, the Caltrain commuter service, and the proposed California HSR
system. Some of those numbers are included with the historical numbers in future 4.4. The
Caltrain numbers may be at least vaguely applicable to long-distance service, as Caltrain
operates Diesel trains on shared corridors.
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Chester’s findings for rail, aviation and automobiles are surprisingly similar on a percentage
basis to Fels’ data of almost 40 years prior. As with operating energy, rail and sedans are
fairly similar on an absolute per-passenger-mile basis in both direct and indirect energy. The
much smaller amount of terrestrial infrastructure needed for aviation does appear to give
it an advantage on a life-cycle basis. However, the significant technological and economic
changes over the 34 years call into question the comparability of these different studies, and
the very significant differences between the US and Australian studies call into question
whether there is a definitive, essential life-cycle energy intensity that can be universally
associated with any transportation mode.
4.4 What is Long Distance?
In focusing on long-distance rail as an object of analysis, a definition must be made of of
exactly what “long-distance” is. This leads to an ontological ambiguity as to whether such
operations can be considered distinct from non-long-distance operations.
Much of the current policy discourse on rail focuses on commuter/regional rail, subway,
light rail and streetcar lines as potential solutions for fostering sustainable mobility and
economics by permitting dense residential and commercial development. High-speed rail
(HSR) in the US is largely envisioned as an extension of regional/commuter rail that will
permit integration of mega-regions as substitution for short-haul aviation.
By contrast, long-distance lines hearken back to an older mobility paradigm that predates
broadly-available commercial aviation. In a more energy-constrained future, energy-intensive
commercial aviation may become less economically-viable as a mobility solution for the
general public. Should such constraints also affect the ability to maintain automobility and
the vast, complex physical infrastructure that makes automobility practical, a larger role for
railroads in long-distance travel may (or may not) become practical.
Amtrak, the only remaining national passenger rail carrier in the US, has used a variety
of categorizations of service for reporting purposes over the years, although recent Amtrak
(2012, A-34) monthly reports divide service into three categories: the Northeast Corridor
Spine, State Supported and Other Short Distance Corridors, and Long Distance, with specific
train names provided in the categories. The long-distance category ranges from the 780-mile
Capitol Limited (Chicago to Washington, DC) to the 2,728-mile Texas Eagle (Chicago to Los
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Angeles). The Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (section 201) defined
long-distance as over 750 miles. Puentes, Tomer, and Kane (2013) define long-distance rail
travel as around 400 miles or greater, which is below the 500-600 mile upper limit where
high-speed rail has classically been considered competitive with air travel (Hay 1967; Perl
and Goetz 2013).
Despite this nominal distinction, in practice long-distance routes commonly overlap and share
riders with corridor operations. For example, the 934-mile City of New Orleans between
Chicago and New Orleans is a third train along with the 300-mile Saluki and Illini in the
Chicago-Champaign-Carbondale Illinois corridor. The 1,377-mile Crescent between New
York City and New Orleans begins its route as one of a multitude of different trains in the
heavily-trafficked Northeast Corridor that is shared with the New Jersey Transit and Metro
North commuter lines. Long-distance routes have multiple intermediate stops and many
individual journeys are much shorter than the full route length.
Corridor-only operations have tighter seat pitch (higher per-car capacity) and lack other
amenities like sleeper or dining cars that cater to passengers making extended journeys.
This makes the distinction meaningful for energy-intensity analysis, but the absence of dis-
aggregated operational information for long-distance service makes specificity difficult.
4.5 How Many People are In Each Vehicle?
The task of carrier management in the private sector and transportation policy in the public
sector is to juggle the conflicting demands of capital utilization, customer satisfaction, opera-
tional cost, and political support in a way that maximizes satisfaction of institutional goals.
While conservationist and economic perspectives value maximizing the number of people
in vehicles and, accordingly, minimizing the amount of capital and energy investment, the
plethora of other influences on vehicle loading add difficulty to the ascertainment of any
fundamental energetic advantages of a particular transport technology, and make it difficult
to objectively compare aggregated energy intensity numbers across modes.
Load factor is the percentage of available vehicle seats occupied during a period of operation.
Although an increased number of passengers adds weight and can increase the amount of
fuel consumed by a vehicle, in general such increases are slight and load factor can be
seen as inversely proportional to energy intensity. Load factor represents a ratio between
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potential efficiency and actual efficiency. If high energy efficiency and / or strong economic
performance are primary goals, high load factors are needed.
On common carriers load factors can vary widely by route, day and season. Aggregation
of these different operations makes comparison simpler, but obscures fine-grained variations
that may be meaningful to rational assessment of specific subsets of operations for the mode
as a whole. High-density main line routes can be dependent on passengers brought to hubs
on low load factor feeder routes. Because long-distance trains and buses make multiple
stops along their route, capacity utilization can vary widely along the route, although this
is averaged by dividing overall passenger-miles by seat-miles (United States Department of
Transportation 2013).
The system-wide FY 2007 average load factor for Amtrak (2008) of 52% is the aggregate of
load factors for different routes ranging from 31% for the New York-Harrisburg, PA Key-
stone Service to 68% for the New York-Montreal Adirondack route. Amtrak’s load factor
in 2011 varied over the year from 45% to 64% with a yearly average of 52% (United States
Department of Transportation 2013).
The US domestic average air load factor of 83% for 2012 varied over the year from 78% in
January to 87% in July (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2013b). Airlines have historically
needed load factors of at least 65% to break even, and that has increased to around 80% in
recent years. The actual minimum economic load factor for any given airline is dependent
upon economic conditions (Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack 2013).
Although Greyhound, the only remaining national motorcoach carrier in the US, does not
publicly disclose load factors, a report by M.J. Bradley and Associates (2007) cited a census
conducted by the American Bus Association in placing the scheduled motorcoach load factor
for 2004 at around 47%. The John Dunham and Associates (2012) bus census reported 34.1
passengers per service mile in 2011, which yields a load factor of 62% assuming a typical
55-passenger bus. However, the percent of bus passenger-miles from regularly-schedule in-
tercity service has dropped from 81% in 1970 to around 30% in 2010 (Rose 1979, 5-9; John
Dunham and Associates 2012, 12), so industry-wide bus figures that aggregate regularly-
scheduled, charter, tour, airport and sightseeing services are less than directly comparable
to the scheduled-service-only figures for Amtrak.
Official public load factor information for international rail systems is difficult to come by,
but load factors in the US seem to be in line with load factors on comparable international
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systems. Figure 4.5 includes sources mentioned in New Lines Programme (2009) augmented
with additional data from public statements and news reports that cannot be assured to
be accurate. Some quoted HSR load factors are well above 50%, although the publication
of figures only for popular lines avoids system averaging that more clearly reflects less-
trafficked lines that are important to the functioning of the network as a whole. Andersson
and Lukaszewicz (2006, 9) contrast local versus long-distance service in noting that local
and regional services have to provide spare capacity to manage large rush-hour peaks, which
results in modest average load factors of 20% to 40%, while the long travel times and high,
demand-regulated pricing associated with long-distance and HSR service result in smoothed
load factors that average in the 50% to 75% range on different systems.
Figure 4.5: Load Factors for US Common Carriers and Various World Rail Systems
The analogous metric for private automobiles is occupancy rate, or number of occupants
per vehicle, with the energy efficiency metric of passenger miles per gallon obtained by
multiplying occupancy rate times the vehicle miles per gallon.
Because the operation of private vehicles is not directly monitored by any central coordi-
nating entity in the same way as airlines or rail, occupancy rate statistics must be modeled
based on travel and traffic surveys, adding significant levels of uncertainty, especially when
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attempting to consider the purpose of travel or when comparing statistics over vastly dif-
ferent time periods. The BTS and FHWA base their passenger-mile estimates on the 2009
National Household Travel Survey, but the BTS/FHWA use an automobile occupancy rate of
1.35 versus the 1.55 used by Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012), which results in higher auto
energy intensity in the BTS/FHWA numbers. Because the FHWA data is only grouped by
short- and long-wheelbase light-duty vehicles, Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012) use a model
to divide between “cars” and “light trucks,” which likely filters out large energy-intensive
commercial vehicles from the latter category.
While individual automobiles only need to operate when demand dictates, and have the
potential for higher load factors than regularly scheduled common carriers, the trend globally
has been in the opposite direction. Scha¨fer et al. (2009, 82) note a decrease in occupants per
vehicle in the US from 2.2 in 1969 to 1.59 in 1995, with the decrease attributed primarily to
decrease in household size and increase in number of vehicles. Accordingly, any assumption
that automobile energy intensity is a fixed value or one that teleologically can only improve
with technology is subject to question.
A further ambiguity with the use of occupancy rate in energy intensity analysis is the different
averages for local and long-distance driving. Rail critic O’Toole (2012) cites Thompson
(1996) in pointing out that in automobile trips longer than 75 miles (which presumably are
in competition for riders with long-distance Amtrak), the occupancy rate for autos in 1990
was 2.19 occupants per vehicle, versus the average of 1.6 for all auto trips commonly used
for computation of energy intensity. Data from the more-recent 2009 National Household
Travel Survey indicates slight increases in overall occupancy rate, and that the occupancy
rate for “social and recreational” purposes (which could also be presumed to compete more
directly with Amtrak) at 2.2 occupants per vehicle (Santos et al. 2011, 33). Using that
higher occupancy rate, the aggregate statistical energy advantage of Amtrak over private
automobiles largely disappears.
4.6 What is Distance?
No transportation mode can provide direct point-to-point access except in the most trivial (or
expensive) cases. All modes involve some additional distance for routing considerations and
non-revenue movements as well as, in the case of common carriers, access to terminals from
initial points of departure and ultimate destinations. When energy intensity is expressed
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simply as BTU-per-passenger-mile, these additional miles of circuity are not considered and
the energy intensity per mile of meaningful distance traveled is understated.
This is an especially significant consideration with the existing, limited Amtrak network.
When traveling between city pairs that have direct connections, the train will likely be on
par with driving distance. The great circle distance between Chicago and New Orleans is
about 835 miles. Driving distance is around 925 miles (1.11x circuity multiple) with the City
of New Orleans distance stated as 934 miles (1.12x circuity multiple).
However, when traveling between city pairs that require multiple trains, the distance pre-
mium can be substantial, in addition to possibility that uncoordinated schedules and op-
erational delays may result in long layovers in the transfer city. The great circle distance
between Seattle and New Orleans is around 2,100 miles. Driving distance is around 2,600
miles (1.24x circuity) and Amtrak service through Chicago is a total of 3,140 miles (1.5x
circuity). In such a case, the train would have to be 18% less energy intensive than driving
and 33% less energy intensive than flying (assuming a direct flight) simply to be on par with
either mode.
Boeing (1975) performed an analysis of 94 city pairs to find ranges of circuity multiples for
different travel modes (figure 4.6). This analysis by an aircraft company clearly favored
direct air travel as travel distances increase, although the report acknowledges that highly
circuitous rail travel was uncommon and that the most frequently traveled city pairs on
Amtrak were below a circuity of 1.45x.
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Figure 4.6: Circuity Trends Based on 94 City-Pairs Analysis (45)
4.7 What is the Purpose of Transportation?
This conception of circuity is based in the utilitarian perspective of neoclassical economics,
which also happens to be at the core of the definition of energy intensity, and which serves as
the foundation of much of the oppositional rhetoric to Amtrak’s continued existence. From
this viewpoint, the purpose of transportation is to get from origin to destination using a
minimum of time, distance, energy and cost. This perspective privileges the quantitative
over the qualitative and frames as irrational the reasoning used by riders that make an
aesthetic choice of Amtrak over faster, shorter and more-efficient modes.
A report by the United States Government Accountability Office (2006, 23-24) included a
survey-based estimate that over 80 percent of riders on long-distance Amtrak routes were
on “recreational and leisure trips, including visits with family and friends and for personal
business, compared with other types of travel, such as business or commuting.” 33% of long-
distance rail travelers were estimated to be retirees. For many, if not most of these people,
long-distance rail travel is about the journey rather than the destination, and Amtrak’s
circuity is a virtue rather than a vice.
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The question of purpose returns the energy intensity question to the fundamental contra-
diction that has been at the heart of Amtrak since its founding: whether it exists to pro-
vide an economically (and energetically) rational transportation service, or whether it exists
to preserve and enhance a politically-popular transportation mode whose virtues are more
qualitative than quantitative. Those present at the founding of Amtrak who held the for-
mer position assumed that Amtrak would wither and die from its own irrationality. Those
holding the latter position saw Amtrak as the long-needed nationalization that would result
in rebirth. This tension persists in the perennial political battles that surround Amtrak
funding, and the contradiction is physically manifest in voluminous, heavy rolling stock that
offers more in terms of comfort and safety than in the energy efficiency that is part of its
marketing.
The concept of the passenger-mile is rooted in an Enlightenment focus on the individual
as the fundamental unit of society and fundamental unit of analysis. From this perspec-
tive, a 20-pound infant is functionally equivalent to a 300-pound linebacker, despite the
radically differing travel and service needs of those two different types of passengers. A
car transporting a nuclear family of four people serves a different social purpose than a car
transporting four carpooling commuters or a driver and three hitchhikers. While the family
car is an integral component of produced suburban space, the carpool and hitchhike require
the expenditure of additional energy and effort, and in some cases, the violation of social
norms.
This also points to the difference in the value of energy intensity numbers in the decision-
making process at the individual or collective level. The “state” in “statistics” needs general-
ized numbers for guiding public policies that control the social behaviors that affect collective
energy consumption. Accordingly, embedded (and often hidden) social and political power
relations directly affect the thermodynamic power relations of social function.
In contrast, attempts by individuals to minimize personal energy consumption need analysis
that focuses on energy consumption at the vehicular and trip level in order to avoid the
ecological fallacy. The Union of Concerned Scientists (2008) take this perspective in their
guide, Getting There Greener: The Guide to Your Lower-Carbon Vacation. This guidebook
recommends travel options based on distance and traveling-party size, which reflects the
differing social purposes of transportation. For example, while the train is more suited to
the solo traveler, the automobile is more functionally and energetically suited to travel by
a family of four. The guidebook also addresses the issue of service class that is hidden in
aggregated vehicle capacity figures by noting that premium service like first-class air and
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sleeper rail occupy more volume/weight and have a higher energy intensity (and carbon
footprint) than coach service.
4.8 What Are Safety and Comfort Worth?
Rail’s rolling- and aerodynamic-resistance advantages with heavy, time-insensitive, weather-
tolerant, inanimate commodities are significantly reduced when applied to light, time-critical,
physically-sensitive, and highly-litigious living beings. The weight and velocity determinants
of physical resistance and energy consumption are directly tied to passenger safety and
comfort. Passenger safety and comfort are directly tied into the continued existence of long-
distance passenger rail in the United States. Therefore, the energetic disadvantage of Amtrak
compared to rail in the rest of the world can be directly traced to questions of service quality
via weight and volume.
Weight and speed are directly related to safety in that desired increases in crashworthiness
generally require reinforcement and safety equipment that increase weight (White 1978,
1986-1987). Increases in speed increase demands for crashworthiness. This implies a social,
political, operational and economic trade-off of safety versus high speed and low weight, and
accordingly, energy intensity.
Aside from the Northeast Corridor’s Metroliner and Acela services, passenger rail service
above 79 miles per hour has remained elusive in the rest of the country since the 1940s, in
part due to safety regulations limiting passenger train speed to 79 MPH on track without
advanced signal protection. Those regulations ostensibly have their origin in a grisly 1946
accident near Naperville, IL involving two Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad passen-
ger trains (Solomon 2003, 1938; Bibel 2012), although Stilgoe (2007, 68–74) asserts that
a significant impetus for those regulations was political pressure from the then-ascendant
highway, trucking and automobile industries. While it could be argued that these speed
restrictions have worked to the energy efficiency benefit of Amtrak long-distance service,
regulatory and operational speed limits have limited the utility of rail service to potential
riders and, therefore, the competitive advantage of passenger rail over cars and airplanes.
The weight / energy vs. safety / comfort trade-off is also of significance in analyzing passen-
ger rail in the US since the Federal crashworthiness standards increase the survivability of
collisions at the expense of higher car weights and energy intensity (Government Printing Of-
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fice, National Archives and Records Administration 2009; Federal Railroad Administration
2011). This has been typified by difficulties with Acela high-speed service where crashwor-
thiness requirements increased car weight well beyond international HSR norms, introducing
mechanical challenges that have significantly increased maintenance costs and reduced equip-
ment availability (United States Government Accountability Office 2005; McCaughrin 2007).
While higher load factors improve profitability, they reduce the capability of a carrier to
respond to demand fluctuations and disruptions, and high load factors are associated with
reduced passenger comfort (Rodrigue, Comtois, and Slack 2013; Vuchic 2007, 197). Crowding
constrains freedom of movement in terminals and on vehicles and can reduce the perceived
cleanliness of shared amenities like bathrooms and lounges. Travelers are often required to
share paired seats with strangers, limiting the available space for reclining and for carry-
on baggage. High load factors add difficulty to the booking of reservations, constraining
available travel times and, due to demand pricing used by all carriers, increasing fares.
Common carriers need to run vehicles during off-peak periods in order to make the system
operationally useful to passengers. Accordingly, unless a transport mode has a physical
or economic monopoly, there is likely a maximum load factor that will trigger mode shift
(perhaps with a delay for mobilization or transformation of normative practices) and prevent
further increases.
What Amtrak is selling is a transportation experience as much as a utilitarian means of
getting from origins to destinations. Unpleasant riding conditions were perceived as one
reason for the decline of passenger rail in the US during the mid-20th century (Lyon 1968)
and a consistent motivation behind management decisions since the advent of the service
has been the aesthetic improvement of this transportation experience.
The Superliner cars that dominate Amtrak’s current long-distance service outside of the
NEC were built on a design based on Budd Hi-Level cars that first began operating on the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway in 1956 (Solomon 2004, 129). Official commentary
from Amtrak (1978, 15) while the company was awaiting delivery of the first Superliners
indicated that the objective with the 74-ton cars was comfort:
The Superliners will be unmatched anywhere in the world. Their stairways,
double-levels and generous lounge and dining areas will provide a train more
spacious and varied than ever before. Improved air-cushioned suspension systems
will give passengers a smoother ride.
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This spaciousness is a characteristic of passenger rail service in the US that distinguishes it
from the rest of the world. As seen in figure 4.7, the amount of per-seat total train volume
(width x height x length / seats) for trains in the US is well above the norms for regional
and HSR services in most of the rest of the world.
Figure 4.7: Comparisons of Per Seat Weight and Train Volume
Figure 4.7 also shows a very strong correlation (R2 = 0.931) between per-seat volume and
per-seat total train weight, indicating that the high weight of passenger trains in the US may
be as much a function of qualitative comfort objectives as the aforementioned quantitative
safety regulations. Therefore a premium exists for mass and volume together, with the lower
mass/volume vehicles generally having lower energy intensity when operational conditions
are similar.
This thirst for weight-volume / safety-comfort has also been seen in automobility in the US.
US auto technical efficiency has improved dramatically over the past 40 years, but most of
those efficiency gains have been plowed back into larger vehicles and increased horsepower
in a demonstration of the rebound effect (Hayward 2011; Lutsey and Sperling 2005; Knittel
2012), an issue exacerbated by decreasing occupancy rates worldwide (Scha¨fer et al. 2009,
82).
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Fuel-intensive aviation has responded to increasing fuel prices with opposite behaviors, tran-
sitioning to lighter planes, more-efficient engines and higher load factors, making well-loaded
long-haul airplanes now more energy efficient than single-passenger cars (European Commis-
sion 2005; International Energy Agency 2009, 321; Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012, 2-14).
Use of higher temperatures and pressures enabled improvements in jet engine fuel efficiency
of 35% between the mid-1970s and mid-2000s, with even more substantial reductions in
noise and smoke emissions. While a further 30% in improvements are theoretically possi-
ble, 25% will likely be a limit without a technological breakthrough for reduction of NOx
emissions (International Energy Agency 2009, 321). However, as with automobiles, these
efficiency gains have also followed Jevon’s (1865) Paradox and induced demand, with effi-
ciency trumping conservation and being offset by growing worldwide demand for air travel
(Kasarda and Lindsay 2012).
The physiological and aesthetic demands of long-duration, long-distance rail are different
from the needs of passengers on comparatively short-duration HSR corridor trains or domes-
tic flights. A business passenger on a three-hour HSR trip can comfortably catch up on work
or nap at her seat with a break or two to get a libation and use the restroom. A passenger
on a 48-hour journey across the North American West will have a much more pleasant ex-
perience if vehicular space is provided for dining, socializing with traveling companions, and
fully reclining for overnight sleep. Accordingly, a service with a customer base like Amtrak’s
needs to provide these amenities at the cost of additional weight and higher energy intensity.
Regardless of the variations in energy intensity figures from different areas and eras, the
intercity bus always stands head and shoulders above competing modes in terms of fuel
efficiency. Buses have been surprisingly immune to weight and comfort improvements for
half a century, perhaps reflecting a technology that reached maturity fairly early in its life-
cycle. Operational innovations have included low-cost curbside carriers targeting high-traffic
corridors as well as a limited number of luxury services in large commuter-intensive markets
like New York City. But spatial decentralization in the US accentuates the social, temporal
and convenience resistances of common-carrier modes like buses.
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Omission of the intercity bus from Chester (2008) and other energy analyses may be in-
dicative of the low status of the bus in the intercity transport pantheon. It is also further
indicative of how the parameters of utility that influence transport decisions are more com-
plex than simple economics or energetics. Indeed, the fuel efficiency and associated low
operating cost of the bus may work against it in creating a broader class stigma from as-
sociation with the members of society that can’t afford one of the more energy-intensive
modes.
4.9 Conclusions
Amtrak’s share of total US transportation energy usage was around 0.04% and 82% of
Amtrak’s operational energy is from Diesel fuel (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2012,
Table 4-6). In 2010, Amtrak handled 6.4 billion passenger-miles or around 0.13% of total
US passenger miles, while air travel was around 12% (Table 1-40). Amtrak carried 30.2
million passengers, in contrast to 786.7 million scheduled passengers who traveled on US
and foreign airlines serving the US in 2010 (). Even if Amtrak can be said to have an energy
intensity advantage over air and private auto transportation, its current contribution to the
environment as a problem or a solution is trivial.
Rigorous comparison (as opposed to advocacy based on decontextualized quantification)
requires consideration of the multiple dimensions of the phenomena, the theoretical and
empirically-determined ranges of those dimensions, and the capacities for changes in indi-
vidual and collective behavior that do (and have the potential to) affect the variables used
to express those dimensions.
For example, when comparing automobiles that are functionally similar, operate within a
fairly limited set of conditions, use a common fuel, and can be subject to standardized
measurement methodologies, the difficulties are reduced. But when comparing modes that
use different fuels and motive technologies, operate on different infrastructure, have different
passenger capacities, and serve different social purposes, the fuzziness of such numbers is
revealed on closer examination, and the numbers begin to have more heuristic than absolute
value.
The energetic advantages of passenger rail can probably be best seen as qualitative rather
than quantitative. Thompson (2000) is among others in noting that rail is efficient in terms
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of land use, which has secondary energy benefits in promoting compact urban form and
reduced building energy use. Rail is also more amenable to electrification than highway
modes, offering the potential for the future use of renewable electricity sources with mature,
established technology that avoids the considerable drawbacks associated with electrified
automobility (Zehner 2013). Assertions of these advantages are value-laden and are not
reflected in the operational energy intensity calculations.
Accordingly the question of comparative energy intensity across transport modes is less
amenable to the rigors of quantification demanded by the positivist philosophy at the founda-
tion of the neoclassical economics and transportation engineering that dominates discussion
of transport issues and, nominally at least, political discourse over the future of long-distance
passenger rail in the United States. Despite the use of methodologies that give the illusion
of objectivity, the analysis above demonstrates that there are a wide variety of underlying
assumptions embedded in energy intensity numbers that give ample opportunity for subjec-
tive value judgments to hide conscious or unconscious biases toward or against a particular
transportation mode. These judgments can be reflected in both presences and absences.
Indeed, as Lefebvre (1974 [1991], 339) observed in his analysis of spatial practices, the power-
ful tendency toward quantification is “technical in appearance, financial in reality and moral
in essence.” Certainly the conclusions of reports produced by industry and advocacy groups
can be assumed to be colored by ideological orientation or pecuniary interest, such as Boeing
(1975); Continental Trailways (1975); Dorin (1979); Hilton (1980); Amtrak (2007); O’Toole
(2012). But the complexity of the concept of energy intensity with massive transportation
systems relates to an epistemological question of whether there can be assessments that are
positively accurate, morally neutral and readily comprehensible, as well as to an ontological
question of whether a unitary energy intensity for any transportation mode can actually be
said to exist.
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Ground transportation modes seem to converge on a fundamental minimal amount of energy
needed to move a particular amount of mass a specified distance. Different modes add to their
energy intensity by providing differing increments of speed, availability, flexibility, circuity,
comfort and safety. The appropriateness and cost of a particular mode for a particular
journey is therefore based on the subjective value of these distinctive qualities within the
context of individual needs, and the societal norms codified in customs, regulations and
spatial structures. That is something that does not lend itself to univariate reduction.
Transportation specialists should incorporate this complexity into discussions of comparative
modal energy intensity so that consumers and policymakers can make informed choices and
rationally address the challenges of future energy transitions.
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CHAPTER 5
THE LIMITS TO LOCOMOBILITY: A SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODEL OF
INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL FUTURES IN THE UNITED STATES IN
THE CONTEXT OF POTENTIAL ENERGY RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS
This paper describes the implementation of a computational systems dynamic
model of potential futures for intercity passenger rail transportation in the United
States. This computational simulation permits active experimentation with dif-
ferent ranges of values for the identified social and technical parameters and,
therefore, permits contingent validation or refutation of the logical coherence of
assertions about the role of intercity passenger rail in a more energy-constrained
country. The simulation affirms the possibility that locomobility might assume a
larger role in post-fossil-fuel US transportation. However, the simulation indi-
cates that this potential is likely contingent on both the successful transition of
the modernist project to renewable energy sources, and an absence of technical in-
novation that permits aeromobility and automobility to meet future long-distance
transport demands.
5.1 Introduction
Rail transportation at different scales is commonly mentioned in popular works on energy
and sustainability. Numerous authors, including Kunstler (2005); Heinberg (2005, 2006); Re-
gional Plan Association (2006); Runte (2006); Winter (2006); Newton (2008); Brown (2009);
MacKay (2009); Frank (2009); Newman, Beatley, and Boyer (2009); Orr (2009), have sug-
gested that passenger rail transport (locomobility) should play a greater role in intercity
transportation as increasing energy prices and resource scarcity reduce the viability of the
predominant auto/air transportation paradigm. However, these assertions commonly ap-
pear to be based on intuition or aspiration, with the energetic teleology of rail presented
uncritically as a given.
120
This paper will attempt to add some quantitative rigor to this discourse by presenting a sys-
tems dynamics simulation of potential future scenarios based on fundamental assumptions
about the interactions between the variety of influences on the volume of intercity locomobil-
ity in the United States. While the future is unknown and unknowable with any significant
level of certainty, this scenario simulation approach permits the exploration of the impli-
cations of assumptions about passenger rail and how those assumptions may dynamically
interact in the transition to whatever follows the fossil fuel age.
The simulation described in this paper is based on four fundamental assumptions:
• The volume of economic activity is directly related to energy consumption that facili-
tates that activity. Therefore, future energy constraints and/or transitions to different
energy sources and types will affect future economic activity as measured in constant-
dollar gross domestic product (GDP), albeit in a non-linear manner.
• The aggregate volume of intercity mobility in the United States is directly related to a
combination of population growth and economic activity that both facilitates mobility
and is positively affected by mobility.
• The secular volumetric decline of intercity locomobility from its once-dominant perch
in the early 20th century can be directly attributed to the expansion of automobility
and aeromobility.
• The transition of all transportation modes from near-total dependence on non-renewable
fossil energy sinks to renewable energy flows has the potential to significantly change
both travel volumes and mode share.
These assumptions are based on historical data from the 20th century. That data is presented
along with simulation outputs as supporting evidence for model assumptions. Numerous
sources were often needed to fill out complete time-series and significant uncertainties exist,
especially with automotive data (where there is little centralized data collection) and when
allocating travel mileage to intercity vs local categories. Data sources and issues regarding
data availability and quality follow below.
121
5.2 A Brief Introduction to Systems Dynamics
Systems dynamics is a technique for computationally simulating the behavior of complex
systems, primarily through the use of ordinary differential equations as quantitative repre-
sentations of both quantitative and qualitative elements of these systems. Simon Levin traces
the origin of dynamic models in ecology to Vito Volterra’s work in the early 20th century
(Hannon and Ruth 1997). Computational systems dynamics originated at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology during the late 1950s under the leadership of Jay W. Forrester (Coyle
1996). Broad use of dynamic modeling techniques by non-programmers was made much more
practical in the 1990s with the broader availability of inexpensive personal computers and
intuitive, graphically-based software like STELLA.
Forrester’s pioneering work focused on analyzing the management of industrial processes, but
the technique has subsequently been used for analyzing a wide variety of different complex
systems at both micro and macro scales. Perhaps the scalar apex was the World3 model
of global socio-environmental systems used in the controversial Limits to Growth (LTG)
project (Meadows et al. 1972). Costanza, Graumlich, and Steffen (2007, 399) assert that
while disdain for LTG has persisted in the fields of economics and policy, they cite the
findings of the Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) as confirming the Limits to Growth
scenarios within the fields of physics and biology.
Chadwick (2000) surveyed the application of dynamic modeling of world systems and noted
that although these models are deterministic, modeling commonly involves more parame-
ter estimation than hypothesis testing, and modelers generally eschew assertions that the
outputs of models should be understood as literal predictions of exact future conditions at
specific times. Abbas and Bell (1994, 382) are explicit in stating that systems dynamics
models should be used “for gaining understanding and for policy analysis, rather than for
prediction.” Toward the former point, Hannon and Ruth (1997, 1) note that “the more
complex the system, the less we are able to sufficiently grasp in our mind its workings and
to prepare our actions. We simply cannot hold the many aspects of a dynamic process in
mind at once.” Therefore, the purpose of the simulation in this research is to promote under-
standing by using the software to keep track of the complex dynamic influences on intercity
locomobility in the US, and to analyze and display their possible interactions.
Systems dynamics models are commonly represented by one of two different types of dia-
grams: influence diagrams or level/rate diagrams.
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Influence diagrams are graphical layouts of influences in a system along with connecting lines
and symbols that describe the interplay between these influences (Coyle 1996, 18). These
influences can be quantitative or qualitative, and are intended to graphically present the
conceptual working of the system. An example of an influence diagram is figure 5.4.
In contrast, level/rate diagrams (45) are more explicit graphical representations of the quan-
titative structure of models. These diagrams are the more classical of the two types, having
their origins in Forrester’s pioneering systems dynamics work. Rectangles represent stocks,
which are variables that change value during the simulation and are analogous to tanks of
water. Valve-like symbols on lines represent flows that control the changing of the values in
stocks, analogous to a faucets on pipe controlling flows into and/or out of the tanks. Circles
(referred to as convertors in STELLA) represent static parameter values or equations that
control the flows. Cloud-like symbols represent sources and sinks from which flows originate
or dissipate when they are no longer relevant to the simulation.
The software STELLA incorporates level/rate diagrams directly into its user interface as
a graphical programming language. Since these diagrams can grow unwieldy with large
numbers of stocks, STELLA provides a way of organizing symbols hierarchically into logical
groups that can then be displayed as high-level block diagrams. STELLA also provides
graphing capabilities for displaying the values in time-series charts.
Figure 5.1 shows a high-level block diagram of a STELLA implementation of the World3
model, figure 5.2 shows a level/rate diagram for the nonrenewable resources block, and figure
5.3 is a graph of outputs.
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Figure 5.1: The Limits to Growth / World3
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Figure 5.2: The Limits to Growth: Nonrenewable Resource Block
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Figure 5.3: The Limits to Growth: Output Graph
Systems dynamics has been used in transportation modeling for both mechanical and socio-
technical processes. Abbas and Bell (1994) provide an introduction to the use of systems
dynamics in transportation modeling along with an extensive list of exemplars. Some notable
transportation models include:
• Luzzi (1976) created a highly-detailed model of the US freight rail system in order to
forecast the long-term effects of poor infrastructure maintenance that was endemic in
pre-Staggers industry of the time.
• Raux (2003) developed a three-scenario demonstration model to simulate the medium-
and long-term effects of different urban transportation policies on sustainability and
the negative influence of auto ownership on traffic levels and congestion.
• Haghani, Lee, and Byun (2003) developed a performance model that focused on land
use and transportation system interaction and could be used to forcast possible con-
ditions under different scenarios. The model consisted of 7 sub-models: population,
migration of population, household, job growth-employment-land availability, housing
development, travel demand, and traffic congestion level.
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• Kibira, Shao, and Nowak (2010) modeled the dynamics of corn ethanol production as a
transportation fuel to explore possible growth scenarios for the industry over a 20-year
period.
• Pfaffenbichler, Emberger, and Shepherd (2008); Pfaffenbichler (2011) created the Metropoli-
tan Activity Relocation Simulator, an interactive transport and land use model that
was workshopped in Asia and benchmarked against other published models.
• Suryani, Chou, and Chen (2010) created a comparatively simple model for forecasting
air passenger demand and terminal capacity expansion. An influence diagram for this
model is shown in figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Air Passenger Demand Systems Dynamics Model ()
Lefebvre (1974 [1991], 105–107) notes that reduction is necessary to “deal with the complexity
and chaos of brute observations.” However, he also indicates that restoration is subsequently
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necessary to avoid hiding of ideological service under a facade of positive knowledge as
dialectics are reduced to logic. The fragility of integrative systems dynamics simulations
exposes the limitations of the underlying formulaic reductions while preserving some heuristic
value in the resulting narratives.
5.3 Mobilities and Modeling
Each transport mode produces its own spaces, with associated social, political, economic,
infrastructural and technical networks that both facilitate those modes and are supported by
those modes. Automobility and aeromobility provided flexibility that permitted capitalist
exploitation of the spatial bounty of the United States, while overcoming the spatial and
economic friction of locomobility. Busmobility has remained stubbornly locked at limited
volumes for group travelers and the underclass. Despite the draining of functional demand
by automobility and aeromobility, locomobility survives both as essential commuter service
and a source of recreation deeply tied to American mythology (Minn 2013).
The theoretical conception of transport as mobilities is fundamental to this simulation, with
the different modes representing systems that encompass not only the vehicles and infras-
tructure, but also the social, economic, and spatial structures that support that mode (Urry
2004, 2007; Cwerner, Kesselring, and Urry 2009). In Lefebvrian terms, mobilities can be
said to represent lived space and spatial practice, in contrast to Cartesian representations
of space or imagined representational space (Lefebvre 1974 [1991], 38–39). While the use of
the conventional metric of passenger-miles in this simulation as a proxy for the vitality of
different transport modes is a crude generalization of the qualitative richness inherent in the
concept of mobilities, such reduction and quantification is undertaken to make this project
both conceptually clear, and computationally tractable.
Mobilities are heterogeneously distributed across space, so it can be presumed that different
regions of the country will experience future locomobility in different ways and at different
volumes. Indeed, there is no assurance that an interconnected national network will survive
even if specific regions see increasing rail intraconnection that drives aggregate national
demand. However, since the core focus of this simulation is national scale and secular
trends, the Cartesian specifics are left for further research.
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A high-level influence diagram for the simulation model is shown in figure 5.5. The bulk
of this paper is devoted to discussion of the different influences encoded in this model, the
empirical or theoretical basis for their quantification, and their effect on model outputs.
Figure 5.5: Simulation Influence Diagram
5.4 The Challenge of Large-Scale Simulation
The complexity of the network of relationships within locomobility and from locomobility
to the broader networks of national mobility and national economy presents a significant
challenge for simulation. In this simulation, that challenge is met with a high level of
abstraction and aggregation reminiscent of the World3 model of global socio-environmental
systems used in the controversial Limits to Growth (LTG) project (Meadows et al. 1972)
from which this chapter derives its name.
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Abbas and Bell (1994, 382) are explicit in stating that systems dynamics models should be
used “for gaining understanding and for policy analysis, rather than for prediction.” Toward
the former point, Hannon and Ruth (1997, 1) note that “the more complex the system, the
less we are able to sufficiently grasp in our mind its workings and to prepare our actions. We
simply cannot hold the many aspects of a dynamic process in mind at once.” Therefore, the
purpose of the simulation in this research is to promote understanding by using the software
to keep track of some complex dynamic influences on intercity locomobility in the US, and
to analyze and display their possible interactions.
The use of this approach opens this simulation to the same set of critiques which met and
persist around LTG. Passell, Roberts, and Ross (1972), reviewing LTG in the New York
Times referred to it as an “empty and misleading work” that was “(l)ess than pseudoscience
and little more than polemical fiction.” A somewhat more sober and cogent critique is that
of Smil (2000) in stating that:
When taking the model apart, line by line, I was particularly astonished by the
variables labeled Nonrenewable Resources and Pollution. Lumping together (to
cite just a few of scores of possible examples) highly substitutable but relatively
limited resources of liquid crude oil with unsubstitutable but immense deposits
of sedimentary phosphate rocks, or short-lived atmospheric gases with long-lived
radioactive wastes, struck me as extraordinarily meaningless.
In defense of LTG, Costanza, Graumlich, and Steffen (2007, 399) assert that while disdain
for LTG has persisted in the social fields of economics and policy, findings of the Millenium
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) confirm the Limits to Growth base case scenario within the
environmental fields of physics and biology.
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Bardi (2011, 13) asserts that these reactions miss the point that LTG was meant to be a
warning rather than prediction, and that “by ignoring the study for the past four decades, we
probably lost the ability to do something to avoid, or at least mitigate, the problems ahead.”
This confusion may be inherent to the contradiction between the positivist foundation of
systems dynamics in quantitative electronic computation and the qualitative relativism and
structuralism with which the results may be most meaningfully interpreted. The confusion
was compounded with LTG by an apolitical framing of the issues within a mechanistic
systems dynamics worldview (Parenti 2012) that implicitly viewed politics as a result of
history rather than a driver of it, although continued political obdurany in the face of
increasing environmental degredation might be said to validate that framing.
This ironically positions LTG, and large-scale modeling in general, as a value-laden political
project, which is consistent with postmodern critiques of all investigative endeavor as value-
laden. This may also partially explain both the mystical devotion and hysterical backlash to
LTG’s use of positivist methodologies as a challenge to the social and economic structures
that derive their legitimacy from those same methodologies. Once this critique is used to
inform interpretation of results, large-scale systems dynamics can then be accepted for its
heuristic value in exploring possible scenarios.
5.5 Historic Data Sources and Limitations
The following data historical data sources were used as the foundation for simulation.
Amtrak Passenger-Miles, Revenues, Expenses (figures 5.9, 5.18, 5.20, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25):
From Amtrak (1972-2013) annual and monthly reports. These numbers differ slightly from
numbers reported by the Association of American Railroads.
Automobile Expense (figure 5.24):
Private expense calculated by summing total new passenger car sales (Carter et al. 2006, Ta-
ble Df343-346; Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2013a, Table 1-15) total fuel use (Federal
Highway Administration 1997, Table MF-221) multiplied by current gasoline price (United
States Energy Information Administration 2012), then divided by passenger-miles and in-
flated to 2010 dollars using the CCI (Engineering News Review 2013). Public expense is
highway disbursements.
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Automobile Registrations (figures 5.21, 5.22):
Total number of automobiles implied by automobile and light truck registration numbers
from Federal Highway Administration (1997, Table MV-200; 1945–2013, Table MV-1 1996–
2011)
Construction Cost Index (figure 5.13):
The CCI is used throughout this document to inflate dollar values to 2010 dollars. Comparing
monetary figures across long periods of time is very inexact and subjective. The CCI is an
index calculated since 1908 and based on 200 hours of common labor at the 20-city average
of common labor rates, plus 25 cwt of standard structural steel shapes at the mill price prior
to 1996 and the fabricated 20-city price from 1996, plus 1.128 tons of portland cement at
the 20-city price, plus 1,088 board-ft of 2 x 4 lumber at the 20-city price. The Engineering
News Review (2013) website only provides the current month CCI. History of CCI available
to members. CCI is extended back to 1871 by using implied GDP variant I price index
from Kuznets (1961, Table R-25 and R-26) to deflate from the CCI starting year of 1908
backwards.
Consumer Price Index (figure 5.13):
Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers - (CPI-U), U.S. city average, All items, from
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013). CPI-U is extended back to 1871 by using implied GDP
variant I price index from Kuznets (1961, Table R-25 and R-26) to deflate CPI-U in its
starting year of 1913 backwards.
Domestic Air Passenger-Miles and Revenue (figure 5.9, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25):
1930-1996 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Df1112-1125). Original sources: United States
Bureau of the Census (1975, Series Q 582); Federal Aviation Administration (1944–2002);
BTS (various years). 1997-2011 from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2013a, Table 1-40)
with original source Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2013b). BTS numbers are slightly
higher than Carter et al and USCB numbers in overlapping years.
Energy Consumption, US, all fuels (figures 5.6, 5.11, 5.12, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.21):
1850-1975 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Db164-171); Original source: 1850-1919 from
Schurr and Netschert (1960). 1920-1948 from United States Bureau of Mines (1932-1993).
1949-2011 from United States Energy Information Administration (2012). 2012 from United
States Energy Information Administration (2013, Table 1.3).
132
Energy Consumption by Country (figure 5.7):
From World Bank (2013, Energy use (kt of oil equivalent)).
Greyhound (figure 5.24):
FirstGroup plc, the current owner of Greyhound Bus Lines, releases minimal information on
operations and little long-term statistical information appears to be available online for the
highly-fragmented motorcoach industry. (FirstGroup plc 2012, 2013),
Gross Domestic Product, US (figures 5.6, 5.9, 5.12, 5.14, 5.15, 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.22, 5.20,
5.23):
Comparing monetary figures across long periods of time is very inexact and subjective. 1929-
2012 from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013, Table 1.1.5 dated 31 July 2013). 1871-1928
is the variant I GDP estimate in current dollars from Kuznets (1961, Tables R-25 and R-
26). 1908-2012 inflated to 2010 dollars using Engineering News Review (2013) Construction
Cost Index. 1871-1912 inflated to 2010 dollars by extending CCI with Kuznets’ price index
implicit in difference between Kuznets tables R-25 and R-26. The Construction Cost Index
has value over other indices because it is based on standard construction materials that are
still commonly used and can be argued to have maintained consistent use value over time.
Gross Domestic Product by Country (figures 5.7, 5.8):
From World Bank (2013, GDP (current US$)).
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Highway Disbursements (figure 5.24):
Total dollar disbursements for highway construction and maintenance Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (1997, Table HF-210; 1945–2013, Table HF-10).
Intercity Auto Passenger-Miles (figure 5.9, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.23, 5.22, 5.21, 5.25):
As a decentralized mode, exact automobile mileage figures do not exist. Only estimates are
available and considerable uncertainty exists. For 1921 - 1938, Federal Highway Adminis-
tration (1997, Table MV-200) numbers for vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) are multiplied by
0.965 to coincide with the 1939-1996 numbers from Wilson (1997, 47) and published online
by Carter et al. (2006, Table Df38–47), which are themselves derived from FHWA VMT num-
bers. Numbers for 1997-2012 are inferred from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2013a,
Table 1-40) figures for total light-duty vehicle highway miles divided by two, as rural travel
has historically been half of all road travel (United States Bureau of the Census 1975, Series
Q 199–207).
Intercity Bus Passenger-Miles (figure 5.9, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.23, 5.25):
As with all highway modes, considerable uncertainty exists with these numbers. 1929-1938
from Walsh (2003); figures only given for 1929, 1934 and 1939; intermediate values linearly
interpolated. 1939-1996 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Df38-47); original source: Wilson
(1997). 1997 - 2006 estimated by multiplying VMT numbers for rural interstate from Federal
Highway Administration (1945–2013, Table VM-1) by 15 to be consistent with numbers from
Wilson. For 2007 - 2011 FHWA changed VMT calculation methodology, which resulted in a
doubling of bus VMT between 2006 and 2007. PMT estimated by multiplying FHWA VMT
numbers by 7.5 to be consistent with earlier numbers. Note that the FHWA new methodology
numbers are consistent with statistics from the American Bus Association (John Dunham
and Associates 2012).
Intercity Rail Passenger-Miles (figure 5.9, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.23, 5.25, 5.27):
Through 1990 all rail travel is considered intercity. After 1991 the sum of Amtrak and
commuter rail are considered intercity. 1882-1889 from United States Bureau of the Census
(1975, Series Q 274-283); original source: United States Interstate Commerce Commission
(1932). 1890-1959 from United States Bureau of the Census (1975, Series Q 284-312); original
sources: United States Interstate Commerce Commission (1890–1953, 1954–1980). 1960-1990
from Carter et al. (2006, Table Df1034-1053). 1991-2010 from Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (2013a, Table 1-40); original sources: American Public Transportation Association
(2012); Federal Transit Administration (2013); Amtrak (1972–2012).
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Intercity Total Passenger-Miles (figure 5.6):
Total of intercity auto, domestic air, intercity rail and intercity bus.
Paved Road Miles (figure 5.22):
Federal Highway Administration (1967, Table M-200; 1997, Table HM-212; 1945–2013, Table
HM-12).
Population (figures 5.6, 5.9, 5.10):
1790-1899 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Aa9-14); original source: United States Bureau
of the Census (1960, 7) with interpolated values between decennial census years. 1900-1989
from United States Bureau of the Census (2000). 1990-1999 from United States Bureau of
the Census (2004). 2000-2009 from United States Bureau of the Census (2011). 2010-2013
from United States Bureau of the Census (2013). Population projections from United States
Bureau of the Census (2012a).
Rail Ton-Miles (figures 5.19, 5.27, 5.28):
1891-1959 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Df965-979); original source: United States In-
terstate Commerce Commission (1890–1953)icc-1954-1980. 1960-1996 is from Carter et al.
(2006, Table Df1064-1069); original source: Association of American Railroads (1965–2012).
Rail Passenger Revenue (figure 5.24):
1890-1980 from Carter et al. (2006, Table Df927-955); original source: United States Inter-
state Commerce Commission (1890–1953)icc-1954-1980.
Rail Passenger Deficit (figure 5.24):
From Hilton (1980, Table 1).
Rail Road and Track Mileage (figures 5.26, 5.27):
1870-1890 from United States Bureau of the Census (1975, Series Q 321-328); original source:
United States Interstate Commerce Commission (1932). 1890-1980 from Carter et al. (2006,
Table Df927-955), which is consistent with United States Bureau of the Census (1975, Series
Q 284-312); original source: United States Interstate Commerce Commission (1890–1953,
1954–1980); 2000-2011 from Association of American Railroads (1965–2012).
Road Passenger Miles by Country (figure 5.8):
World Bank (2013, Roads, passengers carried (million passenger-km)).
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Truck Ton-Miles (figures 5.19, 5.21, 5.28):
Trucking is a decentralized industry with minimal regulation, so this data has a high level of
uncertainty. Numbers from Eno Transportation Foundation (2007) on the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (2013a, Table 1-49) website are about 9% higher than these numbers
that were published earlier. Eno no longer tracks intercity truck ton-miles. 1939-1996 data
from Carter et al. (2006, Table df48-58), which matches 1939-1970 data from United States
Bureau of the Census (1975, Series Q 12-22). 1939-1959 original source: United States In-
terstate Commerce Commission (1961). 1960-1970 original source: United States Interstate
Commerce Commission (1960–1970). 1971-1996 original source: Wilson (1997), which was
compiled and/or estimated using data from the ICC, American Trucking Association, and
FHWA.
5.6 Mobility, Population, Energy and GDP
As shown in figure 5.6, over the 20th century there was a strong positive, albeit somewhat
nonlinear, relationship between economic activity (measured in GDP), domestic energy con-
sumption, mobility (measured in passenger-miles). This is consistent with global GDP trends
as shown in figure 5.7 and with country-by-country observations in figure 5.8.
Figure 5.6: Indexed Co-evolution of GDP, Energy Consumption, Mobility and Population
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Figure 5.7: 1960 - 2010 World Energy Consumption vs. Aggregate World GDP
Figure 5.8: 2010 World Road Passenger-KM vs. GDP by Country
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Each of these influences can be considered limiting factors. When economic activity is
reduced, both the need for and the ability to pay for mobility are reduced. When mobility is
reduced, the need for energy to enable that mobility is also reduced. Limitations on mobility
reduce opportunities for production and consumption, completing a feedback loop.
5.6.1 Population
Looking at specific transport modes, the volume of intercity travel has been most closely tied
to population growth. While there have been significant meaningful short-term deviations,
the secular mobility trends have been very closely correlated to population. Figure 5.9 shows
historic travel volumes along with simple linear regression models demonstrating the close
relationship.
Figure 5.9: Long-Distance Passenger-Mile Influences
Despite the dramatic economic, political and geopolitical events of the 20th century, US pop-
ulation followed a surprisingly stable growth pattern consistent with the concept of demo-
graphic transition (Thompson 1929; Notestein 1945; Caldwell 2006). This simulation assumes
a continuation of this stable pattern with no significant disruptions due to acute shocks like
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global pandemic or thermonuclear war, or from chronic issues like demographic bubbles or
food scarcity. Because there are numerous countries that provide basic necessities for their
population at considerably lower GDP/capita and energy/capita than the US, adaptation to
a potential low-energy-intensity future is assumed to be possible without significant popula-
tion loss or return high population growth rates often associated with conditions of material
poverty.
Fitting a logistic probability curve to United States Bureau of the Census (2012a) Middle
Series population projections, this simulation assumes that US population will experience
very little growth after the year 2100 and plateau around 500 million (figure 5.10).
Figure 5.10: Historic and Projected US Population
5.6.2 Energy Transitions
Primary energy over the 20th century was generally only a small fraction of total factor
costs, but as energy resources become more expensive to extract and produce, increased
energy costs may limit economic activity, creating a negative influence on the economic-
energetic-mobility system (Ayres 2013). Presumably, if the transition to renewables involves
constraints on the availability of the inexpensive energy that powered the American Century
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(Luce 1941), economic activity and mobility will also be constrained, necessitating systemic
adaptation to these constraints.
Smil (2010) notes that energy transitions have historically been prolonged affairs lasting
decades. And given the deep integration of fossil fuel sources into modernity, the transition
to renewable sources may exceed the time scales of prior transitions to and within fossil
sources. Growth curves cannot be extrapolated a priori based on initial bursts of activity,
and innovations often end up following curves with slow initial growth phases and long tails.
Non-renewable energy availability (fossil and nuclear) is assumed to follow a logistic distri-
bution curve. While the use of these curves in the manner of Hubbert (1956) and Deffeyes
(2001) is contested (Rapier 2007; Hemmingsen 2010), aggregate use of non-renewable re-
sources is assumed to follow some kind of growth-peak-decline curve, and the historical data
does seem to fit a logistic curve thus far (figure 5.11), with ultimate cumulative nonrenewable
energy resources of around 11,000 quads.
Figure 5.11: Historic Energy Consumption with Fitted Curves
Since renewables, by definition, move to some continuous range of levels, renewables are
assumed to follow a logistic probability curve, with a slow period of development, a rapid mid-
life of adoption and a slowing growth near a peak that reflects maturation of the technology
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and the physical limitations of the available renewable flows. In order to be consistent
with comparisons, this simulation follows Davis, Diegel, and Boundy (2012) and other US
government agencies in converting renewable electrical energy to BTU using a fossil fuel heat
rate that is one third the theoretical Watt/BTU conversion rate and reflects losses in the
generating process and in hydrocarbon-powered vehicles.
The length and peaks of these curves are contingent upon innovation and ultimate commercially-
viable resource values that are highly contested, politically charged, and unknowable a priori
with any meaningful level of certainty. Therefore the simulation runs are scenarios config-
ured with parameters that fit curves based on the ultimate cumulative resource value for
nonrenewables, and adoption time with ultimate peak flow for renewables.
5.6.3 Renewable Potential
The future potential of renewable energy has been and remains an area of considerable
debate. Meyer and Cuff (2009) frame this contestation over resource futures in the context
of a much longer dispute between groups of “catastrophists” and “cornucopians.” This frame
can be useful in categorizing and analyzing imagined energy futures and, ultimately, their
potential impact on locomobility.
Catastrophist apocalypticism has an ancient literary heritage, and Barnes (2003) notes its
significant role in the Judeo-Christian tradition and its co-evolution with modernity. Another
patron saint of contemporary resource catastrophism (along with M. King Hubbert) is 18th-
century English clergyman and political economist Thomas Malthus (1798), whose Essay on
the Principle of Population establishes the key concepts of neo-Malthusian thought even as
his specific predictive and mathematical details have clearly been demonstrated by history
to be faulty. More contemporary foundational works include The Population Bomb (Erlich
and Erlich 1968) and The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1972).
In contrast, the term “cornucopian,” is a moniker attached (often epithetically) by contem-
porary catastrophists to those who espouse a belief in human ingenuity to yield an effec-
tively limitless resource bounty, or who simply argue against the fatalist pessimism of the
catastrophists. This contemporary usage of the word cornucopian is of uncertain heritage,
although it may originate from Ordway (1953) in reference to, “The Cornucopian Faith.”
Geologist and peak-oil advocate Kenneth Deffeyes (2001) uses the term in contrast to people
like himself, whom he calls, “Hubbertarians.”
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The faith aspect of the cornucopian/catastrophist debate is inescapable due to the inability
of empirical data on available resources to answer questions about how much energy can
be available within the constraints of future technology, economics and politics. For exam-
ple, Lopez et al. (2012) used GIS to estimate US technical annual renewable potential at 482
tWh, which is around 4,700 quads (using a heat rate conversion factor) or over 47 times 2010
US annual energy usage from all sources. Notably, around 80% of this energy comes from
different kinds of industrial-scale solar facilities. However, that purely physical analysis does
not consider the amount of energy needed to build and operate dispersed energy infrastruc-
ture (energy return on investment or EROI), the economics of building and maintaining that
infrastructure, social resistance to covering all available land surface in solar/wind collectors,
or the political resistance from existing fossil-fueled power structures.
The issue becomes more murky when considering the time frame required for such a tran-
sition. Smil (2012) incredulously highlights Al Gore’s audacious proposal for US renewable
transition within a decade (Revkin 2008) and a proposal by Jacobson and Delucchi (2009)
for global transition by 2030 as typical examples of unrealistic assessment. Aside from the
inability of renewables to compete politically or economically with nonrenewables as long as
the latter maintain their significant cost advantage, Smil cites both the lessons of historical
transitions as well as the massive amount of sunk capital in fossil-based infrastructure in
asserting that the transition to renewables will take “decades of expensive commitment”
and “the work of generations of engineers.”
Nuclear energy occupies a liminal space between renewables and nonrenewables. Nuclear
relies on finite (albeit large) resources, and nuclear has thus far been demonstrated suitable
in transportation only for large marine military vehicles and unmanned space probes. Com-
mercial nuclear power is only used for electricity generation, and expanded use of nuclear
power in transport would require the same expensive electrification transition as will likely
be required for the transition to renewables. There are also severe economic and political
forces arrayed against the expansion of nuclear. Conventional nuclear power is not consid-
ered to gain a significant share of total US energy in the scenarios considered in this paper,
although nuclear could be factored in by increasing the cumulative nonrenewable resource
parameter.
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5.7 Energy and GDP
Energy is privileged in this simulation as a fundamental influence on economic life, which is
consistent with the perspective of ecological economics (Hall and Klitgaard 2006; Hall and
Klitgaard 2012). Accordingly, this simulation assumes that material, political or economic
constraints on energy flows will be accompanied by constraints on economic activity as
measured in GDP.
Goldemberg and Lucon (2010, 67–76) and Bryant (2011), among others, note a clear logarith-
mic relationship at the country level between energy consumption and levels of development,
both in terms of GDP per capita and measures like the Human Development Index. In re-
flecting on America’s energy rapaciousness in the wake of the 1973 energy crisis, Walker and
Large (1975) asserted that energy extravagance was a direct result of systematic policies to
promote a healthy and growing capitalist economy.
Smil (2008, 336) notes a very close linear correlation at a global scale between total pri-
mary energy supply and gross world economic product. However Smil also notes that such
observations are problematic on both sides of the graph in terms of how energy use is ac-
counted for and the difficulties of comparing economic values across currencies and times.
And, deeper questions about values are raised in looking at the material results of energy ex-
penditures and considering the importance of energy in intellectual, political and population
development (Smil 1994, 251–253).
The relationship of US energy consumption to GDP followed a sigmoid curve over the 20th
century, with a high efficiency at the beginning of the century reduced efficiency during the
high-growth mid century, and then increased efficiency again with the dawn of the 21st cen-
tury (figure 5.12). While this Environmental Kuznets Curve (Grossman and Krueger 1991,
1995; Yandle, Vijayaraghavan, and Bhattarai 2002) might be assumed to be attributable
to technology, Wagner (2010) asserts that trade in energy-intensive goods skews energy
consumption figures since energy used in foreign production of goods is not considered in
domestic energy consumption statistics. Efficiency gains have been made, but the reduced
ratio of GDP to energy use is more attributable to the off-shoring of energy consumption
and associated environmental damage.
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Figure 5.12: Total National Energy Use vs. GDP
GDP and other historic dollar figures are converted to 2010 dollars using the Engineering
News Review (2013) Construction Cost Index (CCI), which has been tabulated since 1903
and is based on common labor rates and the average costs of a fixed set of common con-
struction materials. This index is chosen over the more common Consumer Price Index
(CPI) because the CCI presumably represents a clearer connection to the material world
than the CPI, which hedonically considers substitutions and changing consumer choices and
is, therefore, less tied to the physical constraints fundamental to this simulation. While both
indices have been fairly closely tied since the 1970s, the CCI inflates dollars from earlier in
the century at a significantly greater level than the CPI (figure 5.13).
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Figure 5.13: Construction Cost Index vs Consumer Price Index
5.8 Energy Simulations
Given these relationships on parameters with a continuous range of values, a multitude of
possible energy scenarios can be imagined based on ultimate available resources and the
timing of transition. Simulation model outputs for four example scenarios are given below.
The scenarios are based on the ultimate available cumulative nonrenewable resource, the
approximate time from 2010 to the midpoint of transition to renewables (the midpoint of
the logistic curve), and a steady-state peak level of annual renewable energy consumption.
For context, total US energy use in 2010 was 98 quads (United States Energy Information
Administration 2012) and the least-squared best-fit logistic curve for ultimate cumulative
nonrenewable resource shown in figure 5.11 is around 11,000 quads. GDP in 2010 was
around $15 trillion dollars (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013). US population was around
309 million (United States Bureau of the Census 2012b), yielding a GDP per capita of around
$48,000.
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Figure 5.14 shows a moderate, business-as-usual energy scenario where the transition to re-
newables is fairly seamless. The ultimate nonrenewable resource base of 11,000 quads peaks
around 2010. The midpoint of transition around 2040 implies a very fast (and perhaps
unrealistic) replacement of nonrenewable energy sources at a rate that keeps up with non-
renewable decline and population growth. The ultimate renewable resource of 130 quads is
also quite optimistic.
The plateau and slight dip in GDP demonstrates that even with a very aggressive transition
to a large resource base, the transition to renewables may involve at least a generation or
two of stagnant economics and material quality of life.
Figure 5.14: Example Medium Energy Scenario
Figure 5.15 shows a very optimistic scenario, with a ultimate nonrenewable resource of 20,000
quads and 30 years to the midpoint of a transition to 200 annual quads of renewable energy.
The large amount of nonrenewable energy that smooths the transition would presumably
come from a realization of the best hopes for unconventional gases and liquid hydrocarbons
as well as expanded nuclear and, perhaps, nuclear fusion. This also presumes significant
public investment in renewables while nonrenewables remain plentiful, which seems quite
unlikely given the demonstrated strength of nonrenewable fuel networks of political power.
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Figure 5.15: Example High Energy Scenario
Figure 5.16 shows a more highly-constrained scenario with ultimate nonrenewables at 11,000
quads, but a 50 year midpoint transition to a renewable resource of 50 quads annually, or
around half of 2010 US primary energy use. This shows a very significant associated dip in
GDP. Presuming no significant decline in population, GDP per capita in 2150 simulates at
$3,600 or only 7% of 2010 levels - meaning a very serious reduction in material quality of
life compared to the early 21st century.
Also notable in figure 5.16 is a discontinuous drop in both GDP and energy production around
in the early 2100s. This is due to consideration in the simulation of the potential elevated
cost of renewables and the inability of the economy to support the cost and continuous
investment needed to both expand capacity and maintain existing energy infrastructure.
Total energy expenditure in 2010 was around $12,300 per quad, or around 8.3% of GDP.
The acceleration of recession in the simulation occurs based on a renewables cost of $20,000
per quad, with the assumption that exceeding the 1981 recession peak of 13.7% of GDP
(United States Energy Information Administration 2012, Table 1.5) would trigger economic
decline as energy demands can not be economically supplied.
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Figure 5.16: Example Low Energy Scenario
A neomedieval scenario similar to the Kunstler (2005) Long Emergency is shown in figure
5.17. There is no transition to high-technology renewables, possibly due to economic diffi-
culty, political chaos, environmental trauma and/or paralyzed policymaking. In the absence
of the inexpensive fossil energy that fueled modernity, the country effectively returns to the
18th century. Following a dramatic reduction in population to levels that can be sustained
with pre-industrial manual agriculture, primary energy sources would be biomass and small-
scale hydro. Mobility would be limited to wind-driven ships, draft animals or foot and most
people would rarely stray very far from their place of birth. Tales of glistening horseless
carriages, roaring 30,000-ton monsters riding endless ribbons of steel, or chariots of fire as-
cending to the heavens would assume mythic characteristics as they are augmented in their
passage from generation to generation.
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Figure 5.17: The Neomedieval Energy Scenario
5.9 Renewability and Modal Shift
Transportation globally is currently almost wholly dependent upon petroleum (United States
Energy Information Administration 2011). Liquid hydrocarbon fuels can be produced (albeit
inefficiently) from abundant supplies of coal or natural gas via the Fischer-Tropsch process
and it is assumed that the cost differential between preservation of existing modalities with
Fischer-Tropsch fuels and transition to renewables will result in fossil resource substitution
on the downside of the nonrenewable availability curve. But ultimately the resource is finite
and a transition is inevitable.
During the transition to energy renewability, different transportation modes may be affected
differently. Assuming an electrically-dominated renewable future, long-distance automobility
and busmobility will be contingent on significant improvement in electrical storage capacity
and reduction in storage cost over current technologies that are bulky and expensive. High-
speed mass-market aeromobility faces an even larger challenge with the best hopes currently
revolving around biofuels and dramatic efficiency gains. By contrast, electrified rail has
been a proven technology for over a century (albeit capital intensive) and hydrogen-fueled
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rail would not face the draconian restrictions of volume and weight that bedevil prospects for
hydrogen-fueled aeromobility (Hydrogen Innovation and Research Centre Denmark 2006).
Because the advancement and level of deployment of these technologies is unknowable a
priori, this simulation incorporates configurable renewability factors for each passenger mode
(air, auto, rail, bus) as well for the related and equally fossil-fuel-dependent activities of truck
transport, road paving and track construction/maintenance. These factors are expressed as
on a scale of 0.0 - 1.0 and represent the percentage of the factored activity that can be
maintained with an equivalent amount of renewable energy in the future. These percentages
can also be loosely considered as the inverse of comparative energy intensity between the
renewably- and nonrenewably-powered variations on that activity, although the percentages
also embody the future economic, social, and political limits on the ultimate capability of
the activity to transition to renewability. Percentages can also conceivably exceed 100%
if the activity could be more vital in the post-fossil-fuel era, such as if electric cars could
ultimately be produced and operated at less expense than existing hydrocarbon-fueled cars.
Scenario formulation involves the setting of these renewability factors prior to simulation.
These factors could conceivably be dynamic, reflecting changes such as reductions in cost
as manufacturing volumes increase. However, given the smooth energy and GDP curves
driving mobility demand, such dynamic capability is omitted under the presumption that
dynamic renewability factors would have only a marginal effect on the timing of transitions
while adding complexity that would cloud understanding of the fundamental processes being
explored in the simulation.
Mode shift in this model cascades in order through aeromobility, automobility, locomobility
and busmobility. This cascade presumes the spatial virtues of automobility and aeromobility
will continue to make them the preferred modes unless some extrinsic factor limits their
availability.
Ten percent of renewably-unsatisfied aeromobility demand is assumed to mode shift to au-
tomobility based on the speed differential between the two modes.
The regression formula used to calculate secular rail demand then accounts for mode shift
from renewably-unsatisfied automobility and aeromobility as both suppression of demand
and mode shift. Unsatisfied locomobility mode shifts to busmobility as the socially- and
aesthetically-undesirable mode of last resort. Unsatisfied busmobility is assumed to remain
unsatisfied.
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Since GDP is constrained by the same energetic limitations that restrict mobility demand,
this simulation does not explicitly consider the potential economic feedbacks of very low
mobility levels. Adaptation to severe constriction on the movement of goods and people is
presumed to occur with spatial reconfiguration and/or transport substitution with technol-
ogy.
For example, the scenario shown in figure 5.18 is based on a moderate energy model and a
presumption of 100% transition of all modes to renewable power. The figure shows historical
data points along with simulation output lines.
Figure 5.18: Seamless Modal Transition Scenario
5.10 Aeromobility
As shown in figure 5.9, historical aeromobility can be modeled using two distinct curves:
a rapid development curve with a subsequent linear relationship to population after the
industry and technology began to mature in the late 1960s. Given the intercept offset in the
equation, the linear relationship actually represents an increase in per-capita air passenger-
miles that peaked at around 2,000 in 2007.
Future transitions to renewable energy sources and possible reductions in energy availability
are presumed to influence the availability of different travel modes. Assuming the contin-
uation of a market economy, decreasing supply would result in increased prices that would
reduce demand accordingly, and in the case of aviation, cause economic disruption in a
perennially fragile industry. Figure 5.19 shows the historic number of passenger-miles and
ton-miles by mode per quad of national energy consumption. While these peak figures inter-
twine modal energy intensity with mode share and transport share of national energy use in
a way that ignores the potential for adaptations in all of these areas, these numbers reflect
historic relationships that, along with the aforementioned renewability factors, give at least a
rough guide for anticipating how future energy constraints might reduce volume in different
modes.
Figure 5.19: Maximum Mobility Rates per National Energy Consumption
Given the historic role of aeromobility in reducing demand for long-distance locomobility in
the mid-20th century, a logical assumption would be that the inability of aeromobility to
significantly transition to renewability might result in increased secular demand for locomo-
bility. However, long-distance passenger rail was already an economically-tenuous enterprise
before the jet age (Hilton 1980, 1-14), and the rise of aeromobility was also accompanied
by an increased embedding of automobility in American spatial form, including the massive
152
public investment in the interstate highway system. That is reflected in the regression for-
mula used for calculating secular demand, so a reduction in aeromobility by itself does not
seem to drive an increase in locomobility.
The scenario shown in figure 5.20 presumes a moderate energy future, but one where aero-
mobility cannot adapt to renewables (renewability factor of zero) and begins a slow decline
in vitality until it ceases to exist as a mass-market transport mode in the early 22nd cen-
tury. While there is some mode shift to auto, the significantly slower speed of land-based
transport modes does not allow them to be one-for-one substitutes for aeromobility. Since
secular demand for locomobility does not rise to a level where locomobility can be profitable
and upset the Amtrak Equilibrium, the adaptation to this new constraint is that most of
this long-distance travel is no longer taken.
Such a scenario would likely involve national-scale spatial adaptations. Businesses might
make greater use of telepresence and/or engage in increased agglomeration in industrially-
specific areas. Families might live closer together, either with workers avoiding relocation
for work distant from existing social networks, or with lower-cost multi-generational housing
arrangements returning to vogue - which would be consistent with stagnant personal wealth
as reflected in GDP/capita. The reduction in long-distance vacations to centralized enter-
tainment centers (like Las Vegas or Orlando) might be at least partially replaced by local
and regional attractions that are more conveniently and economically reached by car and
tour bus, resulting in positive effects for many local economies.
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Figure 5.20: Low Aeromobility Scenario
Electrically-powered automobiles have been demonstrated to be functionally viable (at least
for limited distances) and technological improvements continue apace, but aeromobility as
we know it is entirely dependent upon fossil-based fuels. Airliners have become significantly
more efficient users of fuel over the past half-century (Davis, Diegel, and Boundy 2012,
Table 2-14), but the high speed of jet travel means that aeromobility is inherently energy-
intensive on a passenger-mile basis, leaving significant sensitivity to any potential future
energy constraints.
Biofuels have been demonstrated to work successfully in jet liners, but it seems unlikely that
there is the biomass resource base to support the universal aeromobility of the past 40 years or
under future global development aspirations (Nygren, Aleklett, and Ho¨o¨k 2009). There have
been experiments and proposals for hydrogen-powered aviation (Pohl and Malychev 1997)
that could permit maintenance of some level of aeromobility with hydrogen produced using
electrolysis powered by renewably-generated electricity, but such a transition would represent
both massive capital reinvestment and significant technical innovation, as well as competition
for a more-limited energy supply that would presumably be priced to represent increasing
value. Military experiments with electrically-synthesized hydrocarbon fuels using nuclear-
generated electricity and CO2 from seawater have been successful (Willauer et al. 2012),
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but the economy and scalability of such technology beyond limited military applications are
uncertain. Numerous peak-oil advocates have asserted that given the tenuous economics of
commercial air transportation even in times of economic prosperity, universal commercial
air travel may become financially inviable long before it becomes energetically impractical
(for example Rubin 2009, 230–236).
Energy is the only constraint on aeromobility considered in this simulation. Potential declines
in traffic due to decreased aﬄuence are encoded in the energy constraint since GDP is also
pegged to energy. Potential increases in inequality that result in an increasing number of
poor who cannot afford aeromobility are assumed to be offset by additional aeromobility
for the aﬄuent who control that redistributed wealth. Limits to aeromobility growth, such
as the difficulty of airport expansion (Cidell 2004), are encoded in the population-driven
demand formulas that level off with projected population growth.
5.11 Automobility
Automobility is a network of vehicles, infrastructure, manufacturers, dealers, maintenance
workers, security personnel, etc. Those physical elements are ubiquitous in their affect on
landscape and deeply tied to a rich set of abstractions: economics, semiotics, mythology.
Over the 20th century, automobility transformed the United States into what Seiler (2008,
144) has called “landscapes of compulsory automobility.” The extent of that produced space
as performed spatial practice is quantified in this simulation in terms of passenger-miles,
but there are additional characteristics representing constraints on volume that need to be
factored in to considerations of the future of automobility.
While the abstraction of economic value can be decoupled to some extent from domestic
energy expenditure, the construction and maintenance of paved roads is energy- and capital-
intensive and is less amenable to the geo-economic leverage of post-industrialization. As
seen in figure 5.21, the relationships between paved road miles, automobile registrations
(as a proxy for ownership), intercity passenger-miles, and trucking ton-miles are all posi-
tive across the 20th century. But energy use has the strongest linear relationship. Recent
increases in ton-miles and passenger-miles per paved road-mile may reflect the addition of
lanes to existing roads and increased utilization of a road network largely defined during
massive construction projects in the 1920s and mid-20th-century. Considering road miles as
a proxy for the spatial dispersion of automobility, this may also indicate increased intensity
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of usage within physical, economic and/or political constraints on spatial expansion that
also constrain the relative utility of additional roads.
Figure 5.21: Automobility and Road Paving
This observation is consistent with the narrative of “asphalt’s magic circle” (Lefebvre 1974
[1991], 374; Goodman 1971, 113) where increasing auto ownership leads to political pressure
to increase funding on public roads, which causes automobile-dependent spatial expansion,
which leads to demand for more automobiles. Even during the economic travails of the Great
Depression, automobility as measured in passenger-miles continued to grow. Although hints
of auto market saturation and a return to urban life began to emerge in the 1990s (Thomp-
son and Weissmann 2012; Gallagher 2013; Metz 2013), automobile-based suburbanization
and exurbanization remains a norm in the US and the massive sunk capital investment in
auto-dependent infrastructure seems likely to give automotively-produced spaces significant
persistence.
These positive relationships between energy, paved road mileage, and passenger miles imply
that any future constraints on energy would also constrict passenger-miles indirectly through
a reduction in the amount of paved road mileage and/or the amount of mileage that is
maintained at a state-of-good-repair needed to facilitate high throughput.
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There is presumably a practical limit on the amount of automobility that can operate within
a given amount of paved road mileage, with the frictional effects of congestion likely to
increase the undesirability of automobility before the actual physical limit has been reached.
The exponential curves fitted to recent trends would presumably flatten to sigmoid curves
at some point as congestion increasingly constricts traffic flow.
Questions in the transition to renewability include not only the renewability of vehicles, but
also potential added costs and availability of substitutes for fossil energy and materials used
in road construction and maintenance, including diesel for heavy machinery, natural gas for
concrete production, and fossil bitumen for asphalt concrete.
For example, in the medium energy scenario depicted in figures 5.22 and 5.23, all modes
transition to renewability, but intercity highway paving is given a renewability factor of 0.5
that could reflect increased highway maintenance costs with renewable energy, or, perhaps
increased neoliberal disinvestment in public infrastructure. No facility is given for mode shift
from auto to air under the assumption that most short- and medium-distance intercity auto
travel is incompatible with long-distance aviation. While renewable cars are still purchased,
they are more for local transportation and less for long-distance travel. There is some desire
for mode shift to rail, but continued nationalization presents a political obstacle to expanded
service while mode shift of truck freight to rail presents increased rail network contention
issues between increased rail freight traffic and increasingly unwelcome, disruptive passenger
trains. Busmobility sees some mode shift from rail and little highway disruption under the
presumption of a maintenance prioritization for the high-volume corridors typically used by
intercity buses.
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Figure 5.22: Low Paving Renewability Scenario
Figure 5.23: Low Paving Renewability Scenario: Passenger-Miles
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5.12 Locomobility
In contrast to the steady growth of automobility and aeromobility over the 20th century,
locomobility peaked in the US around 1920 and, outside of a burst of traffic during World
War II due to troop movements and constraints on automobility, there was a long-term
secular decline through the formation of Amtrak. The common narrative is that deployment
of subsidized automobility and then aeromobility progressively captured intercity traffic from
the railroads and yielded them technically obsolete as passenger transport (Morgan 1959;
Stover 1970, 127–157; Hilton 1980). A simple linear regression model shown in figure 5.9
supports this narrative to some extent, although the positive contribution of aeromobility to
automobility presents the statistical paradox that the coefficient for air influence on intercity
rail is actually positive. This formula is used for the calculation of secular demand for
locomobility.
A key potential advantage of rail over highway and air travel modes is the capability for
electrification, with electricity generated with renewable sources. Electrified rail is a mature
technology that has been used for over a century and is extensively deployed in both freight
and passenger systems around the world. Electrification involves considerable capital expense
and maintenance costs. Alternatively, the ability of rail systems to handle larger vehicles
and the more limited spatial extent may make hydrogen fuel-cell powered trains somewhat
easier to deploy than fuel-cell highway vehicles and cheaper than extensive electrification of
rail lines that extend long distances through sparsely populated Western states.
A precursor to making assertions about intercity rail is defining what should be consid-
ered intercity rail given locomobility’s multiscalar nature. While Amtrak provides the only
national intercity passenger rail network and many of their trains have routes over 1,000
miles, much of their traffic is regional traffic in the Northeast Corridor, and many riders of
long-distance trains only use them for limited portions of full routes. Commuter trains are
commonly considered along with urban transit, but many of these lines have long intercity
hauls. For example, the Greenport eastern terminus on the Long Island Railroad (2013)
Ronkonkoma Branch is 96 miles and three hours from Penn Station in Manhattan. This re-
search considers intercity rail to include both Amtrak and commuter rail passenger-miles in
totals, which makes present numbers consistent with historical statistics for private railroads
that included all rail ridership regardless of length of trip.
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The private railroads faced dire economic and regulatory challenges in the late 1960s, which
led to significant turmoil in the rail industry and dried up the cross-subsidy by freight
of legally-mandated passenger service. This resulted in de facto nationalization of intercity
locomobility under Amtrak in 1971 (Phillips 2011). Nationalization eliminated the existential
threat faced by intercity locomobility, but replaced that threat with a persistent political
equilibrium (Hilton 1980, 78; Perl 2002, 76–133) that has locked passenger-mileage to general
population growth and GDP (figure 5.9).
This Amtrak Equilibrium is assumed in this simulation to represent a baseline minimum of
passenger rail service that can satisfy spatio-politically defined commuter needs and sidero-
dromophilic demand (railfans, recreational travelers and travelers who can’t/won’t fly), while
not requiring a subsidy large enough to attract significant political opposition. Presumably,
this demand will fluctuate with general economic activity, so the formula for the Amtrak
Equilibrium is based on population and GDP. Potential demand would likely increase with
population and might increase with higher levels of poverty (increased demand for a subsi-
dized alternative to aeromobility or an alternative to bus service associated with marginalized
social classes), but actual demand by passengers with the ability to pay seems more likely
to be tied to GDP.
Amtrak has only been able to cover 50% to 70% of its operating expenses with operating
revenues, before considering capital expenditures or the undercapitalization that has often
resulted in service-related revenue loss. Amtrak’s 2012 operating expense of $0.57/pass-mile
is within post-WW-II railroad norms, albeit quite a bit above the $0.18/pass-mile for Grey-
hound (not considering public infrastructure costs) or the $0.23/pass-mile for automobiles
(highways, fuel, vehicles) (figure 5.24).
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Figure 5.24: Approximate Aggregate Costs per Mile For Different Modes
The supply of rail service is physically limited by the availability of a complex web of rolling
stock, stations, maintenance facilities, information technology etc. needed to facilitate oper-
ations. Even assuming a continuation of privately owned and operated track, passenger rail
operations require considerable and continuous capital investment to function.
If locomobility were to ever return to being a profitable enterprise where revenues exceeded
expenses and the cost of capital, rail system managers would presumably seek investment
to grow the passenger business, and investors could respond positively. Some of that cap-
ital might even be diverted from in automobility and aeromobility, assuming that such a
transition were not associated with broader capital shortages. However, in the absence of
profitability, rail systems are dependent upon the state, either in the form of direct subsidy
or through public-private partnerships (Coston 2001; Enthoven et al. 2011).
This simulation assumes that some increase in locomobility demand may result from any
limitations of automobility and aeromobility to transition to renewability. However, while
aeromobility exists as a viable alternative in terms of passenger-miles, in the absence of
any identifiable mechanism for changing the fundamental political stalemate behind the
Amtrak Equilibrium, this simulation assumes that service expansion will not exceed sidero-
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dromophilic demand unless intercity passenger rail is a commercially viable enterprise. This
level of demand is used as a lower threshold for secular demand matching the historic fig-
ures associated with the formation of Amtrak. The privatization threshold is assumed to
be parity of secular demand with aeromobility, which would reflect commercial viability as
increased captive demand would result in increased fares, which would then yield higher
revenues and an incentive for management to seek to increase supply and for investors to
supply the capital needed to expand service.
An example of such a scenario is shown in figure 5.25. In this moderate energy scenario,
automobility and aeromobility are unable to transition to renewability and have renewability
factors of 0.1 and 0.0, respectively. The decline in aeromobility and automobility unleash
secular demand for locomobility, which achieves parity with aeromobility around the year
2100 at 65 billion passenger-miles per year. Despite the economic malaise associated with
the energy dip in the transition to renewables, passenger rail becomes a profitable business
for private rail firms seeking new revenue streams to offset economically-induced declines in
freight traffic. The initial economic decline also causes a stall in deployment of renewables,
which feeds back as continuing economic decline and a stable (and purely coincidental)
parity between automobility and locomobility around 2130. But this is a Pyhrric victory for
locomobility as most Americans cannot afford the increased rail service availability that is
largely reserved for a dwindling upper- and upper-middle-class seeking long-distance mobility
while segregating themselves from the impoverished masses.
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Figure 5.25: High Rail Scenario
5.13 Freight and Track
A major infrastructural constraint on the expansion of locomobility is available capacity on
existing track for additional passenger service.
Miles of right-of-way (road miles) dropped from a high of around 254,000 in 1916 to 139,000
in 2010, around half of which is the best-maintained high-density class-A track. Track miles
dropped from a high of around 411,000 in 1931 to around 206,000 in 2010 (figure 5.26). After
the shift of high-value and short-distance freight traffic to truck, and the shift of passenger
travel to automobiles and airplanes, the massive network built in the late 19th century was
no longer spatially suited to the needs of increasingly freight-oriented private railroads.
When those private companies were deregulated under the Staggers Act in 1980, they were
able to more-easily abandon unprofitable lines and consolidate systems, creating a well-
maintained, spatially-constrained system that is optimized for large, long and slow trains
transporting freight between a limited number of origins and destinations.
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Short, fast, time-sensitive passenger trains are incompatible with this arrangement, with
estimates that one Amtrak intercity passenger train consumes between two and five freight-
train scheduling slots, depending on specific line conditions and passenger train speed (Wilner
2013). Contention with freight is the primary cause of Amtrak system delays (Amtrak 2012)
and railroads have quoted significant sums that would be needed to add capacity for even a
small number of additional passenger trains on heavily-used lines (Johnson 2012).
Figure 5.26: Rail System Mileage
When passenger traffic is smoothed to cover the spikes of the World Wars and the trough of
the Great Depression, track mileage correlates well with the combination of passenger-miles
and freight ton-miles (figure 5.27). Therefore, this simulation assumes that a significant
increase in passenger traffic would stimulate demand for additional track mileage to accom-
modate additional traffic.
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Figure 5.27: Rail System Mileage Correlated to Traffic
Both rail and truck freight traffic (in ton-miles) have been strongly correlated with GDP
(figure 5.28). Increased economic activity involves the movement of more goods and com-
modities associated with that activity.
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Figure 5.28: Freight Ton-Miles vs. GDP
However, in a transition to renewability, freight rail traffic would be affected by a number
of positive and negative influences, which are represented in the simulation by renewability
factors. 40% of the tons originated in 2012 were coal (Association of American Railroads
2013), and although products for renewable energy systems (such as wind turbine parts)
might take up some of this slack, a significant amount of revenue could be lost as the need
for shipments of nonrenewable fuels (coal and oil) is reduced to zero. Increases in transporta-
tion costs as well as decreases in US labor costs associated with reduced economic activity
would presumably reduce the global shipment of goods, which would reduce the intercity
intermodal traffic that is a vital part of current freight business. A concomitant increase in
regional manufacturing might increase the significance of branch lines and promote reacti-
vation of lines abandoned during deindustrialization, but decreased overall revenues would
likely constrain the availability of funds for maintenance and capital improvements, reducing
the state of good repair on some lines and constraining the capability for network expansion
to tap additional customers.
Some of the traffic lost by freight rail in the transition to renewability might be offset by
mode shift of high-value, high-tariff shipments from intercity trucking, depending on the
ability of trucking to adapt to renewable energy sources.
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Long-distance trucking is dependent on the same highway network as automobility. Since
the vast majority of road damage is attributable to trucks (Chester 2008, 40), trucking can
be seen as dependent upon the political power of automobility to elicit public funding for
highways. Even if road freight technology were able to make a meaningful transition to
renewable energy sources, the inability of intercity automobility to also make a significant
transition would require a transition in the funding model for road infrastructure. Reductions
in public road funding, state of good repair, and, in the worst case scenarios, lane miles
would presumably adversely affect the economics of trucking and result in mode shift to rail
freight. The adaptability of trucking to renewability is represented in the simulation with a
renewability factor.
While high speeds are a fundamental objective in competition with automobility and aero-
mobility, in the absence of such competition, speed might not be as significant an issue.
Wilner (2013) cites industry sources as indicating that under current conditions, reduction
of top speeds from 79 MPH to the 59 MPH associated with priority intermodal trains would
reduce impacts on freight operations and improve schedule reliability. This simulation consid-
ers track mileage as a proxy for spatial extent and a limiting influence, but does not consider
operational speed. Therefore, increased locomobility as measured in passenger-miles does
not necessarily mean faster or more luxurious locomobility.
5.13.1 The Motorcoach
The motorcoach has been consistently calculated to have half or less of the energy intensity
of any other mode (Hirst 1972, 1973; Federal Energy Administration 1974; Congressional
Budget Office 1979; J. Bleijenberg, and Dijkstra 1997; American Bus Association 2007;
Union of Concerned Scientists 2008; John Dunham and Associates 2012) and this could
presumably give buses an advantage in a more-constrained energy future. Buses have seen
significant ridership growth in recent years (Schweiterman and Fischer 2010), although the
large percentage increases are not volumetrically large due to the comparatively small initial
base ridership. Libertarian rail critic O’Toole (2011) notes high flexibility, high energy
efficiency, low capital requirements and low operating costs as rational reasons to promote
the motorcoach over expensive and constricted fixed-guideway transport.
However, intercity buses are all powered by diesel engines, leaving their future contingent on
the same technical innovations in electrification that affect their smaller automotive brethren.
Buses could also be said to piggy-back on the shared infrastructure investment largely paid
167
for by automotive fuel taxes and general public funds translated by the broad popularity
and economic might of automobility. While buses in many parts of the world do operate
on minimally-maintained road infrastructure, if intercity automobility cannot adapt during
the transition to renewability, reductions in automotive-driven highway investment would
certainly have a negative effect on the speed, reliability and desirability of renewable bus-
mobility.
As the slowest, least expensive and, arguably, least comfortable form of public transportation,
the motorcoach has become integrated in the North American imagination with class and
racial divisions as the modal option for those who cannot afford preferred forms of transport
(Walsh 2003). Luxury bus services have been provided in some high traffic corridors, but with
broader deployment, the concomitant reduction in passengers per vehicle needed to improve
the aesthetic experience would also increase energy intensity, thus offsetting the economic
and energetic advantage of the bus over more-flexible road options like jitneys or private
vehicles. And like trucking, buses currently piggy-back on road infrastructure spending from
private automobility, which makes the existing economic model for busmobility dependent
on continued automobility. Therefore, Locomobility is assumed in this simulation to have
an aesthetic and class advantage which could result in segregative modal preference and
political power over busmobility for those that can afford the higher fares.
Therefore, this simulation assumes that beyond a minimal threshold of demand associated
with baseline poverty, busmobility is the option of last resort which receives the residual
after demand is satisfied by automobility, aeromobility and locomobility. Busmobility is also
limited by the paved road value determined by auto passenger miles. A renewability factor
is provided for configuration of the percentage of potential busmobility supply that can be
preserved in the transition to renewability.
Mobility demand that cannot be satisfied by any of these four modes will remain unmet.
5.14 Simulated Futures
Because of the large number of continuous-value parameters, the number of potential sce-
narios is theoretically infinite. To narrow the range of considered scenarios, a sequence of
1,000 simulation runs using randomly-assigned parameter values was executed (the Monte
Carlo method). Parameters varied included the renewability factors for each mode (including
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freight modes and road paving), the ultimate cumulative amount of nonrenewable energy (to
shape the nonrenewable logistic distribution curve), renewable energy adoption timing and
renewable energy ultimate peak flow (to shape the renewable logistic probability curve).
While some parameter value ranges may be more probable than others (such as high railroad
renewability from electrification or low air renewability from limited ability to transition to
non-fossil fuel sources), since this model is used to explore possibilities rather than proba-
bilities, the random values for each parameter were distributed evenly across the range of
values considered possible.
The number of potential scenarios where there is a significant increase in locomobility are
fairly small (figure 5.29). The median of 33 billion PMT/Year and the dominance of the 40-45
billion PMT/Year class reflects the encoding of the Amtrak Equilibrium into the simulation
as a floor and ceiling, which can only be upset by a significant decline in aeromobility. While
a positive upset would represent a doubling of 2011 Amtrak and commuter rail volume of 18
billion PMT/Year (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2013a, Table 1-40), only a handful
of the potential scenarios exceed the Amtrak Equilibrium by any significant amount and
none achieve anything close to the 580 billion PMT/year of domestic aeromobility in 2012
(Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2013c).
Although the absence of probability distributions for the independent variables invalidates
specific implications that can be made of the probability of a future increase in locomobility,
it does indicate the extent to which future locomobility may be contingent on a transition
to a high level of renewable energy, the ability of rail systems to be able to use that energy,
and the inability of aeromobility to adapt to that new era - whether through technological
or resource limitation.
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Figure 5.29: Monte Carlo Simulation Output Distribution
A linear regression model was then created using the varying parameters as independent
variables and the output of locomobility passenger-miles in the final simulation year (2150)
as the dependent variable. As might be expected from the implications of the formulas used
for modal volume, the renewability of locomobility (figure 5.30) and the speed of transition
to renewables positively influence the volume of locomobility in the final simulation year of
2150 (p-values less than 0.001). Likewise, the renewability of aeromobility (figure 5.31) and
the amount of renewable energy that will be available are negative influences. In the scatter
plots, the barrier of the Amtrak Equilibrium is visible around 42 billion PMT/year.
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Figure 5.30: Monte Carlo Simulation Locomobility Renewability
Figure 5.31: Monte Carlo Simulation Aeromobility Renewability
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R Model Source Code
This model was implemented in the R statistical software package with integration using the
general solver for ordinary differential equations from the deSolve library.
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     1 # US Intercity Passenger Rail Systems Dynamics Model
     2 # rev. 19 January 2014
     3 #
     4 # (c) 2013 − 2014 by Michael Minn
     5 # This is free software and is offered without guarantee or warranty. 
     6 # You can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of 
     7 # version 2 of the GNU General Public License (GPL v2) as published 
     8 # by the Free Software Foundation (www.gnu.org).
     9 #
    10 ####################################################
    11 #
    12 # INSTRUCTIONS
    13 # 
    14 # This file contains an R systems dynamics model that simulates
    15 # possible future scenarios for intercity passenger rail in 
    16 # the United States. Calibration data (calibration.csv)
    17 # is provided for comparing simulation results to historical
    18 # data.
    19 # 
    20 # As a demonstration you can source this file and run one of
    21 # the following demo simulations:
    22 # 
    23 #       source("model.r"); scenario.rail.high()
    24 #       source("model.r"); scenario.rail.medium()
    25 #       source("model.r"); scenario.rail.low()
    26 # 
    27 # The "parameters" variable is the list of simulation parameters
    28 # with default values.
    29 # 
    30 # The "states" variable is the vector of initial simulation
    31 # states
    32 # 
    33 # model.integrate() returns a time−series data frame containing
    34 # state values from an integration using default parameters
    35 # 
    36 # The "scenario" parameter to model.integrate() is an optional
    37 # list containing a named subset of parameters for a scenario
    38 # that differ from the default parameters.
    39 # 
    40 # The plot.*() functions take the time−series output from
    41 # a model.integrate() run and plots meaningful graphs.
    42 # 
    43 # scenarios.monte_carlo() runs a sequence of simulations
    44 # using randomly−assigned parameter values. The output is a list
    45 # of simulation "scenarios," "outputs" (state values for the
    46 # final years of each scenario simulation), an lm (regression model)
    47 # examining the influence on the dependent variable (default
    48 # pass_mi.rail), and the state name of the dependent variable.
    49 # A graph of scenario parameter values is displayed during
    50 # the execution of the scenarios and the output list can
    51 # be used for further analysis.
    52 #
    53 ####################################################
    54
    55
    56 source("mmr.r")
    57 library(deSolve)
    58
    59 ####################################################
    60 #  PARAMETERS
    61 ####################################################
    62
    63 parameters = list(
    64         # Years for simulation run
    65         years = 1900:2150,
    66
    67         # USCB population model: 1 = constant, 2 = low, 3 = middle, 4 = high
    68         population_model = 3,
    69
    70         # Maximum level of growth from renewable energy
    71         # 1 = no growth, < 1 = shrinkage
    72         renewability.rail = 9.0,
    73         renewability.auto = 0.5,
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    74         renewability.air = 0.1,
    75         renewability.bus = 0.5,
    76         renewability.truck = 0.5,
    77         renewability.track = 0.9,
    78         renewability.paving = 1.0,
    79
    80         # Ultimate cumulative US usage of non−renewable energy in quads
    81         # Fitted curve of 10,063 puts peak around 2008
    82         # 20,000 puts peak around 2048
    83         # See energy.scenarios()
    84         # cumulative_nonrenewable = 10063,
    85         # cumulative_nonrenewable = 20000,
    86         cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
    87
    88         # Peak amount of energy available from renewable sources
    89         # Used as parameter for logistic curve
    90         # renewable_peak_quads = 200,
    91         renewable_peak_quads = 100,
    92
    93         # Number of years from 2010 needed to get halfway through the 
    94         # transition to renewable energy.
    95         # Used as parameter for logistic curve.
    96         renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 50,
    97
    98         # Cost per quad for renewable energy.
    99         # Based on an assumption of unknown increased cost.
   100         # renewable_cost_per_quad = 10000,
   101         renewable_cost_per_quad = 20000,
   102
   103         # 2010 US energy expenditure ($MM) per quadrillion BTU
   104         # U.S. Energy Information Administration,
   105         # Annual Energy Review 2011, Table 1.5
   106         nonrenewable_cost_per_quad = 12329,
   107
   108         # Maximum percent of GDP that can be devoted to renewables
   109         # 13.7% is peak value from 1981 recession
   110         # 2010 value was 8.3%
   111         # U.S. Energy Information Administration,
   112         # Annual Energy Review 2011, Table 1.5
   113         renewable_gdp_percent_limit = 0.137,
   114
   115         # Baseline historic level of hydroelectric electricity not counted
   116         # in renewable energy increases
   117         hydro_baseline = 2,
   118
   119         # Selects which regression model is used to determine rail demand
   120         # The sqrt model (1) diminishes the effect of globalized GDP spikes.
   121         # The linear model (2) matches history better than the sqrt model.
   122         # The population−only linear model (3) differentiates more clearly.
   123         rail_demand_model = 1,
   124
   125         # Percent of rail freight (in ton−miles) associated with 
   126         # non−renewable energy that will be lost in the transition 
   127         # to renewables.
   128         # 41% of tons originated in 2012 were coal (AAR 7/9/2013)
   129         # This should be adjusted to reflect new renewable energy
   130         # freight (wind turbine parts, etc.)
   131         rail_nonrenewable_freight = 0.4,
   132
   133         # The percent of renewably−unsatisfied aeromobility that shifts
   134         # to automobility. Based on speed differential.
   135         air_auto_mode_shift_percent = 50 / 500
   136 )
   137
   138 ####################################################
   139 #  STATE VARIABLES
   140 ####################################################
   141
   142 states = c(
   143         # Population in millions
   144         population = 76.094,
   145
   146         # GDP in billions of dollars (2010 $B CCI−adjusted)
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   147         gdp = 2040.5,
   148
   149         # Quads of domestic energy use per year
   150         quads.renewable = parameters$hydro_baseline,
   151         quads.nonrenewable = 9.3 − parameters$hydro_baseline,
   152         quads.nonrenewable.consumed = 1000,
   153
   154         # Passenger−miles in billions − initially all railroad
   155         pass_mi.air = 0,
   156         pass_mi.auto = 0,
   157         pass_mi.rail = 16.038,
   158         pass_mi.bus = 0,
   159
   160         # Modeled demand in billions of passenger−miles for
   161         # intercity passenger rail. 
   162         rail.demand.secular = 16.038,
   163
   164         # Minimum politically−dictated demand needed to satisfy 
   165         # commuters, recreational travelers, and railfans.
   166         # Billions of passenger−miles
   167         # See rail.regression()
   168         rail.demand.baseline = −31.23 + (0.1863 * 76.094) + 
   169                 (0.001316 * 2040.5) − (6.25e−06 * 76.094 * 2040.5),
   170
   171         # Whether passenger rail is nationalized (0=no, 1=yes)
   172         rail.nationalization = 0,
   173
   174         # Total route miles of railroad track (1900)
   175         # Assumes all road miles provide passenger service
   176         # Track miles are a proxy for spatial extent and spatial integration
   177         rail.route_mi = 193346,
   178
   179         # Miles of railroad track under construction
   180         rail.route_mi.construction = 0,
   181
   182         # MM registered vehicles
   183         cars.renewable = 0,
   184         cars.nonrenewable = 0,
   185
   186         # Miles of paved roads − 1900 guess based on later data
   187         roads.paved = 100000,
   188
   189         # Miles of road paving under construction
   190         #
   191         roads.paved.construction = 0,
   192
   193         # Freight in billions of ton−miles
   194         ton_mi.rail = 141.597,
   195         ton_mi.truck = 0,
   196
   197         # Amount of demand not satisfied by supply due to constraints
   198         constraint.quads.renewable.econ = 0,
   199         constraint.pass_mi.air.energy = 0,
   200         constraint.pass_mi.auto.energy = 0,
   201         constraint.pass_mi.auto.roads = 0,
   202         constraint.pass_mi.rail.energy = 0,
   203         constraint.pass_mi.rail.network = 0,
   204         constraint.pass_mi.bus.energy = 0,
   205         constraint.pass_mi.bus.roads = 0,
   206         constraint.ton_mi.truck.roads = 0,
   207         constraint.ton_mi.truck.energy = 0,
   208         constraint.ton_mi.rail.fossil = 0,
   209         constraint.ton_mi.rail.energy = 0
   210 )
   211
   212
   213 ####################################################
   214 #  INTEGRATOR FORMULAS FOR DYNAMIC INTERACTION
   215 ####################################################
   216
   217 integrator = function(time, states, parameters)
   218 {
   219 with (as.list(c(states, parameters)),
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   220 {
   221         ################### Population ###################
   222         # Logistic curve fitted to historic population growth and 
   223         # USCB (2012) Middle Series population projections
   224         # See population.models()
   225
   226         if (round(population_model) <= 1) # Constant series
   227                 d.population = dlogis(time, location = 1982.7, 
   228                         scale = 47.26) * 476.8
   229
   230         else if (round(population_model) == 2) # Low series
   231                 d.population = dlogis(time, location=1984.1, 
   232                         scale=47.66) * 483.3
   233
   234         else if (round(population_model) == 3) # Middle series
   235                 d.population = dlogis(time, location = 1992.7, 
   236                         scale=49.83) * 526.3
   237
   238         else # High series
   239                 d.population = dlogis(time, location=2002.4, 
   240                         scale=52.09) * 579.5
   241
   242
   243         ################### Energy −> GDP ###################
   244
   245         # Nonrenewable energy limited by logistic density curve 
   246         # based on ultimate cumulative resource. 
   247         # Manually fitted 2nd derivative of a logistic equation
   248         x = (28.2 − (2.1244 * log(cumulative_nonrenewable))) *
   249                 (quads.nonrenewable.consumed /
   250                 cumulative_nonrenewable − 0.5)
   251         d.quads.nonrenewable = 15 * (−(exp(x) − exp(−x)) / 
   252                 (2 + exp(x) + exp(−x))^2)
   253         d.quads.nonrenewable = 
   254                 max(d.quads.nonrenewable, −quads.nonrenewable)
   255         d.quads.nonrenewable.consumed = 
   256                 quads.nonrenewable + d.quads.nonrenewable
   257
   258
   259         # If nonrenewables are still growing, only minimal 
   260         # growth in renewables from environmentalist discourse.
   261         if (d.quads.nonrenewable > 0)
   262                 d.quads.renewable.demand = quads.renewable * 0.01
   263
   264         # Otherwise, maximum possible growth on logistic curve
   265         else
   266                 d.quads.renewable.demand = dlogis(
   267                         qlogis(quads.renewable / renewable_peak_quads)) * 
   268                         2 * renewable_peak_quads / 
   269                         renewable_transition_midpoint_years
   270
   271         # Renewable capability limited by amount of GDP for 
   272         # CapEx and maintenance.
   273         quads.renewable.supply = gdp * renewable_gdp_percent_limit * 
   274                 1000 / renewable_cost_per_quad
   275         d.quads.renewable.supply = 
   276                 quads.renewable.supply − quads.renewable
   277         d.quads.renewable = 
   278                 min(d.quads.renewable.demand, d.quads.renewable.supply)
   279
   280         # Track unsatisfied demand
   281         d.constraint.quads.renewable.econ = max(0, d.quads.renewable.demand 
− 
   282                 d.quads.renewable.supply) − constraint.quads.renewable.econ
   283
   284         # GDP is Kuznets function of energy
   285         # See gdp.energy()
   286         # gdp.kuznets = −1610 + (388 * quads) − 
   287         #       (7.22 * quads^2) + (0.051 * quads^3)
   288         # gdp.linear = 462.4 + (150.1 * quads)
   289         quads = quads.nonrenewable + quads.renewable
   290         d.quads = d.quads.nonrenewable + d.quads.renewable
   291         if (quads < 99) # Kuznets
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   292                 d.gdp = (388 * d.quads) − (2 * 7.22 * d.quads * quads) + 
   293                         (3 * 0.051 * d.quads * quads^2)
   294         else # Linear
   295                 d.gdp = 150.1 * d.quads
   296
   297         quads.available = function(renewability_factor)
   298         {
   299                 quads.nonrenewable + d.quads.nonrenewable +
   300                 (renewability_factor * 
   301                 (quads.renewable + d.quads.renewable − hydro_baseline))
   302         }
   303
   304         ################### Automobiles ###################
   305
   306         # Cars are bought to satisfy auto travel demand
   307         # Linear historic relationship
   308         # In millions of vehicle registrations
   309         # See automobility.registration.pmt()
   310         # See registrations.energy()
   311
   312         if (time < 1918)
   313         {
   314                 d.cars.nonrenewable = 0
   315                 d.cars.renewable = 0
   316         }
   317         else
   318         {
   319                 d.cars.nonrenewable = 2 * d.quads.nonrenewable
   320                 d.cars.nonrenewable = 
   321                         max(d.cars.nonrenewable, −cars.nonrenewable)
   322
   323                 d.cars.renewable = 
   324                         renewability.auto * 1.78 * d.quads.renewable
   325                 d.cars.renewable = max(d.cars.renewable, −cars.renewable)
   326         }
   327
   328         ################### Roads ###################
   329
   330         # 50% of construction projects come online each year 
   331         d.roads.paved.construction = roads.paved.construction * −0.5
   332         d.roads.paved = −d.roads.paved.construction
   333
   334         # Road paving/decline is a linear function of energy
   335         d.roads.paved.construction = d.roads.paved.construction + 
   336                 28719 * (d.quads.nonrenewable + 
   337                 (renewability.paving * d.quads.renewable))
   338
   339
   340         ################### Track ###################
   341
   342         # 20% of projects under construction come online each year 
   343         d.rail.route_mi.completion = rail.route_mi.construction * 0.5
   344
   345         # 1% natural depreciation, except during regulation period
   346         d.rail.route_mi.depreciation = rail.route_mi * 
   347                 ifelse(time < 1980, 0.005, 0.02)
   348
   349         # See rail.track()
   350         # d.rail.track.used = ((190000 − (0.0243 * ton_mi.rail) + 
   351         #       (5990 * pass_mi.rail)) * 1.1) − rail.track
   352         rail.network_capacity_utilization = function()
   353         {
   354                 (157900 − (0.02643 * ton_mi.rail) + 
   355                 (2705 * pass_mi.rail)) / rail.route_mi 
   356         }
   357
   358         # Demand capacity + 10% surplus
   359         # Be conservative about expanding capacity
   360         d.rail.route_mi.demand = 
   361                 (rail.network_capacity_utilization() − 1.1) * 
   362                 rail.route_mi / 5
   363         d.rail.route_mi.demand = max(0, d.rail.route_mi.demand)
   364
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   365
   366         # Ability to build limited by energy
   367         # Rate based on historic maximum per unit
   368         # See energy.max_rates()
   369         d.rail.route_mi.energy = 
   370                 (quads.available(renewability.track) * 29017) − 
   371                 rail.route_mi
   372         d.rail.route_mi.energy = max(0, d.rail.route_mi.energy)
   373         d.rail.route_mi.expansion = 
   374                 min(d.rail.route_mi.demand, d.rail.route_mi.energy)
   375
   376         # Final calculations
   377         d.rail.route_mi.construction = 
   378                 d.rail.route_mi.expansion − d.rail.route_mi.completion
   379         d.rail.route_mi = 
   380                 d.rail.route_mi.completion − d.rail.route_mi.depreciation
   381
   382
   383         ################### Passenger Miles: Air ###################
   384
   385         # Demand for aeromobility is a function of population
   386         # See pass_mi.regression()
   387         if (time < 1935)
   388                 d.pass_mi.air.demand = 0
   389
   390         else if (time < 1966) 
   391                 # development period: 
   392                 # pass_mi=−6.06 + (1.89e−10 * population^5)
   393                 d.pass_mi.air.demand=5 * 1.89e−10 * 
   394                         d.population*population^4
   395         else # maturity: pass_mi = −894 + 4.86 * population
   396                 d.pass_mi.air.demand = 4.86 * d.population
   397
   398         d.pass_mi.air = d.pass_mi.air.demand
   399
   400         # Supply of aeromobility limited by ability 
   401         # to transition to renewables.
   402         # Rate based on historic maximum per unit
   403         # See energy.max_rates()
   404         d.pass_mi.air.energy = 
   405                 (quads.available(renewability.air) * 6.0) − pass_mi.air
   406         d.constraint.pass_mi.air.energy = max(0, d.pass_mi.air.demand − 
   407                 d.pass_mi.air.energy) − constraint.pass_mi.air.energy
   408
   409         # Increase or decrease is the minimum of demand and all limits
   410         d.pass_mi.air = min(d.pass_mi.air.demand, d.pass_mi.air.energy)
   411
   412         # Sanity check − no negative travel
   413         d.pass_mi.air = max(d.pass_mi.air, −pass_mi.air)
   414
   415
   416
   417         ################### Passenger Miles: Auto ###################
   418
   419         # Demand for automobility is a function of population
   420         # plus unsatisfied air demand mode shift to auto
   421         # See pass_mi.regression()
   422         # pass_mi = −1180 + (10.8 * population)
   423         d.pass_mi.auto.demand = 10.4 * d.population + 
   424                 (air_auto_mode_shift_percent *
   425                 min(0, d.pass_mi.air.demand − d.pass_mi.air))
   426
   427         # Automobility limited by ability to transition to renewables
   428         # Rate based on historic maximum per unit
   429         # See energy.max_rates()
   430         d.pass_mi.auto.energy = 
   431                 (quads.available(renewability.auto) * 21.74) − pass_mi.auto
   432
   433         d.constraint.pass_mi.auto.energy = max(0, d.pass_mi.auto.demand − 
   434                 d.pass_mi.auto.energy) − constraint.pass_mi.auto.energy
   435
   436         # Auto demand suppressed by lack of adequate paved roads
   437         # See roads.influences()
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   438         d.pass_mi.auto.roads = (1.1 * exp(5.537 + 
   439                 (roads.paved + d.roads.paved) / 1246000)) − pass_mi.auto
   440
   441         d.constraint.pass_mi.auto.roads = max(0, d.pass_mi.auto.demand − 
   442                 d.pass_mi.auto.roads) − constraint.pass_mi.auto.roads
   443
   444         # Final value is demand constrained by limits
   445         d.pass_mi.auto = min(d.pass_mi.auto.demand, d.pass_mi.auto.energy, 
   446                 d.pass_mi.auto.roads)
   447
   448         # Sanity check − no negative travel
   449         if (time < 1918)
   450                 d.pass_mi.auto = 0
   451         else
   452                 d.pass_mi.auto = max(d.pass_mi.auto, −pass_mi.auto)
   453
   454
   455
   456         ################### Passenger Miles: Rail ###################
   457
   458         # Secular locomobility demand is proportional to GDP and population,
   459         # but is suppressed by automobility and aeromobility.
   460         # See rail.regression()
   461
   462         # Square−root model − GDP coefficient slightly reduced to 
   463         # eliminate year 2000 hump
   464         if (round(rail_demand_model) == 1) 
   465                 d.rail.demand.secular = (0.4341 * d.population) + 
   466                         (0.020 * d.gdp) −
   467                         ifelse(pass_mi.auto <= 0, 0, 
   468                         (2.091 * 0.5 * d.pass_mi.auto / sqrt(pass_mi.auto)))
 −
   469                         ifelse(pass_mi.air <= 0, 0, 
   470                         (3.737 * 0.5 * d.pass_mi.air / sqrt(pass_mi.air))) −
   471                         (4.8e−05 * ((d.population * gdp) + 
   472                         (population * d.gdp)))
   473
   474         # Linear model
   475         else if (round(rail_demand_model) == 2) 
   476                 d.rail.demand.secular = (0.1361 * d.population) + 
   477                         (0.02097 * d.gdp) − (0.07621 * d.pass_mi.auto) + 
   478                         (0.03794 * d.pass_mi.air) −
   479                         (3.96e−05 * 
   480                         ((d.population * gdp) + (population * d.gdp)))
   481
   482         # Population−only linear model
   483         else
   484                 d.rail.demand.secular = (0.6 * d.population) − 
   485                         (0.08451 * d.pass_mi.auto) +
   486                         (0.08193 * d.pass_mi.air)
   487
   488
   489         # Minimum politically−dictated demand needed to satisfy 
   490         # commuters, recreational travelers and railfans.
   491         # See rail.regression()
   492         d.rail.demand.baseline = (0.1863 * d.population) + 
   493                 (0.001316 * d.gdp) − 
   494                 (6.25e−06 * ((d.population * gdp) + (population * d.gdp)))
   495
   496
   497         #print(paste(time, "rail =", rail.demand.secular + d.rail.demand.sec
ular, "air =",
   498         #       pass_mi.air + d.pass_mi.air, "nationalization =", rail.natio
nalization))
   499
   500         # Growth behavior depends on whether system is nationalized
   501         if (rail.nationalization > 0.5)
   502         {
   503                 # if (pass_mi.rail >= pass_mi.air)
   504                 if ((rail.demand.secular + d.rail.demand.secular) >= 
   505                         (pass_mi.air + d.pass_mi.air))
   506                 {
   507                         # Privatize when market share demonstrates
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   508                         # competitiveness with marginally−profitable air
   509                         d.rail.nationalization = 0 − rail.nationalization
   510                         d.pass_mi.rail.demand = d.rail.demand.secular
   511                 }
   512                 else
   513                 {
   514                         # Nationalized system follows baseline equalibrium
   515                         d.rail.nationalization = 0
   516                         d.pass_mi.rail.demand = d.rail.demand.baseline
   517                 }
   518         }
   519
   520         else # Private system
   521         {
   522                 if ((time > 1950) && ((pass_mi.rail + d.rail.demand.secular)
 < 
   523                         (rail.demand.baseline + d.rail.demand.baseline)))
   524                 {
   525                         # If secular demand drops below baseline,
   526                         # nationalize to prop up the system
   527                         d.rail.nationalization = 1 − rail.nationalization
   528                         d.pass_mi.rail.demand = (rail.demand.baseline + 
   529                                 d.rail.demand.baseline) − pass_mi.rail
   530                 }
   531                 else
   532                 {
   533                         # Private system follows secular forces
   534                         d.rail.nationalization = 0
   535                         d.pass_mi.rail.demand = d.rail.demand.secular
   536                 }
   537         }
   538
   539
   540         # Locomobility limited by ability to transition to renewables
   541         # Rate based on historic maximum per unit, which occurred in 1944
   542         # and was similar to rates in the steam era.
   543         # See energy.max_rates()
   544         d.pass_mi.rail.energy = 
   545                 (quads.available(renewability.rail) * 2.684) − pass_mi.rail
   546
   547         d.constraint.pass_mi.rail.energy = max(0, d.pass_mi.rail.demand − 
   548                 d.pass_mi.rail.energy) − constraint.pass_mi.rail.energy
   549
   550         # Supply of locomobility limited by network capacity.
   551         d.pass_mi.rail.network = d.pass_mi.rail.demand * 0.9 / 
   552                 rail.network_capacity_utilization()
   553         d.pass_mi.rail.network = max(0, d.pass_mi.rail.network)
   554
   555         d.constraint.pass_mi.rail.network = 
   556                 max(0, d.pass_mi.rail.demand − d.pass_mi.rail.network) − 
   557                         constraint.pass_mi.rail.network
   558
   559         # Final value is demand constrained by limits
   560         d.pass_mi.rail = min(d.pass_mi.rail.demand, d.pass_mi.rail.energy, 
   561                 d.pass_mi.rail.network)
   562
   563         # Sanity check − no negative travel
   564         d.pass_mi.rail = max(d.pass_mi.rail, −pass_mi.rail)
   565
   566
   567         ################### Passenger Miles: Bus ###################
   568
   569         # Historic bus demand is a function of GDP
   570         # plus unsatisfied rail demand mode shifts to bus
   571         # Assumed to be transport for the lumpenproletariat
   572         # pass_mi = 18.36 + (0.0007737 * gdp)
   573         # See bus.regression()
   574         d.pass_mi.bus.demand = (0.0007737 * d.gdp) +
   575                 max(0, d.pass_mi.rail.demand − d.pass_mi.rail)
   576
   577         # Bus supply limited by ability to transition to renewables.
   578         # Unsatisfied bus travel will feedback into lost GDP.
   579         # Rate based on historic maximum per for rail since buses 
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   580         # are historically reserved for marginalized populations.
   581         # See energy.max_rates()
   582         d.pass_mi.bus.energy = 
   583                 (quads.available(renewability.bus) * 2.684) − pass_mi.bus
   584
   585         d.constraint.pass_mi.bus.energy = max(0, d.pass_mi.bus.demand − 
   586                 d.pass_mi.bus.energy) − constraint.pass_mi.bus.energy
   587
   588
   589         # Buses piggyback on auto−funded infrastructure
   590         # Bus demand suppressed by lack of adequate paved roads
   591         # This is auto PMT calculation adjusted for assumption that
   592         # one bus carries 16x number of avg passengers as a car
   593         # but is the traffic equivalent of four cars = 4x auto PMT
   594         # See roads.influences()
   595         d.pass_mi.bus.roads = ((1.1 * exp(5.537 + 
   596                 (roads.paved + d.roads.paved) / 1246000)) − pass_mi.bus) / 4
   597
   598         d.constraint.pass_mi.bus.roads =
   599                 max(0, d.pass_mi.bus.demand − d.pass_mi.bus.roads) − 
   600                 constraint.pass_mi.bus.roads
   601
   602         # Very limited industry and understanding of industry before 1939
   603         if (time < 1944)
   604                 d.pass_mi.bus = 0
   605
   606         else if (time == 1944)
   607                 d.pass_mi.bus = 23
   608
   609         else
   610                 # Final value is demand constrained by limits
   611                 d.pass_mi.bus = min(d.pass_mi.bus.demand, 
   612                         d.pass_mi.bus.energy, d.pass_mi.bus.roads)
   613
   614         # Sanity check − no negative travel
   615         d.pass_mi.bus = max(d.pass_mi.bus, −pass_mi.bus)
   616
   617
   618         ################### Truck Freight ###################
   619
   620         # Truck freight demand (in billion ton−miles) is a function of GDP
   621         # See freight.gdp()
   622         if (time < 1939)
   623                 d.ton_mi.truck.demand = 0
   624         else
   625                 d.ton_mi.truck.demand = 0.1042 * d.gdp
   626
   627
   628         # Truck capacity limited by ability to transition to renewables
   629         # Rate based on historic maximum
   630         # See energy.max_rates()
   631         d.ton_mi.truck.energy = 
   632                 (quads.available(renewability.truck) * 10.487) −
   633                 ton_mi.truck
   634
   635         d.constraint.ton_mi.truck.energy = max(0, d.ton_mi.truck.demand − 
   636                 d.ton_mi.truck.energy) − constraint.ton_mi.truck.energy
   637
   638
   639         # Truck capacity limited by road infrastructure
   640         # See roads.traffic()
   641         d.ton_mi.truck.roads = (1.1 * exp(4.229 + 
   642                 (roads.paved + d.roads.paved) / 935500)) − ton_mi.truck
   643
   644         d.constraint.ton_mi.truck.roads = max(0, d.ton_mi.truck.demand − 
   645                 d.ton_mi.truck.roads) − constraint.ton_mi.truck.roads
   646
   647
   648         # Final value is demand constrained by limits
   649         d.ton_mi.truck = min(d.ton_mi.truck.demand, d.ton_mi.truck.energy,
   650                 d.ton_mi.truck.roads)
   651
   652
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   653         # Sanity check − no negative travel
   654         d.ton_mi.truck = max(d.ton_mi.truck, −ton_mi.truck)
   655
   656
   657         ################### Freight Rail ###################
   658
   659         # Freight rail demand (in billion ton−miles) is a function of GDP
   660         # See freight.gdp()
   661         d.ton_mi.rail.demand.gdp = 0.114 * d.gdp
   662
   663         # Rail demand reduced by loss of nonrenewable−energy−related 
   664         # freight (coal, etc). 
   665         # Around 40% of traffic in 2010 was coal/petroleum.
   666         # See freight.energy()
   667         # ton−miles = exp(5.457 + 0.01955 * quads)
   668         
   669         d.ton_mi.rail.fossil = 0.4 * 0.01955 * d.quads.nonrenewable * 
   670                 exp(5.457 + (0.01955 * quads.nonrenewable))
   671         d.ton_mi.rail.fossil = max(0, d.ton_mi.rail.fossil)
   672
   673         d.constraint.ton_mi.rail.fossil = max(0, −d.ton_mi.rail.fossil) − 
   674                 constraint.ton_mi.rail.fossil
   675
   676         # Rail demand increased by mode shift from unsatisfied truck demand
   677         d.ton_mi.rail.mode_shift = 
   678                 max(0, d.ton_mi.truck.demand − d.ton_mi.truck)
   679
   680
   681         # Rail capacity limited by ability to transition to renewables
   682         # Rate based on historic maximum
   683         # See energy.max_rates()
   684         d.ton_mi.rail.energy = 
   685                 (quads.available(renewability.rail) * 22.915) − ton_mi.rail
   686
   687         d.constraint.ton_mi.rail.energy = 
   688                 max(0, d.ton_mi.rail.demand.gdp − d.ton_mi.rail.energy) − 
   689                 constraint.ton_mi.rail.energy
   690
   691         # Final value is total demand constrained by limits
   692         d.ton_mi.rail.demand = d.ton_mi.rail.demand.gdp + 
   693                 d.ton_mi.rail.fossil + d.ton_mi.rail.mode_shift
   694
   695         d.ton_mi.rail = min(d.ton_mi.rail.demand, d.ton_mi.rail.energy)
   696
   697
   698         return(list(c(d.population, d.gdp, 
   699                 d.quads.renewable, d.quads.nonrenewable, 
   700                 d.quads.nonrenewable.consumed,
   701                 d.pass_mi.air, d.pass_mi.auto, 
   702                 d.pass_mi.rail, d.pass_mi.bus, 
   703                 d.rail.demand.secular, d.rail.demand.baseline, 
   704                 d.rail.nationalization,
   705                 d.rail.route_mi, d.rail.route_mi.construction,
   706                 d.cars.renewable, d.cars.nonrenewable, 
   707                 d.roads.paved, d.roads.paved.construction,
   708                 d.ton_mi.rail, d.ton_mi.truck,
   709                 d.constraint.quads.renewable.econ,
   710                 d.constraint.pass_mi.air.energy, 
   711                 d.constraint.pass_mi.auto.energy, 
   712                 d.constraint.pass_mi.auto.roads,
   713                 d.constraint.pass_mi.rail.energy,
   714                 d.constraint.pass_mi.rail.network,
   715                 d.constraint.pass_mi.bus.energy,
   716                 d.constraint.pass_mi.bus.roads, 
   717                 d.constraint.ton_mi.truck.roads,
   718                 d.constraint.ton_mi.truck.energy,
   719                 d.constraint.ton_mi.rail.fossil,
   720                 d.constraint.ton_mi.rail.energy)))
   721 })
   722 }
   723
   724
   725 ####################################################
181
model.r                                                                      Page 11
   726 #  MAIN INTEGRATOR CALL
   727 ####################################################
   728
   729 difference_integrator = function(time, states, parameters) 
   730 {
   731         return(list(states + unlist(integrator(time, states, parameters))))
   732 }
   733
   734 model.integrate = function(scenario = NULL, difference_equations = F)
   735 {
   736         parameters.run = parameters
   737         if (!is.null(scenario))
   738                 for (name in names(scenario))
   739                         if (length(grep(name, names(parameters))) > 0)
   740                                 parameters.run[[name]] = scenario[[name]]
   741
   742         if (difference_equations)
   743                 results = ode(y = states, times = parameters.run$years,
   744                         func = difference_integrator, 
   745                         parms = parameters.run, method="iteration")
   746         else
   747                 results = ode(y = states, 
   748                         times = parameters.run$years, 
   749                         func = integrator, 
   750                         parms = parameters.run, method=euler)
   751
   752         rownames(results) = results[,"time"]
   753
   754         return(data.frame(results))
   755 }
   756
   757
   758 ####################################################
   759 #  SCENARIO FUNCTIONS
   760 ####################################################
   761
   762 scenario.energy.high = function()
   763 {
   764         scenario = list(
   765                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   766                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   767                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   768                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   769                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   770                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   771                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 20000,
   772                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 30,
   773                 renewable_peak_quads = 200)
   774         
   775         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   776         model.energy(results)
   777
   778         return(results)
   779 }
   780
   781 scenario.energy.medium = function()
   782 {
   783         scenario = list(
   784                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   785                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   786                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   787                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   788                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   789                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   790                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   791                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 25,
   792                 renewable_peak_quads = 130)
   793         
   794         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   795         model.energy(results)
   796
   797         return(results)
   798 }
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   799
   800 scenario.energy.low = function()
   801 {
   802         scenario = list(
   803                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   804                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   805                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   806                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   807                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   808                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   809                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   810                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 50,
   811                 renewable_peak_quads = 50)
   812         
   813         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   814         model.energy(results)
   815
   816         return(results)
   817 }
   818
   819 scenario.energy.neomedieval = function()
   820 {
   821         scenario = list(
   822                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   823                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   824                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   825                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   826                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   827                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   828                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   829                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 50,
   830                 renewable_peak_quads = 10)
   831         
   832         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   833         model.energy(results)
   834
   835         return(results)
   836 }
   837
   838 scenario.pass_mi.seamless = function()
   839 {
   840         scenario = list(
   841                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   842                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   843                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   844                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   845                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   846                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   847                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   848                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 25,
   849                 renewable_peak_quads = 130)
   850         
   851         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   852         plot.pass_mi(results)
   853
   854         return(results)
   855 }
   856
   857
   858 scenario.limit.air = function()
   859 {
   860         scenario = list(
   861                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   862                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   863                 renewability.air = 0.0,
   864                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   865                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   866                 renewability.paving = 1.0,
   867                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   868                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 25,
   869                 renewable_peak_quads = 130)
   870         
   871         results = model.integrate(scenario)
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   872         plot.pass_mi(results)
   873
   874         return(results)
   875 }
   876
   877
   878 scenario.limit.roads = function()
   879 {
   880         scenario = list(
   881                 renewability.rail = 1.0,
   882                 renewability.auto = 1.0,
   883                 renewability.air = 1.0,
   884                 renewability.bus = 1.0,
   885                 renewability.truck = 1.0,
   886                 renewability.paving = 0.5,
   887                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   888                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 25,
   889                 renewable_peak_quads = 130)
   890         
   891         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   892         plot.automobility(results)
   893
   894         return(results)
   895 }
   896
   897 scenario.rail.low = function()
   898 {
   899         scenario = list(
   900                 renewability.rail = 0.0,
   901                 renewability.auto = 1,
   902                 renewability.air = 1,
   903                 renewability.bus = 1,
   904                 renewability.truck = 1,
   905                 renewability.paving = 1,
   906                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
   907                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 30,
   908                 renewable_peak_quads = 200)
   909         
   910         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   911         plot.pass_mi(results)
   912
   913         return(results)
   914 }
   915
   916 scenario.rail.medium = function()
   917 {
   918         scenario = list(
   919                 renewability.rail = 0.75,
   920                 renewability.auto = 0.5,
   921                 renewability.air = 0.75,
   922                 renewability.bus = 0.75,
   923                 renewability.truck = 0.8,
   924                 renewability.paving = 0.5,
   925                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 26000,
   926                 renewable_transition_midpoint_years = 72,
   927                 renewable_peak_quads = 143)
   928         
   929         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   930         plot.pass_mi(results)
   931
   932         return(results)
   933 }
   934
   935 scenario.rail.high = function()
   936 {
   937         scenario = list(
   938                 renewability.rail = 0.9,
   939                 renewability.auto = 0.1,
   940                 renewability.air = 0,
   941                 renewability.bus = 0.1,
   942                 renewability.truck = 0.1,
   943                 renewability.paving = 0.3,
   944                 cumulative_nonrenewable = 11000,
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   945                 renewable_peak_quads = 100)
   946         
   947         results = model.integrate(scenario)
   948         plot.pass_mi(results)
   949
   950         return(results)
   951 }
   952
   953
   954 scenarios.monte_carlo = function(runs = 1000, target_year = "2150", 
   955         dependent_variable = "pass_mi.rail")
   956 {
   957         set.seed(7) # so results are reproducable
   958
   959         parameters.ranges = matrix(ncol=3, byrow = T, data=c(
   960                 "renewability.rail",                    0,      1,
   961                 "renewability.auto",                    0,      1,
   962                 "renewability.air",                     0,      1,
   963                 "renewability.bus",                     0,      1,
   964                 "renewability.truck",                   0,      1,
   965                 "renewability.paving",                  0.1,    1,
   966                 "cumulative_nonrenewable",              11500,  20000,
   967                 "renewable_peak_quads",                 10,     200,
   968                 "renewable_transition_midpoint_years",  50,     100))
   969         parameters.ranges = data.frame(row.names = parameters.ranges[,1],
   970                 low = as.numeric(parameters.ranges[,2]),
   971                 high = as.numeric(parameters.ranges[,3]))
   972
   973         scenarios = data.frame(matrix(data=vector(), 
   974                 ncol=nrow(parameters.ranges),
   975                 dimnames=list(c(), rownames(parameters.ranges))))
   976
   977         output = data.frame(matrix(data=vector(),
   978                 ncol=length(states) + 1,
   979                 dimnames=list(c(), c("time", names(states)))))
   980
   981         mmr.plot.foundation(xlim=c(0,100), ylim=c(0,100), 
   982                 xlab=dependent_variable, ylab="Indexed Parameters")
   983
   984         for (run in 1:runs)
   985         {
   986                 scenario = list()
   987                 for (param in rownames(parameters.ranges))
   988                         scenario[[param]] = runif(1, 
   989                                 parameters.ranges[param, "low"], 
   990                                 parameters.ranges[param, "high"])
   991
   992                 results = model.integrate(scenario)
   993                 output = rbind(output, results[target_year,])
   994                 scenarios = rbind(scenarios, scenario)
   995
   996                 x = output[nrow(output), dependent_variable]
   997                 print(paste("Run ", run, ":", dependent_variable, "=", x))
   998
   999                 for (z in 1:nrow(parameters.ranges))
  1000                 {
  1001                         name = rownames(parameters.ranges)[z]
  1002                         low = parameters.ranges[z,"low"]
  1003                         high = parameters.ranges[z,"high"]
  1004                         value = scenario[[name]]
  1005                         indexed = 100 * (value − low) / (high − low)
  1006                         points(x=x, y=indexed, pch=mmr.symbols[z], 
  1007                                 col=mmr.palette[z])
  1008                 }
  1009         }
  1010
  1011         mmr.legend(x="topright", legend=rownames(parameters.ranges), 
  1012                 cex=0.7, type="p")
  1013
  1014         formula = formula(paste(dependent_variable,"~", 
  1015                 paste(rownames(parameters.ranges), collapse="+")))
  1016         print(formula)
  1017         regression = lm(formula, 
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  1018                 data=cbind(output, scenarios[,rownames(parameters.ranges)]))
  1019         print(summary(regression))
  1020
  1021         return(list(scenarios = scenarios, results = output, 
  1022                 depvar = dependent_variable, model=regression))
  1023 }
  1024
  1025 # results = model.integrate(states, parameters, difference_equations = T)
  1026
  1027 # results = model.monte_carlo()
  1028
  1029
  1030 ####################################################
  1031 #  OUTPUT DISPLAY FUNCTIONS
  1032 ####################################################
  1033
  1034 # Sample export to PNG
  1035 # png("graphics/scenario.limit.air.png", width=1950, height=1125, res=200)
  1036 # source("model.r"); scenario.limit.air()
  1037 # dev.off()
  1038
  1039 plot.calibration.load = function()
  1040 {
  1041         data = read.table("calibration.csv", header=T, sep=',', 
  1042                 quote="\"", check.names=F, skip=1)
  1043         rownames(data) = data$Year
  1044         data$Year = NULL
  1045         return(data)
  1046 }
  1047
  1048
  1049 plot.automobility = function(results)
  1050 {
  1051         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1052
  1053         data = data.frame(row.names = rownames(calibration),
  1054                 check.names = F,
  1055                 registrations = calibration$"Auto Registrations (MM)",
  1056                 renewable = rep(NA, nrow(calibration)),
  1057                 paved = calibration$"Paved Road Miles" / 20000,
  1058                 pass_mi = calibration$"Intercity Auto (MM PMT)" / 20000)
  1059
  1060         mmr.plot(y=data, xlim=c(1900, 2150), 
  1061                 ylim=c(0, 300), xlab="Year", type="p")
  1062
  1063         data = data.frame(row.names=rownames(results), check.names=F,
  1064                 "Nonrenewable Cars" = results$cars.nonrenewable,
  1065                 "Renewable Cars" = results$cars.renewable,
  1066                 "Paved Roads (50K miles)" = results$roads.paved / 20000,
  1067                 "Auto Passenger−Miles (50MM)" = results$pass_mi.auto / 20,
  1068                 "GDP (100B)" = results$gdp / 100)
  1069
  1070         mmr.plot(data, overwrite=T)
  1071
  1072         mmr.legend(data)
  1073 }
  1074
  1075 plot.constraints = function(results)
  1076 {
  1077         data = data.frame(row.names = rownames(results), check.names=F,
  1078                 "Renewable Energy Affordability ($B)" = 
  1079                         results$constraint.quads.renewable.econ,
  1080                 "Air Energy (MM Pass−Mi)" = 
  1081                         results$constraint.pass_mi.air.energy,
  1082                 "Auto Energy (MM Pass−Mi)" = 
  1083                         results$constraint.pass_mi.auto.energy,
  1084                 "Auto Highway Capacity (MM Pass−Mi)" = 
  1085                         results$constraint.pass_mi.auto.roads * 1000,
  1086                 "Passenger Rail Energy (MM Pass−Mi)" =
  1087                         results$constraint.pass_mi.rail.energy,
  1088                 "Rail Network Capacity (MM Pass−Mi)" =
  1089                         results$constraint.pass_mi.rail.network,
  1090                 "Bus Energy (MM Pass−Mi)" =
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  1091                         results$constraint.pass_mi.bus.energy,
  1092                 "Bus Road Capacity (MM Pass−Mi)" =
  1093                         results$constraint.pass_mi.bus.roads,
  1094                 "Truck Highway Capacity (10MM Ton−Miles)" =
  1095                         results$constraint.ton_mi.truck.roads / 100,
  1096                 "Truck Energy(10MM Ton−Miles)" =
  1097                         results$constraint.ton_mi.truck.energy / 100,
  1098                 "Lost Fossil Fuel Rail Traffic (10MM Ton−Miles)" = 
  1099                         results$constraint.ton_mi.rail.fossil / 100,
  1100                 "Freight Rail Energy (MM Ton−Miles)" = 
  1101                         results$constraint.ton_mi.rail.energy / 1000)
  1102
  1103         data[data == 0] = NA
  1104
  1105         mmr.plot(data, xlab="Years", log="y")
  1106         mmr.legend(data, cex=0.7)
  1107 }
  1108
  1109
  1110 plot.energy = function(results)
  1111 {
  1112         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1113
  1114         years = rownames(results)
  1115         data = data.frame(row.names = years, check.names=F,
  1116                 "Renewable Quads" = 
  1117                         calibration[years, "Renewable Quads"],
  1118                 "Nonrenewable Quads" = 
  1119                         calibration[years, "Nonrenewable Quads"],
  1120                 "Total Quads" = calibration[years, "Renewable Quads"] + 
  1121                         calibration[years, "Nonrenewable Quads"],
  1122                 "GDP" = 
  1123                         calibration[years,"GDP (2010 $B CCI−adjusted)"] / 20
0,
  1124                 "Population (10 MM)" = 
  1125                         calibration[years, "Population (MM)"] / 10)
  1126         
  1127         simulated = data.frame(row.names = years,
  1128                 renewable = results$quads.renewable,
  1129                 nonrenewable = results$quads.nonrenewable,
  1130                 total = results$quads.renewable + results$quads.nonrenewable
,
  1131                 gdp = results$gdp / 200,
  1132                 pop = results$population / 10)
  1133
  1134         mmr.plot(data, xlab="Year", ylab="Quads / GDP", 
  1135                 type="p", ylim=c(0, max(data, simulated, na.rm=T)))
  1136         mmr.plot(simulated, type="l", overwrite=T)
  1137         mmr.legend(data, type="p")
  1138
  1139 }
  1140
  1141
  1142 plot.freight = function(results)
  1143 {
  1144         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1145
  1146         years = rownames(results)
  1147
  1148         data = data.frame(row.names = years, 
  1149                 rail = calibration[years, "Rail Ton−Miles (B)"],
  1150                 truck = calibration[years, "Motor Vehicle Ton−Miles (B)"],
  1151                 track = calibration[years, "Rail Track Miles"] / 500)
  1152
  1153         mmr.plot(data, ylim=c(0, 2000), xlab="Year", 
  1154                 ylab="Billion Ton−Miles (B) / Road Miles ('000)", type="p")
  1155
  1156         data = data.frame(row.names = years, check.names = F,
  1157                 "Rail Ton−Miles" = results$ton_mi.rail,
  1158                 "Truck Ton−Miles" = results$ton_mi.truck,
  1159                 "Rail Track Miles" = results$rail.track / 500,
  1160                 "GDP" = results$gdp / 100)
  1161                 
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  1162         mmr.plot(data, overwrite=T)
  1163
  1164         mmr.legend(data, type="p")
  1165 }
  1166
  1167 plot.locomobility = function(results)
  1168 {
  1169         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1170
  1171         years = rownames(results)
  1172
  1173         data = data.frame(row.names = years, 
  1174                 intercity = calibration[years, "Intercity Rail (MM PMT)"],
  1175                 amtrak = calibration[years, "Amtrak (MM PMT)"],
  1176                 ton_mi = calibration[years, "Rail Ton−Miles (B)"] * 10,
  1177                 track = calibration[years, "Rail Road Miles"] / 10,
  1178                 track_construction = rep(NA, length(years)))
  1179
  1180         mmr.plot(data, type="p", xlab="Years", ylim=c(0,80000))
  1181
  1182         data = data.frame(row.names = years, check.names = F,
  1183                 "Private Rail" = results$pass_mi.rail * 1000,
  1184                 "Nationalized Rail" = results$pass_mi.rail * 1000,
  1185                 "Freight Ton−Miles (B)" = results$ton_mi.rail * 10,
  1186                 "Road Miles" = results$rail.route_mi / 10,
  1187                 "Road Miles Under Construction" = 
  1188                         results$rail.route_mi.construction / 10,
  1189                 "Secular Demand (B PMT)" = 
  1190                         results$rail.demand.secular * 1000,
  1191                 "Baseline Demand (B PMT)" = 
  1192                         results$rail.demand.baseline * 1000)
  1193
  1194         data[results$rail.nationalization > 0, "Private Rail"] = NA
  1195         data[results$rail.nationalization <= 0, "Nationalized Rail"] = NA
  1196
  1197         mmr.plot(data, overwrite=T)
  1198
  1199         mmr.legend(data, cex=0.9)
  1200 }
  1201
  1202 plot.monte_carlo.distribution = function(monte_carlo, column="pass_mi.rail")
  1203 {
  1204         x = monte_carlo$results[, column]
  1205         distribution = hist(x=x, plot=F)
  1206         mmr.columns(y=distribution$counts, colnames=distribution$breaks, 
  1207                 collabels = distribution$counts, 
  1208                 xlab="Intercity Rail Passenger−Miles per Year in 2150 (B)", 
  1209                 ylab="Random Scenario Frequency")
  1210 }
  1211
  1212 plot.monte_carlo.parameter = function(monte_carlo, 
  1213         ylab="Automobility Renewability Factor", parameter="renewability.aut
o")
  1214 {
  1215         x = monte_carlo$results[, "pass_mi.rail"]
  1216         y = monte_carlo$scenarios[, parameter]
  1217         mmr.plot(x=x, y=y, type="p", xlim=c(0, round(max(x) + 10, −1)),
  1218                 xlab="Intercity Rail Passenger−Miles per Year in 2150 (B)",
  1219                 ylab=ylab)
  1220 }
  1221
  1222         
  1223
  1224 plot.pass_mi = function(results)
  1225 {
  1226         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1227         
  1228         data = calibration[,c("Intercity Rail (MM PMT)", 
  1229                 "Intercity Rail (MM PMT)",
  1230                 "Intercity Auto (MM PMT)",
  1231                 "Domestic Air (MM PMT)", 
  1232                 "Intercity Bus (MM PMT)", 
  1233                 "GDP (2010 $B CCI−adjusted)",
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  1234                 "Amtrak (MM PMT)")] / 1000
  1235
  1236         data[rownames(calibration) >= "1971", 1] = NA
  1237         data[rownames(calibration) < "1971", 2] = NA
  1238
  1239         mmr.plot(data, xlim=range(parameters$years), ylim=c(1,3000), 
  1240                 type="p", log="y", 
  1241                 xlab="Year", ylab="Passenger Miles (B) / GDP (2010 $T)")
  1242
  1243         data = data.frame(row.names = rownames(results), check.names = F,
  1244                 "Private Rail" = results$pass_mi.rail,
  1245                 "Nationalized Rail" = results$pass_mi.rail,
  1246                 "Auto" = results$pass_mi.auto,
  1247                 "Air" = results$pass_mi.air,
  1248                 "Bus" = results$pass_mi.bus,
  1249                 "GDP" = results$gdp / 1000,
  1250                 "Amtrak" = rep(NA, nrow(results)))
  1251
  1252         data[results$rail.nationalization > 0, "Private Rail"] = NA
  1253         data[results$rail.nationalization <= 0, "Nationalized Rail"] = NA
  1254  
  1255         mmr.plot(data, type="l", overwrite=T)
  1256
  1257         mmr.legend(legend=data, type="p", cex=0.9)
  1258 }
  1259
  1260 plot.population = function(results)
  1261 {
  1262         calibration = plot.calibration.load()
  1263         data = data.frame(row.names = rownames(calibration), check.names=F,
  1264                 "Population (MM)" = calibration$"Population (MM)",
  1265                 "GDP ($100/Capita)" = 
  1266                         calibration$"GDP (2010 $B CCI−adjusted)" * 10000000 
/ 
  1267                         (calibration$"Population (MM)" * 1000000))
  1268
  1269         mmr.plot(data, xlab="Year", 
  1270                 xlim=range(as.numeric(rownames(results))), type="p")
  1271
  1272         data = data.frame(row.names=rownames(results), check.names=F,
  1273                 "Population (MM)" = results$population,
  1274                 "GDP ($100/Capita)" = 10 * results$gdp / results$population)
  1275
  1276         mmr.plot(data, overwrite=T)
  1277
  1278         x=as.numeric(range(rownames(results)))
  1279         countries = list("USA" = 42000, "EU" = 28537, "Portugal" = 18535, 
  1280                 "Poland" = 10019, "India" = 1034) # , Kenya = 574)
  1281         sapply(1:length(countries), function(z)
  1282         {
  1283                 
  1284                 y = countries[[z]] / 100
  1285                 lines(x=x, y=rep(y, 2), lwd=3,  
  1286                         col=mmr.palette[3], lty=mmr.linetypes[3])
  1287                 text(x=2120, y=y+20, pos=4, labels=names(countries[z]))
  1288         })
  1289
  1290         mmr.legend(data)
  1291 }
  1292
189
5.15 Conclusion
Given the explicit importance of energy availability built in to the simulation, the primary
factors influencing future locomobility are the renewability of aeromobility and the level
of renewable energy that is ultimately available. The automotive production of space was
well beyond that which could have been produced with locomobility, so any diminution
of automobility would likely result in spatial reconfiguration rather than an expansion of
locomobility to preserve the spatially rapacious tendencies of automobility.
Based on the assumptions encoded in the model, the simulations give some justification for
the hypotheses stated in the introduction:
• In the absence of any significant, prolonged energy shock, passenger rail can be pre-
sumed to continue to exist in a policy stalemate as a multi-scaled mode that is a hybrid
of subsidized mobility and kinetic recreation
• If significant energy constraints arise but are not overwhelming, spatial contention
for private rail infrastructure with increasingly-important rail freight will likely be an
increasing impediment to expansion of passenger rail availability and accessibility, and
may pose an existential threat to national service in the worst-case conditions.
• Even if energy constraints become significant, the dominance of automobility in Amer-
ican spatial structure should give automobility persistence as long as the technology is
even modestly affordable
• In the most energy-constrained scenarios, capital and public subsidy may not be avail-
able to maintain rail infrastructure outside of spatially-constrained corridors.
Regional/Commuter rail systems play a vital role in the economic lives of their communities
and electrified systems are well-equipped to preserve locomobility during the transition to
renewability if that future involves preservation of at least some portion of the modernist
project. But the national, diesel-fueled locomobility network makes little quantitative contri-
bution to overall mobility in the United States and its survival seems much more contingent
on either enough prosperity to support its existence as kinetic art (Hilton 1980, 75–78),
or on a level of poverty that preserves some measure of modernity while invalidating the
transportation modes that evolved as the direct consequence of modernity. Whether either
of those futures is desirable involve questions of values that positivist analytical techniques
190
have difficulty illuminating. Whether either of those futures will come to be involves ques-
tions of faith for which simulation can offer only minimal guidance.
A question raised but not answered by these results is what the role of Amtrak should be in
the future. Advocates like Vranich (1997, 2004) have asserted that the existence of Amtrak as
a political bureaucracy impedes the transformation needed to advance the state of intercity
rail transportation in the United States. However, given the historically-observable secular
trends, in the absence of some kind of governmental intervention it is unclear how anything
other than a limited, high-cost service tailored specifically to aﬄuent recreational travelers (in
the manner of cruise ships) could be cost- and utility-competitive with aeromobility within
existing energetic and economic structures. Given the lengthy periods historically associated
with energy transitions, it seems unlikely that energy constraints will significantly change
those structures, if ever, until late in the 21st century. Amtrak as a public amenity persists
as the guardian (for better or worse) of long-distance, nationally-interconnected locomobility
for the general public.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This project has looked at potential futures for long-distance intercity rail transportation in
the United States in the context of possible energy resource constraints. Futures are images
of what could be based on the perspective of the imaginers. As with science fiction, those
images often tell us more about present issues and aspirations than future probabilities. But
exploration of futures serves a utilitarian purpose as a structured means for revealing biases
and for considering the implications and limitations of present policy choices.
From a pro-rail perspective, the summative conclusion of these three papers is that the actor-
network durability of passenger rail in the US should cause it to persist (chapter 3), and the
immediate capability for electrification gives locomobility a qualitative energy advantage over
aeromobility and automobility that should place locomobility in an advantageous position
during the transition to electrified renewables (chapter 4).
From an anti-rail perspective, the passenger train is a archaic transport mode that persists
primarily as a legacy of past spatial choices and as a translation by public and private
actor-networks for aesthetic or remunerative benefit (chapter 3), and has no real energy
argument to justify public subsidy (chapter 4). The suitability of rail is more for freight
than people, and this inherent quality will likely decrease the importance of locomobility as
energy transitions and technology improvements place a premium on the functional efficiency
of individualized transport (chapter 5).
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Despite the contradiction of these divergent aspirations, as well as the dissimilarity of the
three epistemic approaches taken in this project, all converge on a central conclusion: if
energy constraints occur during and/or after the sociotechnical transition to energy renewa-
bility, the volume and spatial dispersion of future long-distance locomobility in the US will
likely be contingent on the capability of different transportation modes to make that transi-
tion.
Politically and materially, the cornucopian persistence of automobility and aeromobility
would likely leave little demand for locomobility outside of recreational uses and local/regional
systems that facilitate capitalist exploitation of concentrated urban spaces. This is reflected
in network durability from an ANT-perspective (chapter 3) as well as persistent automobility
and aeromobility in the model outputs for high-energy and/or high-renewability scenarios
(chapter 5). The absence of significant energy constraints would make any quantitative or
qualitative energy advantages to rail (chapter 4) irrelevant.
In contrast, catastrophist material and energetic constraints would destabilize the material,
social and political actor-networks of automobility and aeromobility leaving them vulnera-
ble to retranslation (chapter 3). But despite the nostalgic discourses of rail advocates, the
material dependency of locomobility on industrial modernity (chapter 4) leaves it equally
vulnerable to retranslation as the parallel and largely-discursive arguments of energetic ef-
ficiency supporting survival strategies run up against insurmountable material realities - as
demonstrated in the neomedieval model scenario (chapter 5). This would likely leave the
US incapable of operating and maintaining (much less expanding) a robust passenger rail
system as the downfall of modernity and mass capitalist industrialization take with it the
iconic transportation mode associated with modernity’s advent.
Between the cornucopian and catastrophist extremes lies a potentially unstable middle
ground where policy decisions resulting in incremental changes in network structure could
dramatically change the scope and volume of the long-distance rail network in the United
States. Discursive translation of rail energy efficiency in the context of individualistic urban-
ism, debt-induced residential density increases, age-induced recreational demands, strategic
rail advocacy, and some continued measure of material prosperity could result in a larger
network.
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Discursive translation of capitalist crisis and strategic translation of electoral disempower-
ment into neoliberal austerity could result in devolution of the national system to regional
corridors. However, the extensive, long-term, anticipatory public investment that would
be needed to form a more robust national passenger rail network seems unlikely given the
network durability associated with a deep embedding of automobility and aeromobility in
economic, political and spatial structures in the United States.
There are a limited number of model scenarios where material constraints and transitional
failure yield a return to dominance of long-distance passenger rail. Given their contingency
on spatially-disruptive collapses of automobility and aeromobility, the desirability of these
scenarios is debatable. The absence of probabilities for model inputs makes it impossible to
state whether infrequency should also be interpreted as improbability.
This project has made a structuralist assumption that political choices are largely influenced
by material and economic forces, rather than the other way around. In the economic and
energetic graphs explaining the calculations of model coefficients (chapter 5), the strong
correlations give little evidence of any significant stochasticity that might be expected from
political processes that are often dismissed as irrational or dysfunctional. Indeed, the choices
seem to be remarkably rational, although whether those choices are good is a value judgment
that is contingent on the values of the reader.
Accordingly, this rationality leaves limited agency for making policy choices that would
upset the existing energy and transportation actor-networks. The discursive translation of
the 9/11 attacks into trillion-dollar oil wars of choice demonstrated the continued capacity
of the US to act in response to acute perceived external threats. But those actions were
made from a position of energetic strength as part of a strategy to preserve that energetic
strength. Given the likely long pace of the transition to the post-fossil epoch (Smil 2010),
future energetic threats to national prosperity and security would be internal and chronic.
Jeffersonian distrust of central power is encoded in our foundational documents and the
associated political institutions. Centrally-coordinated responses to climate and energetic
challenges would require a radical rewriting or reinterpretation of those documents (such
as that advocated by Orr 2009, 13-48). Accordingly, it is unclear whether future chronic
energetic challenges will be met with policy responses of anarchy, totalitarianism or some
curious hybrid of the two. The Keynsian / Hamiltonian response to the Great Depression
might be an analogy from history, although that too was made from a position of energetic
strength and the conclusion in global war makes this less attractive as an aspiration for
addressing future energy transitions.
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Therefore, policy suggestions resulting from this research are limited. Certainly, policy
initiatives such as those advocated by Perl (2002) and Gilbert and Perl (2010) would result
in a more robust US passenger rail system. But the conclusions of Chapter 4 call into
question the universal energy intensity advantage of locomobility and, therefore, whether
enhanced long-distance locomobility would be the rational functionalist response to an energy
constrained future. And given the remarkable stability of the Amtrak Equilibrium over the
past 40 years (chapters 3 and 5), it seems likely that some significant exogenous shock (energy
or otherwise) will be needed to destabilize that equilibrium and precipitate a significant policy
retranslation one way or the other.
6.1 Possibilities for Future Research
During the construction of the systems dynamics simulation, consideration was given to
explicitly modeling the political processes elucidated in the ANT analysis of Amtrak. While
this approach was abandoned, this represents a novel mixed-method approach that might
be applicable to other, more-constrained domains.
The ANT analysis relied primarily on secondary sources. An more-constrained analysis
based on primary interviews might yield fruitful perspectives and subjectivities hidden by
the seeming desire of many rail writers to either attempt to remain apolitical or project
discursive objectivity. Likewise, an analysis of the current Amtrak political actor-network
with a more robust social-theory framework might be helpful.
The railfan community has been pivotal to the survival of Amtrak, but the sociology and
psychology of that community in the US seems to be largely unexamined in scholarly litera-
ture. This quality that, “There’s something about the train” has been punctualized in this
research as siderodromophilia. Further analysis of this phenomenon could involve technical
research, such as MRI of railfan brains, or qualitative research like ethnography. Likewise,
information about Amtrak ridership is limited and highly aggregated, so a detailed ethno-
graphic analysis of Amtrak riders might offer valuable and novel insights.
Likewise, the broader community of both amateur and professional railroaders holds attitudes
and engages in rituals that resemble religious behavior in a Weberian sense (Weber 1920
[1963]; Troeltsch 1912 [1992]). Deeper analysis of this community in the manner of what
Leonard (1987) did with jazz music might result in an interesting paper.
208
Both the quantitative modeling and the qualitative analysis of Amtrak might benefit by a
more-detailed mode shift model.
The network capacity model in the simulation is also crude. System capacity has been and
continues to be an area of significant engineering research (e.g. Landex et al. 2006; Vassallo,
and Fagan 2007; Cambridge Systematics 2008; Lai and Barkan 2009; Thompson 2010) and a
more detailed capacity model that also examines specific Cartesian geographies might have
both intellectual and practical value. Such a model could incorporate predictive land-use
modeling like SERGoM (Theobald 2005; United States Environmental Protection Agency
2009).
An interactive web version of the systems dynamics model might have popular appeal within
the railfan community.
The energy statistics for Amtrak are highly aggregated and a more detailed, contempo-
rary engineering analysis seems to be in order. However, such an analysis would require
the cooperation of Amtrak management and the threat of uncovering intentionally hidden
information on economically weak routes might be a disincentive to cooperation.
Probabilities could be added to the simulation parameter distributions using futures studies
methods like Delphi/expert surveys, workshops, and gaming. Such analysis would require
funding and would probably require further elaboration of the simulation model to make the
project appear more rigorous.
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